Concurrent signatures allow two entities to generate two signatures in such a way that both signatures are ambiguous till some information is revealed by one of the parties. This kind of signature is useful in auction protocols and in a wide range of scenarios in which involving participants are mutually distrustful. In this study, to have quantum‐attack‐resistant concurrent signatures as recommended by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NISTIR 8105), the first concurrent signature scheme based on coding theory is proposed. Then, its security is proved under Goppa Parameterized Bounded Decoding and the Goppa Code Distinguishing assumptions in the random oracle model. In addition, performance evaluation shows that the proposal is approximately as efficient as Dallot scheme. The authors should highlight that their proposal can be a post‐quantum candidate for fair exchange of signatures without a trusted third party in an efficient way (without a high degree of interactions).
Concurrent signatures allow two entities to generate two signatures in such a way that both signatures are ambiguous till some information is revealed by one of the parties. This kind of signature is useful in auction protocols and in a wide range of scenarios in which involving participants are mutually distrustful. In this study, to have quantum‐attack‐resistant concurrent signatures as recommended by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NISTIR 8105), the first concurrent signature scheme based on coding theory is proposed. Then, its security is proved under Goppa Parameterized Bounded Decoding and the Goppa Code Distinguishing assumptions in the random oracle model. In addition, performance evaluation shows that the proposal is approximately as efficient as Dallot scheme. The authors should highlight that their proposal can be a post‐quantum candidate for fair exchange of signatures without a trusted third party in an efficient way (without a high degree of interactions).
We present a lattice-based concurrent signature construction as a post-quantum solution to fair exchange of digital signatures. Our construction has the following two desirable features: (1) it is adaptively secure in the standard model, that is, its security does not rely on the random oracle assumption, and (2) it achieves anonymity, a stronger security notion than ambiguity. That is, before the release of the keystone, from a third party's point of view, a signature in our construction could be generated by anyone, not just limited to two parties involved in the exchange. We obtain these results by applying a novel idea to the lattice-based signatures due to Boyen.
When using digital signatures, we need to deal with the problem of fairness of information exchange. To solve this problem, Chen, etc. introduced a new conception which is named concurrent signatures in Eurocrypt'04. Using concurrent signatures scheme, two entities in the scheme can generate two ambiguous signatures until one of the entities releases additional information which is called keystone. After the keystone is released, the two ambiguous signatures will be bound to their real signers at the same time. In order to provide a method to solve the fairness problem of quantum digital signatures, we propose a new quantum concurrent signature scheme. The scheme we proposed does not use a trusted third party in a quantum computing environment, and has such advantages as no need to conduct complex quantum operations and easy to implement by a quantum circuit. Quantum concurrent signature improves the theory of quantum cryptography, and it also provides broad prospects for the specific applications of quantum cryptography.
Fair exchange is essential in E-commerce, and concurrent signature realizes the fair exchange of digital signatures with removing the requirement of a trusted third party. Multi-party concurrent signature is an extension to the multi-user scenario. The security of existing multi-party concurrent signatures is mostly based on traditional hard problems that could be solved efficiently with quantum algorithms in a post-quantum world. Meanwhile, the lattice-based cryptography is considered to be resistant to quantum attack. Wang et al. proposed a lattice-based multi-party concurrent signature. We give the analysis of their proposed signature scheme and find that it is not secure since an inside adversary can forge the signature. Moreover, the initial signer can produce any signatures, instead of a signature on the original messages, if he is malicious.
Abstract Quantum computing poses fascinating challenges for current cryptography, threatening the security of many schemes and protocols widely used today. To adapt to this reality, the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) is currently running a standardization process in search of post‐quantum (classical, yet resistant to quantum attacks ) cryptographic tools, focusing on signature schemes and key encapsulation mechanisms. Many of the competing proposals also include designs for two‐party key exchange, which can be combined in different ways to fit scenarios involving parties, that is, yielding group key exchange protocols. However, very few implementations of such group protocols are available to practitioners, which face a non‐trivial challenge when deciding how to implement a protocol for establishing secure group sessions in this new post‐quantum scenario. With this in mind, the authors report on the implementation of a secure post‐quantum group key exchange protocol in the so‐called Quantum Random Oracle Model . The protocol decided to implement is based on a KEM called Kyber , which is one of the finalists of the NIST competition. Not only this group construction is the only one available in the literature using a NIST finalist, but also, among all post‐quantum designs the authors are aware of, it uses this strongest security model (as, e.g. in other proposals, the adversarial interaction with the hash functions of the system is assumed to be exclusively classical). Furthermore, experimental evidence is provided supporting this choice in terms of performance, even if the number of involved entities is large (up to 2000). All data and code are publicly available.
By introducing signcryption technology into concurrent signature,a signcryption-based concurrent signature scheme was presented,which was proven to have the existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen messages attacks under the random oracle model,Based on this scheme,a fair exchange protocol was proposed,which could be used to exchange digital goods.This protocol did not need secure communications channel,in which two parties generate sym-metrical ambiguous signatures and individual keystones were released by themselves,which ensured the properties of confidentiality,ambiguousness and fairness,which made our protocol could be used in e-commerce payment,e-contract signing,mail authentication,etc.
Concurrent signatures scheme is an effective way to solve the problem of fair exchange without the help of any trusted third party. Until now, all concurrent signatures are based on traditional cryptosystems, but the emergence of quantum computing poses a severe threat to the security of classic public–key cryptosystems. More and more attentions are being paid to lattice–based cryptosystems, which is one of the candidate cryptosystems against the attacks from quantum computing. In this paper, we present a new formal model of multi–party concurrent signatures scheme and a lattice–based multi–party concurrent signatures scheme. The scheme has comparative advantages in both efficiency and security over the existing concurrent signatures schemes based on traditional cryptosystem. In particular, our scheme is constructed based on constant–size ring signatures, and thus we have solved the open problem: how to construct a multi–party concurrent signatures scheme based on constant–size ring signatures, which was proposed by Tonien et al. (2006).