Abstract. How to define the security of undeniable signature schemes is a challenging task. This paper presents two security definitions of undeniable signature schemes which are more useful or natural than the existing definition. It then proves their equivalence. We first define the UC-security, where UC means universal composability. We next show that there exists a UC-secure undeniable signature scheme which does not satisfy the standard definition of security that has been believed to be adequate so far. More precisely, it does not satisfy the invisibility defined by [10]. We then show a more adequate definition of invisibility which captures a wider class of (naturally secure) undeniable signature schemes. We finally prove that the UC-security against non-adaptive adversaries is equivalent to this definition of invisibility and the strong unforgeability in FZK-hybrid model, where FZK is the ideal ZK functionality. Our result of equivalence implies that all the known proven secure undeniable signature schemes (including Chaum’s scheme) are UC-secure if the confirmation/disavowal protocols are both UC zero-knowledge.
Making use of the idea of convertible digital signature, this paper proposes a new fair electronic payment scheme based on a new interactive verification protocol that is proposed in the paper too. The security of the scheme is based on the hard question of discrete logarithm. The scheme makes both sides in equal positions during the course of electronic transaction. And then, the fairness of electronic transaction is achieved. A trusted third party (TTP) is involved in the scheme to guarantee the fairness of the scheme for both sides. However, only during the course of registration and dispute resolution will TTP be needed. TTP is not needed during the normal payment stage. That is to say, it does not affect efficiency of payment to involving TTP. So the scheme is a fair electronic payment scheme in optimistic sense.