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Lecture notes in computer science

Secret Public Key Protocols Revisited

Hoon Wei Lim

Published Jan 1, 2009• 5 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-04904-0_33

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We revisit the problem of secret key agreement using interactive public communication for two parties and propose a new secret key agreement protocol. The protocol attains the secret key capacity for general observations and attains the second-order asymptotic term in the maximum length of a secret key for independent and identically distributed observations. In contrast to the previously suggested secret key agreement protocols, the proposed protocol uses interactive communication. In fact, the standard one-way communication protocol used prior to this paper fails to attain the asymptotic results above. Our converse proofs rely on a recently established upper bound for secret key lengths. Both our lower and upper bounds are derived in a single-shot setup and the asymptotic results are obtained as corollaries.
To ensure resistance to attacks with coercion to disclose a secret key by an active adversary, the protocol of deniable encryption includes a procedure for mutual authentication of the sender and receiver of a message with their long-term public keys, which is combined with a hidden exchange of single-use public keys used to generate a single-use shared key, on which the secret message is encrypted. Longterm public keys are used to generate a shared secret key, on which a fake message is encrypted. The produced intermediate ciphertexts are converted into a single ciphertext, which is computationally indistinguishable from the ciphertext obtained by probabilistic encryption of a fake message. This approach allows us to build an encryption protocol that is resistant to bi-sided attacks with coercion, since the disclosure of users' private keys gives access only to the fake message and cannot be used to prove the possibility of alternative decryption of the ciphertext transmitted over a public communication channel. The authentication of the single-use public keys is also used to implement protocols for secure encryption using short shared keys.