Secure multi-party computation (MPC) has been a research focus of cryptography in resent studies.However, hiding the topology of the network in secure computation is a rather novel goal.Inspired by a seminal paper [1], we proposed a topology-hiding broadcast protocol based on NTRUEncrypt and secret sharing.The topology is concealed as long as any part of the network is corrupted.And we also illustrated the merits of our protocol by performance and security analysis.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) has been a research focus of cryptography in resent studies.However, hiding the topology of the network in secure computation is a rather novel goal.Inspired by a seminal paper [1], we proposed a topology-hiding broadcast protocol based on NTRUEncrypt and secret sharing.The topology is concealed as long as any part of the network is corrupted.And we also illustrated the merits of our protocol by performance and security analysis.
Secure Multi-Party Computation is a hot topic in recent years. However, though Secure Multi-Party Computation allows each participant to calculate without making their information known to other nodes, the underlying topology of their network is prone to exposure. Inspired by Tal Moran, Bo Mi et al. designed a broadcast protocol based on NTRUEcrypt, which realized topology-hiding but relying on a third party. In view of this shortcoming, we proposed a topology-hiding broadcast protocol based on Shamir's Secret Sharing scheme with self-adaptive paradigm. Security and performance analyses demonstrated that our scheme is unconditional secure and computationally light-weighted.
Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) is one of the foundational achievements of modern cryptog-raphy, allowing multiple, distrusting, parties to jointly compute a function of their inputs, while revealing nothing but the output of the function. Following the seminal works of Yao and Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson and Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson, the study of MPC has expanded to consider a wide variety of questions, including variants in the attack model, underlying assumptions, complexity and composability of the resulting protocols. One question that appears to have received very little attention, however, is that of MPC over an underlying communication network whose structure is, in itself, sensitive information. This question, in addition to being of pure theoretical interest, arises naturally in many contexts: designing privacy-preserving social-networks, private peer-to-peer computations, vehicle-to-vehicle networks and the “in-ternet of things ” are some of the examples. In this paper, we initiate the study of “topology-hiding computation ” in the computational setting. We give formal definitions in both simulation-based and indistinguishability-based flavors. We show that, even for fail-stop adversaries, there are some strong impossibility results. Despite this, we show that protocols for topology-hiding computation can be constructed in the semi-honest and fail-stop models, if we somewhat restrict the set of nodes the adversary may corrupt.
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is perhaps the most popular paradigm in the area of cryptographic protocols. It allows several mutually untrustworthy parties to jointly compute a function of their private inputs, without revealing to each other information about those inputs. In the case of unconditional (information-theoretic) security, protocols are known which tolerate a dishonest minority of players, who may coordinate their attack and deviate arbitrarily from the protocol specification. It is typically assumed in these results that parties are connected pairwise by authenticated, private channels, and that in addition they have access to a “broadcast ” channel. Broadcast allows one party to send a consistent message to all other parties, guaranteeing consistency even if the broadcaster is corrupted. Because broadcast cannot be simulated on the point-to-point network when more than a third of the parties are corrupt, it is impossible to construct general MPC protocols in this setting without using a broadcast channel (or some equivalent addition to the model). A great deal of research has focused on increasing the efficiency of MPC, primarily in terms of round complexity and communication complexity. In this work we propose a refinement of the round complexity which we term broadcast complexity. We view the broadcast channel as an expensive resource
In this dissertation, we consider the design of broadcast and secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols in the presence of adversarial faults. Secure multi-party computation is the most generic problem in fault-tolerant distributed computing. In principle, a multi-party computation protocol can be used to solve any distributed cryptographic problem. Informally, the problem of multi-party computation is the following: suppose we have n parties P1, P2,..., Pn where each party Pi has a private input xi. Together, the parties want to compute a function of their inputs (y1, y2,...,yn) = f(x1, x2,...,xn). However, some parties can be corrupted and do not execute a prescribed protocol faithfully. Even worse, they may be controlled by an adversary and attack the protocol in a coordinated manner. Despite the presence of such an adversary, a secure MPC protocol should ensure that each (corrupted) party Pi learn only its output yi but nothing more. Broadcast in the presence of adversarial faults is one of the simplest special cases of multi-party computation and important component of larger protocols. In short, broadcast allows a party to send the same message to all parties, and all
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a central problem in cryptography. Unfortunately, it is well known that MPC is possible if and only if the underlying communication network has very large connectivity—specifically, (t), wheretis the number of potential corruptions in the network. This impossibility result renders existing MPC results far less applicable in practice, since most deployed networks have in fact a very small degree. In this paper, we show how to circumvent this impossibility result and achieve meaningful security guarantees for graphs with small degree (such as expander graphs and several other topologies). In fact, the notion we introduce, which we call almost-everywhere MPC, building on the notion of almost-everywhere agreement due to Dwork, Peleg, Pippenger and Upfal, allows the degree of the network to be much smaller than the total number of allowed corruptions. In essence, our definition allows the adversary to implicitly wiretap some of the good nodes by corrupting sufficiently many nodes in the “neighborhood ” of those nodes. We show protocols that satisfy our new definition, retaining both correctness and privacy for most nodes despite small connectivity, no matter how the adversary chooses his corruptions. Instrumental in our constructions is a new model and protocol for the secure message transmission (SMT) problem, which we call SMT by public discussion, and which we use for the establishment of pairwise secure channels in limited connectivity networks. Key words: Secure multi-party computation, almost-everywhere agreement, secure message transmission, expander graphs, bounded-degree networks. 1
Most proposed protocols for multi-party computation are designed to be secure either against information-theoretic or against computational adversaries.Each setting has its known advantages and disadvantages.In the computational setting we can achieve nonrobust MPC for up to t < n corrupted parties, but relying on unproven intractability assumptions.In the information-theoretic setting we do not have any unproven assumptions, but only t < n/2 corrupted parties can be tolerated.In [Cha89] Chaum sketches a hybrid protocol that brings together the best of both worlds: Information-theoretic security with abort (i.e.privacy and correctness, but no fairness or robustness) is achieved for t < n/2 corrupted parties.Beyond this threshold, for t < n corrupted parties, the protocol achieves computational security with abort.In this work, we first formalize the protocol idea described in [Cha89] and prove its security.In a second step, we extend the protocol to provide fairness and robustness.Whereas fairness comes "for free", robustness requires a trade-off similar to the one in [IKLP06].Then, we describe a construction for realizing the protocol in the universallycomposable setting as proposed in [Can01].For his protocol, Chaum assumed that a broadcast channel is given.In the last part of this work we discuss the implications of dropping this assumption, and obtain an interesting new result: It is possible to achieve the same bounds as in [Cha89], extended with fairness, without a broadcast channel.