Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Bruno de Finetti and quantum mechanics

Sandy L. Zabell

Published Jan 1, 2009• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Related papers

Analogs of de Finetti's theorem and interpretative problems of quantum mechanics

R. L. Hudson

Foundations of Physics•Oct 1, 1981•32 citations

The World According to De Finetti

Joseph Berkovitz

Bruno de Finetti is one of the founding fathers of the subjectivist school of probability, where probabilities are interpreted as rational degrees of belief. His work on the relation between the theorems of probability and rationality is among the corner stones of modern subjective probability theory. De Finetti maintained that rationality requires that degrees of belief be coherent, and he argued that the whole of probability theory could be derived from these coherence conditions. De Finetti’s interpretation of probability has been highly influential in science. This paper focuses on the application of this interpretation to quantum mechanics. We argue that de Finetti held that the coherence conditions of degrees of belief in events depend on their verifiability. Accordingly, the standard coherence conditions of degrees of belief that are familiar from the literature on subjective probability only apply to degrees of belief in events which could (in principle) be jointly verified; and the coherence conditions of degrees of belief in events that cannot be jointly verified are weaker. While the most obvious explanation of de Finetti’s verificationism is the influence of positivism, we argue that it could be motivated by the radical subjectivist and instrumental nature of probability in his interpretation; for as it turns out, in this interpretation it is difficult to make sense of the idea of coherent degrees of belief in, and accordingly probabilities of unverifiable events. We then consider the application of this interpretation to quantum mechanics, concentrating on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment and Bell’s theorem.

•Sep 24, 2011•2 citations

The World According to de Finetti: On de Finetti’s Theory of Probability and Its Application to Quantum Mechanics

Joseph Berkovitz

The frontiers collection•Aug 13, 2011•8 citations

David Albert: On Quantum Mechanics (2013)

Harvard University Press eBooks•Oct 18, 2022•0 citations

Exchangeability and de Finetti’s theorem: from probabilities to quantum-mechanical states

Rüdiger Schack

This paper gives a simple introduction to the quantum mechanical concept of a probability operator valued measurement (POVM) and shows how it can be used to derive a quantum version of de Finetti’s representation theorem.

AIP conference proceedings•Jan 1, 2004•0 citations

Henri Poincare and the Quantum Theory

Russell K. McCormmach

Isis•Apr 1, 1967•26 citations
Bruno de Finetti is one of the founding fathers of the subjectivist school of probability, where probabilities are interpreted as rational degrees of belief. His work on the relation between the theorems of probability and rationality is among the corner stones of modern subjective probability theory. De Finetti maintained that rationality requires that degrees of belief be coherent, and he argued that the whole of probability theory could be derived from these coherence conditions. De Finetti’s interpretation of probability has been highly influential in science. This paper focuses on the application of this interpretation to quantum mechanics. We argue that de Finetti held that the coherence conditions of degrees of belief in events depend on their verifiability. Accordingly, the standard coherence conditions of degrees of belief that are familiar from the literature on subjective probability only apply to degrees of belief in events which could (in principle) be jointly verified; and the coherence conditions of degrees of belief in events that cannot be jointly verified are weaker. While the most obvious explanation of de Finetti’s verificationism is the influence of positivism, we argue that it could be motivated by the radical subjectivist and instrumental nature of probability in his interpretation; for as it turns out, in this interpretation it is difficult to make sense of the idea of coherent degrees of belief in, and accordingly probabilities of unverifiable events. We then consider the application of this interpretation to quantum mechanics, concentrating on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment and Bell’s theorem.