This paper investigates artificial noise injection into the temporal and spatial dimensions of a legitimate wireless communication system to secure its transmissions from potential eavesdropping. We consider a multiple-input single-output (MISO) orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) system in the presence of a single-antenna passive eavesdropper and derive both the secrecy rate and average secrecy rate of the legitimate system. It is assumed that the legitimate transmitter knows the full channel information of the legitimate transceivers but does not know the instantaneous channel state information of the passive eavesdropper. Closed-form expressions for the secrecy rate and average secrecy rate are derived for the asymptotic case with a large number of transmit antennas. We also investigate 1) the power allocation between the data and the AN; 2) the power allocation between the spatial and the temporal AN. Computer simulations are carried out to evaluate the performance of our proposed artificial noise scheme.
This paper investigates artificial noise injection into the temporal and spatial dimensions of a legitimate wireless communication system to secure its transmissions from potential eavesdropping. We consider a multiple-input single-output (MISO) orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) system in the presence of a single-antenna passive eavesdropper and derive both the secrecy rate and average secrecy rate of the legitimate system. It is assumed that the legitimate transmitter knows the full channel information of the legitimate transceivers but does not know the instantaneous channel state information of the passive eavesdropper. Closed-form expressions for the secrecy rate and average secrecy rate are derived for the asymptotic case with a large number of transmit antennas. We also investigate 1) the power allocation between the data and the AN; 2) the power allocation between the spatial and the temporal AN. Computer simulations are carried out to evaluate the performance of our proposed artificial noise scheme.
This paper investigates artificial noise (AN) injection along the temporal and spatial dimensions of a legitimate system to secure its transmissions from potential eavesdropping. In particular, we consider a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) system in the presence of a multiple-antenna passive eavesdropper and characterize both the secrecy rate and average secrecy rate of the legitimate system. We assume that the legitimate transmitter knows the full channel state information (CSI) of the links connecting it with its legitimate receiver but does not know the instantaneous CSI of the passive eavesdropper. Closed-form expressions for the secrecy rate and average secrecy rate are derived for the asymptotic case of a large number of transmit antennas. We compare the degrading effects of spatial and temporal AN on the eavesdropper's rate. We also investigate the power allocation between the data and the AN and the power allocation between the spatial and the temporal AN. An upper bound on the secrecy rate loss due to the presence of the eavesdropper is also derived, and computer simulations are carried out to demonstrate the performance of our proposed AN scheme.
We investigate the physical layer security of wireless single-input single-output orthogonal-division multiplexing (OFDM) when a transmitter, which we refer to as Alice, sends her information to a receiver, which we refer to as Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropping node, Eve. To prevent information leakage, Alice sends an artificial-noise (AN) signal superimposed over her information signal. We investigate the impact of the channel delay spread, OFDM cyclic prefix, information/AN power allocation, and information and AN precoders design on the achievable average secrecy rate. We consider the two cases of known and unknown channel state information (CSI) at Alice. Furthermore, we compare both cases of per-sub-channel processing and joint sub-channels processing at Eve's receiver. Our numerical results show the gains of AN injection in terms of average secrecy rate for different OFDM operating conditions. Moreover, based on our new insights, we demonstrate that the AN-aided scheme is effective and achieves almost the same average secrecy rate as the full-CSI case without the need for Eve's instantaneous CSI at Alice.
This paper investigates the power allocation problem for artificial noise (AN) secure precoding systems, and proposes closed-form solutions for maximizing the achievable secrecy rate. It is assumed that the transmitter knows the full channel information at the legitimate receiver, and knows only the statistics of the channel information at the eavesdropper. Lower bounds are derived for the secrecy rates in multiple-input single-output channels with single or multiple eavesdroppers and multiple-input multiple-output channels with multiple eavesdroppers. When the number of transmit antennas is sufficiently large, the bounds are tight, and closed-form solutions can be derived from these bounds. The analytical results suggest simple and yet informative solutions as follows: Let the numbers of receive antennas at the legitimate receiver and at the eavesdropper beNrandNr,e, respectively. The system should distributeNr,e/(Nr+Nr,e)of the power to AN in the high SNR regime, and distribute zero power to AN in the low SNR regime; the rate loss due to the eavesdropper is−Nrlog(Nr/(Nr+Nr,e))−Nr,elog(Nr,e/(Nr+Nr,e))bits/sec/Hz in the high SNR regime and nearly negligible in the low SNR regime. The derived results also show that equal power and water-filling power allocations lead to similar solutions and rate loss. Simulation results corroborate the theoretical results.
This paper studies a secure communication over multiple-input multiple-output multi-antenna eavesdropper (MIMOME) channels which consist of legitimate parities, namely a transmitter and receiver, equipped with multi-antennas and a passive eavesdropper with multi-antennas. For securing the communication between the legitimate parties, we consider an artificial noise (AN) scheme in which the legitimate transmitter sends its secret messages and AN signal together. Meanwhile, it is assumed that the legitimate receiver has a full-duplex capability which enables it to capture the secret message from the transmitter and simultaneously generate a jamming signal to strengthen security. While there have been studies on similar setups, most of them focus on the design of the jamming signal with the assumption of full channel-state information (CSI) and/or system parameter optimization based on numerical evaluations. On the contrary, in this work, we instead introduce a tight lower bound on an achievable ergodic secrecy rate as a versatile analytic tool and derive a closed-form expressions for the bound. To confirm the analytic results, we carry out numerical evaluations of the ergodic secrecy rate which are compared with the proposed lower bound.
Optimal power allocation for orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) wiretap channels with Gaussian channel inputs has already been studied in some previous works from an information theoretical viewpoint. However, these results are not sufficient for practical system designs. One reason is that discrete channel inputs, such as quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) signals, instead of Gaussian channel inputs, are deployed in current practical wireless systems to maintain moderate peak transmission power and receiver complexity. In this paper, we investigate the power allocation and artificial noise design for OFDM wiretap channels with discrete channel inputs. We first prove that the secrecy rate function for discrete channel inputs is nonconcave with respect to the transmission power. To resolve the corresponding nonconvex secrecy rate maximization problem, we develop a low-complexity power allocation algorithm, which yields a duality gap diminishing in the order of O(1/√N), where N is the number of subcarriers of OFDM. We then show that independent frequency-domain artificial noise cannot improve the secrecy rate of single-antenna wiretap channels. Towards this end, we propose a novel time-domain artificial noise design which exploits temporal degrees of freedom provided by the cyclic prefix of OFDM systems to jam the eavesdropper and boost the secrecy rate even with a single antenna at the transmitter. Numerical results are provided to illustrate the performance of the proposed design schemes.
This paper studies the design of artificial-noise-aided (AN-aided) secure transmission in slow-fading multiple-input–single-output (MISO) channels. We consider the scenario where a multiantenna transmitter sends messages to a single-antenna legitimate receiver in the presence of multiple noncolluding single-antenna eavesdroppers. It is assumed that the transmitter possesses instantaneous channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate channel but only the statistics of the eavesdropper's channels. Instead of adopting the well-known adaptive and nonadaptive transmission schemes, we consider the newly proposed semiadaptive scheme, in which the communication rate is fixed, and the secrecy rate is adaptively adjusted according to the legitimate channel's CSI. Compared with the adaptive scheme, a major advantage of fixing the communication rate is that the codebook can be fixed, and thus, the encoder and decoder designs are both simplified. We consider a generalized AN-aided beamforming structure, which allows arbitrary beamforming direction. Specifically, we focus on the problem of maximizing the secrecy throughput on the premise of reliable and secure transmission. By solving this problem, the optimal beamforming direction, power-allocation parameters, and secrecy rate are derived in closed form, and the optimal communication rate is obtained numerically. Finally, simulation results are presented to show the performance of the semiadaptive scheme.