Abstract A security evaluation against the finite-key-size effect was performed for a commercial plug-and-play quantum key distribution (QKD) system. We demonstrate the ability of an eavesdropper to force the system to distill key from a smaller length of sifted-key. We also derive a key-rate equation that is specific for this system. This equation provides bounds above the upper bound of secure key under finite-key-size analysis. From this equation and our experimental data, we show that the keys that have been distilled from the smaller sifted-key size fall above our bound. Thus, their security is not covered by finite-key-size analysis. Experimentally, we could consistently force the system to generate the key outside of the bound. We also test manufacturer’s software update. Although all the keys after the patch fall under our bound, their security cannot be guaranteed under this analysis. Our methodology can be used for security certification and standardization of QKD systems.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) guarantees information-theoretic security by the laws of physics, but deployment at scale requires compact, manufacturable photonic terminals. Continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD) is well suited for this transition through telecom-compatible, room-temperature coherent detection. However, unifying full on-chip core terminal integration, room-temperature operation, high loss tolerance, and composable end-to-end security in long-distance QKD remains a key bottleneck. Here we report a fully integrated CV-QKD platform in which two hybrid III--V/Si
3N
4 integrated lasers, a silicon transmitter, and a silicon coherent receiver implement the core terminal functions, operating with a local local oscillator (LLO) over fibre links of 25--150 km. A Bayesian machine-learning algorithm maintains robust phase lock throughout the long records required for composable security, consistently outperforming the conventional unscented Kalman filter, while rate-matched multidimensional reconciliation approaches the Shannon limit. The system certifies a composable finite-size secret-key rate of 29.3 kbps at 100 km from a 140-billion-symbol block, with 12.9 kbps at 125 km under finite-size analysis and 9.17 kbps at 150 km under asymptotic analysis. By establishing the longest finite-size and asymptotic reaches and the highest secret-key rate per symbol reported for integrated CV-QKD, this work advances the development of practical chip-based quantum networks.
The decoy state quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is proven to be an effective strategy against the photon number splitting attack. It was shown that the 1-decoy state protocol, easier to implement in the practical QKD system, outperforms the 2-decoy state protocol for block sizes of up to 108 bits. How intensity fluctuations influence the performance of the 1-decoy state protocol with finite resources remains a pending issue. In this paper, we present a finite-key analysis of the 1-decoy state protocol with intensity fluctuations and obtain the secret key rate formula about intensity fluctuations. Our numerical simulation results show that the stronger the intensity fluctuations, the lower the secret key rate for a small data block size of a few bits. Our research can provide theoretical implications for the selection of data size in the QKD system with intensity fluctuations.