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Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum

Physical Reality, Theoretical Physics, and Mathematics—15 Years Later

Piret Kuusk

Published Nov 15, 2016• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Physicists usually admit a rather naive concept of physical reality: it is the object they are investigating using experiments understood as actions in the real world.in theoretical physics, the object of investigation is not the real world itself but its mathematical description which is considered as describing physical reality as exactly as possible.i present arguments from philosophy of science and from recent work in the theory of gravitational physics which indicate a possibility to defend also antirealistic views, and clarify in which sense both standpoints can be viable.

DOI
10.11590/abhps.2016.2.05

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Physicists usually admit a rather naive concept of physical reality: it is the object they are investigating using experiments understood as actions in the real world.in theoretical physics, the object of investigation is not the real world itself but its mathematical description which is considered as describing physical reality as exactly as possible.i present arguments from philosophy of science and from recent work in the theory of gravitational physics which indicate a possibility to defend also antirealistic views, and clarify in which sense both standpoints can be viable.
Both science and philosophy have been characterized as seeking to understand the nature of reality. They are sometimes even pitted against each other, suggesting that the success of science undermines the relevance of philosophy. But attending to the sort of understanding or explanation being sought offers a different picture: contemporary physics as practiced sometimes fails to provide a clear physical account of the world. This lies at the root of the dissatisfaction with standard quantum theory expressed by Einstein, Schrödinger, and John Bell. As an example, close consideration of Schrödinger's famous cat example suggests that physicists often have missed his point. What a philosophical disposition can contribute is not alternative physics, but rather the sort of careful attention to argument needed to extract a physical picture from a mathematical formalism.
I am very grateful to the Master and Fellows of Trinity College for inviting me to give the Tarner Lectures. What I want to do in this book, stated boldly and baldly, is to consider the relevance of developments in modern theoretical physics to metaphysical questions about the ultimate nature of reality. By metaphysical questions I mean the very general sorts of questions that arise out of a critical examination of the principles, concepts and fundamental presuppositions that lie behind modern physics. How should we interpret the claims that physicists seem to be making about the world? Are they intended to be understood as literally true, for example, and exactly what are those claims, given that the pages of theoretical physics monographs are largely filled with abstract mathematical formalism? In the first chapter, I shall be looking at a range of philosophical points of view in the framework of which such questions can be addressed, and attempt the difficult task of adjudicating between the different approaches. At the end of the day I shall be arguing for a pretty straightforward metaphysical realism, that the external world exists independently of our knowledge of it. In the second chapter I shall look at arguments from various branches of modern physics that are sometimes claimed to bring in an essential role for subjectivity in physics, bringing the observer into a central role, creating his own reality.
Despite its power as the conceptual basis for a huge range of physical phenomena in atomic and subatomic physics, quantum mechanics still suffers from a lack of clarity regarding the physical meaning of its fundamental theoretical concepts, such as those of quantum state and of quantum theoretical quantities or variables , dealt with by the known mathematical-theoretical rules. These concepts have generally been considered as not giving a direct description of physical systems, for they do not correspond to what is usually understood by `physical states' or `physical properties', notably characterized by definite numerical values such as those obtained from measurement. The situation has been tentatively expressed in terms of various `interpretations', conceived not only with regard to the physical meanings of mathematical quantities, but also in connection with philosophical statements about `physical reality'. The question of whether or not quantum theoretical quantities describe definite physical systems existing in nature has therefore generally been considered as beyond the possibilities of physics, because of the definitions that are commonly taken for `physical state' and `physical quantity'. We sketch the main ideas on this problem and propose a possible way out of the puzzle, in terms of an extension of the meaning given to the concepts of the physical state and physical quantity of a system, which would allow one, without any theoretical change in quantum mechanics, to speak consistently of real quantum systems as having definite physical properties .
Humans live in many different worlds, each of which has its own representation in mind space. The world of the scientist will be called the physical realms. The laws of physics are an integral part of the real world, and humans acquire a natural understanding of these laws without regard to any mathematical formulation. While the experimental physicist studies the behavior of the real world, the theoretical physicist develops and studies its representation in the mathematical world (i.e., mind space). It is not necessary to know the mathematical equations to be able to carry out a physical investigation. This can be performed through observation and recording of the data numerically, and using the processes of interpolation and extrapolation. Practicing physicists usually find that they must adopt the roles of both the theoretical as well as the experimental physicist to achieve the aims of an experiment. Observers play a vital role in physics. They become important when their state of motion changes, or when their presence affects the results of the experiment. The observer can be either animate or inanimate. Unlike inanimate observers, animate observers have access to mind space, which allows them to make decisions from collected information.
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During the past two or three centuries western philosophy and science have confirmed each other in their ontological attitude towards external reality. The particular opinion that physical objects have an existence completely independent of observation was established as the necessary basis for all scientific investigation. The discovery in quantum physics that the phenomena ultimately constituting the stability of the material world cannot be separated from the instruments of observation was necessarily felt disastrous to the scientific world-picture, and many philosophers and scientists, including celebrated physicists, are still trying by all means to save ontology in quantum physics. The motive power behind this activity is the belief that the objectivity of science can be maintained only if the elementary particles of matter can be objectified in the usual way. The present chapter deals with the fundamental conditions in quantum physics which entail a complete breakdown of the conceptual frame of classical mechanics