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The Journal of Philosophy

The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism, and the Quantum Theory by Arthur Fine

R. I. G. Hughes

Published Jan 1, 1991• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.5840/jphil199188560

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Arthur Fine 1986 Chicago: University of Chicago Press xi + 186 pp price £21.25 ISBN 0 226 24946 8 The Shaky Game concentrates on Einstein's view of quantum mechanics, largely the matter of indeterminacy. Although the author wants to distance himself from recent unnamed French hermeneuts and exegetes, we see here precisely the shaky game identified by Lucien Febvre in 1928 – one where a commentator seeks to 'engender concepts from disincarnated minds which live their lives beyond time and space'.

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The primary title of this essay is derived from Arthur Fine's recent book, The Shaky Game (1986), which is a rephrasing of “risky game”, a term Einstein applied to the defenders of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, claiming that “‘most of them simply do not see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality‘” (Fine 1986, 2). Just as Einstein's term indicates his disagreement with this standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, Fine's term is being used to express disapproval of his interpretation of the philosophy of physics of Einstein and Bohr. The subtitle forecasts my evaluation of Fine's attempt in NOA (the “Natural Ontological Attitude”) to provide a satisfactory ontological basis of scientific inquiry.

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The Natural Ontological Attitude from a Physicist's Perspective: Towards Quantum Realism

Daniel James Robertson

The debate between Arthur Fine and Alan Musgrave is well known amongst those involved in the scientific realism debate and centres upon two papers that are quite often found together in philosophy of science anthologies. Reading them like this gives the very strong impression the Musgrave is the victor which is the commonly held view. In this thesis, I wish to overturn this view by placing Fine's paper in context, namely as part of a larger work on the history and philosophy of quantum physics. Fine's book, The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism and Quantum Theory, gives us good reason to believe that quantum physics significantly undermines the whole scientific realism debate, and as such, has strongly influenced Fine's development of the Natural Ontological Attitude, which is as Fine believes a middle ground between realism and anti-realism. The present thesis evaluates the Natural Ontological Attitude from a physicist's perspective and defends Fine against Musgrave's reply to the extent that it demonstrates that Musgrave would do well to read Fine's paper in context. That said, just as Fine in his youth hoped that a quantum realist position will one day be found, so I also possess this aspiration; and so, despite my concluding that Fine is justified in holding to NOA, I argue furthermore that NOA is but a precursor to a potential quantum structural realist position. After showing that structural realism is worthy of consideration by using it to counter Fine's objections to scientific realism, I analyse the results of quantum physics in an attempt to understand what it can tell us about reality in the quantum realm. Eliminativist Ontic Structural Realism holds great promise as a quantum realism contender, and as such, it inspired the questions regarding individuality and reality that are discussed in the final main chapter. I thus resuscitate hope that the cause of the quantum realist is not yet lost.

•Jan 1, 2011•1 citation
Arthur Fine 1986 Chicago: University of Chicago Press xi + 186 pp price £21.25 ISBN 0 226 24946 8 The Shaky Game concentrates on Einstein's view of quantum mechanics, largely the matter of indeterminacy. Although the author wants to distance himself from recent unnamed French hermeneuts and exegetes, we see here precisely the shaky game identified by Lucien Febvre in 1928 – one where a commentator seeks to 'engender concepts from disincarnated minds which live their lives beyond time and space'.
The primary title of this essay is derived from Arthur Fine's recent book, The Shaky Game (1986), which is a rephrasing of “risky game”, a term Einstein applied to the defenders of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, claiming that “‘most of them simply do not see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality‘” (Fine 1986, 2). Just as Einstein's term indicates his disagreement with this standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, Fine's term is being used to express disapproval of his interpretation of the philosophy of physics of Einstein and Bohr. The subtitle forecasts my evaluation of Fine's attempt in NOA (the “Natural Ontological Attitude”) to provide a satisfactory ontological basis of scientific inquiry.
The debate between Arthur Fine and Alan Musgrave is well known amongst those involved in the scientific realism debate and centres upon two papers that are quite often found together in philosophy of science anthologies. Reading them like this gives the very strong impression the Musgrave is the victor which is the commonly held view. In this thesis, I wish to overturn this view by placing Fine's paper in context, namely as part of a larger work on the history and philosophy of quantum physics. Fine's book, The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism and Quantum Theory, gives us good reason to believe that quantum physics significantly undermines the whole scientific realism debate, and as such, has strongly influenced Fine's development of the Natural Ontological Attitude, which is as Fine believes a middle ground between realism and anti-realism. The present thesis evaluates the Natural Ontological Attitude from a physicist's perspective and defends Fine against Musgrave's reply to the extent that it demonstrates that Musgrave would do well to read Fine's paper in context. That said, just as Fine in his youth hoped that a quantum realist position will one day be found, so I also possess this aspiration; and so, despite my concluding that Fine is justified in holding to NOA, I argue furthermore that NOA is but a precursor to a potential quantum structural realist position. After showing that structural realism is worthy of consideration by using it to counter Fine's objections to scientific realism, I analyse the results of quantum physics in an attempt to understand what it can tell us about reality in the quantum realm. Eliminativist Ontic Structural Realism holds great promise as a quantum realism contender, and as such, it inspired the questions regarding individuality and reality that are discussed in the final main chapter. I thus resuscitate hope that the cause of the quantum realist is not yet lost.