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Scalable Attribute-Based Encryption Under the Strictly Weaker Assumption Family.

Yuqiao Deng, Ge Song

Published Jan 1, 2016• 0 citations
OpenAlex

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Cloud computing offers abundant computing resources and scalable storage, but data leakage in the cloud storage environment is a common and critical concern due to inadequate protection measures. Revocable-attribute-based encryption (RABE) is introduced as an advanced form of identity-based encryption (IBE), which encrypts sensitive data while providing fine-grained access control and an effective user revocation mechanism. However, most existing RABE schemes are not resistant to quantum attacks and are limited in their application scenarios due to the revocation model. In this paper, we propose a RABE scheme constructed from lattices. Our scheme has several advantages, including a near-zero periodic workload for the key generation center (KGC), ensuring scalability as the number of users increases. Additionally, the encryptor is relieved from managing a revocation list. Moreover, our scheme guarantees the confidentiality and privacy of other ciphertexts even if the decryption key for a specific period is compromised. We validated the correctness of our scheme and demonstrated its security under the assumption of learning with errors (LWE), which is widely believed to be resistant to quantum attacks. Finally, we provide an application example of our RABE scheme in the electronic healthcare scenario.
In a selective opening (SO) attack an adversary breaks into a subset of honestly created ciphertexts and tries to learn information on the plaintexts of some untouched (but potentially related) ciphertexts. Contrary to intuition, standard security notions do not always imply security against this type of adver-sary, making SO security an important standalone goal. In this paper we study receiver security, where the attacker is allowed to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts. First we study the relation between two existing security definitions, one based on simulation and the other based on indistinguishability, and show that the former is strictly stronger. We continue with feasibility results for both notions which we show can be achieved from (variants of) non-committing encryption schemes. In particular, we show that indistinguishability-based SO security can be achieved from a tweaked variant of non-committing encryption which, in turn, can be instantiated from a variety of basic, well-established, assumptions. We conclude our study by showing that SO security is however strictly weaker than all variants of non-committing encryption that we consider, leaving potentially more efficient constructions as an interesting open problem.
We show that the Evasive Inner Product Functional Encryption assumption introduced by Hsieh, Lin and Luo (Eurocrypt 2024) is false in its full generality. Our counterexample adds to a long sequence of works that have attacked different variants of Evasive LWE, taking down another instance that has been considered “public coin” (and hence safe) in the literature. Our attack extends the counterexample against pseudorandom functional encryption (PRFE), developed by Agrawal, Modi, Yadav and Yamada (TCC 2025) to encompass the notion of Evasive Inner Product Functional Encryption (evIPFE) proposed by Hsieh, Lin and Luo (Eurocrypt 2024). The original attack relied crucially on the underlying functional encryption scheme being powerful enough to compute pseudorandom functions; our attack shows, perhaps surprisingly, that the much weaker “evasive” inner product functionality suffices to mount the attack. We interpret our attack as showing that even the slightest power given to the adversary in choosing unrestricted private coins in the evasive LWE family of assumptions, renders it insecure.