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Lecture notes in computer science

Towards Quantum Distance Bounding Protocols

Aysajan Abidin, Eduard Marin, Dave Singelée, Bart Preneel

Published Jan 1, 2017• 9 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-62024-4_11

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Distance-bounding (DB) protocols let a verifier upper-bound a prover's physical distance by timing rapid challenge-response exchanges. Quantum communication promises simpler DB protocols with stronger security guarantees, yet existing quantum distance-bounding (QDB) proposals are analysed in ad-hoc models and, to the best of our knowledge, lack a common game-based treatment of standard fraud attacks. We contribute (i) a reusable security framework for QDB that fixes system and timing assumptions, specifies a quantum-capable adversary model, formalises distance-, mafia-, and terrorist-fraud experiments, and includes a simple i.i.d. depolarizing noise model; and (ii) an application of this framework to a published QDB protocol. For this protocol we characterise the honest per-round acceptance probability under noise and lift it to the multi-round setting, yielding explicit completeness guarantees as a function of the number of fast rounds, the acceptance threshold, and the noise parameter. For active adversaries we bound the per-round success probability of distance-fraud attacks and analyse the best known mafia-fraud strategy, deriving corresponding multi-round soundness bounds. We also show that the protocol is inherently insecure against terrorist-fraud in our model. The framework cleanly separates protocol-independent definitions from protocol-specific analysis and can be used to evaluate existing and future QDB protocols on a common basis.

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We present a distance bounding (DB) protocol that employs quantum-bits (qubits) in the implementation of the rapid-bit exchange (a.k.a., challenge-response) phase, instead of classical bits. This is not the first attempt at using qubits in a DB protocol, as Abidin et al. proposed a way to implement DB protocols using qubits in RFIDSec 2016 [1]. We improve upon Abidin et al.'s protocol and make it resistant to photon number splitting attacks. In addition, our new protocol eliminates the need for communication from the prover to the verifier in the last authentication phase, which is necessary in the protocol by Abidin et al.

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Distance-bounding (DB) protocols let a verifier upper-bound a prover's physical distance by timing rapid challenge-response exchanges. Quantum communication promises simpler DB protocols with stronger security guarantees, yet existing quantum distance-bounding (QDB) proposals are analysed in ad-hoc models and, to the best of our knowledge, lack a common game-based treatment of standard fraud attacks. We contribute (i) a reusable security framework for QDB that fixes system and timing assumptions, specifies a quantum-capable adversary model, formalises distance-, mafia-, and terrorist-fraud experiments, and includes a simple i.i.d. depolarizing noise model; and (ii) an application of this framework to a published QDB protocol. For this protocol we characterise the honest per-round acceptance probability under noise and lift it to the multi-round setting, yielding explicit completeness guarantees as a function of the number of fast rounds, the acceptance threshold, and the noise parameter. For active adversaries we bound the per-round success probability of distance-fraud attacks and analyse the best known mafia-fraud strategy, deriving corresponding multi-round soundness bounds. We also show that the protocol is inherently insecure against terrorist-fraud in our model. The framework cleanly separates protocol-independent definitions from protocol-specific analysis and can be used to evaluate existing and future QDB protocols on a common basis.
We present a distance bounding (DB) protocol that employs quantum-bits (qubits) in the implementation of the rapid-bit exchange (a.k.a., challenge-response) phase, instead of classical bits. This is not the first attempt at using qubits in a DB protocol, as Abidin et al. proposed a way to implement DB protocols using qubits in RFIDSec 2016 [1]. We improve upon Abidin et al.'s protocol and make it resistant to photon number splitting attacks. In addition, our new protocol eliminates the need for communication from the prover to the verifier in the last authentication phase, which is necessary in the protocol by Abidin et al.