Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

WORLD SCIENTIFIC (EUROPE) eBooks

Bohr’s Diaphragms

Tongdong Bai, John J. Stachel

Published Nov 14, 2016• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In his response to EPR, Bohr introduces several ideal experimental arrangements that often are not understood correctly, and his discussion about them is given a positivist reading. Our analysis demonstrates the difference between such areading and Bohr’s actual position, and also clarifies the meaning of several of Bohr’s key physical and philosophical ideas: The role of the quantum of action in the distinction between classical and quantum systems; The criterion of measurability for theoretically defined concepts; The freedom in placement of the “cut” between measuring instrument and measured system; The non-visualizability of the quantum formalism; and Bohr’s concepts of phenomenon and complementarity.

DOI
10.1142/9781786341419_0002

Related papers

On Bohr’s Epistemological Contribution to the Quantum-Classical Cut Problems

Manuel Bächtold

Although microscopic systems are described by means of quantum mechanics, the outcomes obtained when performing measurements on such systems “appear” to us as being “classical” (Giulini et al. 2003). This situation is puzzling. How does the classical appearance of these measurement outcomes emerge (problem A)? And why, after all, couldn’t we describe these measurement outcomes by means of quantummechanics (problem B)? Problem A can be tackled within the domain of physics. As a matter of fact, it has been partly solved by means of decoherence theory (Zurek 1981, 1982, 1991; Blanchard et al. 2000; Joos et al. 2003). Problem B falls under the competency of epistemology, as it deals with the respective role of classical physics and quantum mechanics. Concerning this topic of the quantum- classical cut, the contribution of Bohr and especially his thesis of the necessary use of classical concepts have been very influential during the twentieth century. Many scholars in the past have examined Bohr’s writings concerning this thesis (Folse 1985; Honner 1987; Murdoch 1987; Faye 1991; Chevalley 1991; Scheibe 1993). Recently, this thesis has been discussed in relation to decoherence theory. More precisely, Camilleri and Schlosshauer (2015) asked if Bohr’s thesis is challenged by decoherence theory. Their inquiry leads them to conclude that this is not the case. In other words, Bohr’s viewis still defendable. This chapter aims at showing that Bohr’s view is not only defendable but can throw light on the problems associated with the quantum- classical cut. First, I will recall that Bohr’s way of dealing with this cut is not ontological but epistemological. I will then put forward four conceptual distinctions and argue that those are essential to understand and discuss Bohr’s thesis of the necessary use of classical concepts. Finally, on the basis of this clarification, the relation between Bohr’s thesis and decoherence theory will be discussed.

Bloomsbury Academic eBooks•Jan 1, 2017•4 citations

On a Recent Critique of Complementarity: Part II

Paul K. Feyerabend

“Bohr was primarily a philosopher, not a physicist, but he understood that natural philosophy ... carries weight only if its every detail can be subjected to the ... test of experiment” (Heisenberg in [59], p. 95). As a result his approach differed from that of theschool-philosopherswhom he regarded with a somewhat “sceptical attitude, to say the least” ([59], p. 129) and whose lack of interest in “the important viewpoint which had emerged during the development of atomic physics” he noticed with regret ([59], p. 183).But it also differed, and to a considerable degree, from the spirit of what Professor T. S. Kuhn has called a “normal science.” Looking at Bohr's method of research we see that technical problems, however remote, are always related to a philosophical point of view; they are never treated as “tiny puzzles” whose solution is valuable in itself, even if one has not the faintest idea what it means, and where it leads: “For me” Bohr writes to Sommerfeld in 1922 ([59], p. 71) “[the quantum theory] is not a matter for petty didactic details, but a serious attempt to reach ... an inner coherence.” Emphasis is put on matters of principle ([59], p. 36) and minor discrepancies, or “puzzles” in the sense of Kuhn, instead of being deemphasized, and assimilated to the older paradigm,are turned into fundamental difficultiesby looking at them from a new direction, and by testing their background “in its furthest consequences by exaggeration” ([59], p. 329). A noteworthy example of Bohr's “non-normal” and rather metaphysical approach to physics is his scepticism in the face of the success of his own atomic model.

Philosophy of Science•Mar 1, 1969•31 citations

Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?

Guido Bacciagaluppi, Elise Crull

This is a reprinting of Bohr’s response to the EPR paper, wherein Bohr relies on his principle of complementarity to demonstrate an ambiguity in the criterion of reality as described by EPR and to argue that quantum mechanics is in fact a complete description of reality given the bounds of complementarity.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Nov 14, 2024•66 citations

Niels Bohr and the Formalism of Quantum Mechanics

Dennis Dieks

It has often been remarked that Bohr's writings on the interpretation of quantum mechanics make scant reference to the mathematical formalism of quantum theory; and it has not infrequently been suggested that this is another symptom of the general vagueness, obscurity and perhaps even incoherence of Bohr's ideas. Recent years have seen a reappreciation of Bohr, however. In this article we broadly follow this "rehabilitation program". We offer what we think is a simple and coherent reading of Bohr's statements about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, basing ourselves on primary sources and making use of and filling lacunas in|recent secondary literature. We argue that Bohr's views on quantum mechanics are more firmly connected to the structure of the quantum formalism than usually acknowledged, even though Bohr's explicit use of this formalism remains on a rather global and qualitative level. In our reading, Bohr's pronouncements on the meaning of quantum mechanics should first of all be seen as responses to concrete physical problems, rather than as expressions of a preconceived philosophical doctrine. In our final section we attempt a more detailed comparison with the formalism and conclude that Bohr's interpretation is not far removed from present-day non-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics.

Bloomsbury Academic eBooks•Jan 1, 2017•14 citations

An Everett Perspective on Bohr and EPR

Guido Bacciagaluppi

After summarising a previously given analysis of Bohr's reply to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR), this chapter endorses the claim made by Everett himself that Everettian quantum mechanics `in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr'. On the one hand, it shows how Everett's theory provides a reconstruction of Bohr's viewpoint of complementarity as applied to the EPR case and a justi�cation of his criticism of EPR's `criterion of reality'. On the other hand, it includes a notion of physical reality that is independent of any observational context, and suggests a remaining shortcoming of Bohr's reply.

Bloomsbury Academic eBooks•Jan 1, 2017•1 citation

Introduction

Jonathan Allday

Quantum theory has passed through three distinct stages during its evolution. The first is generally referred to as ‘old quantum theory’. During a period roughly between 1900 and 1925 Planck, Bohr and Einstein, among others, grappled with various experimental and theoretical crises by patching up classical mechanics with some new quantum ideas applied as band-aids. This is not to disparage the work; it was vitally important, and you can only do what is possible at the time. The quantum world is very different to the picture painted by classical physics. That being the case and given the extreme nature of some of these differences, we might question the wisdom of accepting the quantum view. Scientists can be quite disparaging about philosophy, sometimes while in the process of espousing, quite stridently, a philosophical position of their own. The chapter also presents an overview on the key concepts discussed in this book.

CRC Press eBooks•Sep 21, 2022•0 citations
In his response to EPR, Bohr introduces several ideal experimental arrangements that often are not understood correctly, and his discussion about them is given a positivist reading. Our analysis demonstrates the difference between such areading and Bohr’s actual position, and also clarifies the meaning of several of Bohr’s key physical and philosophical ideas: The role of the quantum of action in the distinction between classical and quantum systems; The criterion of measurability for theoretically defined concepts; The freedom in placement of the “cut” between measuring instrument and measured system; The non-visualizability of the quantum formalism; and Bohr’s concepts of phenomenon and complementarity.
Although microscopic systems are described by means of quantum mechanics, the outcomes obtained when performing measurements on such systems “appear” to us as being “classical” (Giulini et al. 2003). This situation is puzzling. How does the classical appearance of these measurement outcomes emerge (problem A)? And why, after all, couldn’t we describe these measurement outcomes by means of quantummechanics (problem B)? Problem A can be tackled within the domain of physics. As a matter of fact, it has been partly solved by means of decoherence theory (Zurek 1981, 1982, 1991; Blanchard et al. 2000; Joos et al. 2003). Problem B falls under the competency of epistemology, as it deals with the respective role of classical physics and quantum mechanics. Concerning this topic of the quantum- classical cut, the contribution of Bohr and especially his thesis of the necessary use of classical concepts have been very influential during the twentieth century. Many scholars in the past have examined Bohr’s writings concerning this thesis (Folse 1985; Honner 1987; Murdoch 1987; Faye 1991; Chevalley 1991; Scheibe 1993). Recently, this thesis has been discussed in relation to decoherence theory. More precisely, Camilleri and Schlosshauer (2015) asked if Bohr’s thesis is challenged by decoherence theory. Their inquiry leads them to conclude that this is not the case. In other words, Bohr’s viewis still defendable. This chapter aims at showing that Bohr’s view is not only defendable but can throw light on the problems associated with the quantum- classical cut. First, I will recall that Bohr’s way of dealing with this cut is not ontological but epistemological. I will then put forward four conceptual distinctions and argue that those are essential to understand and discuss Bohr’s thesis of the necessary use of classical concepts. Finally, on the basis of this clarification, the relation between Bohr’s thesis and decoherence theory will be discussed.
“Bohr was primarily a philosopher, not a physicist, but he understood that natural philosophy ... carries weight only if its every detail can be subjected to the ... test of experiment” (Heisenberg in [59], p. 95). As a result his approach differed from that of theschool-philosopherswhom he regarded with a somewhat “sceptical attitude, to say the least” ([59], p. 129) and whose lack of interest in “the important viewpoint which had emerged during the development of atomic physics” he noticed with regret ([59], p. 183).But it also differed, and to a considerable degree, from the spirit of what Professor T. S. Kuhn has called a “normal science.” Looking at Bohr's method of research we see that technical problems, however remote, are always related to a philosophical point of view; they are never treated as “tiny puzzles” whose solution is valuable in itself, even if one has not the faintest idea what it means, and where it leads: “For me” Bohr writes to Sommerfeld in 1922 ([59], p. 71) “[the quantum theory] is not a matter for petty didactic details, but a serious attempt to reach ... an inner coherence.” Emphasis is put on matters of principle ([59], p. 36) and minor discrepancies, or “puzzles” in the sense of Kuhn, instead of being deemphasized, and assimilated to the older paradigm,are turned into fundamental difficultiesby looking at them from a new direction, and by testing their background “in its furthest consequences by exaggeration” ([59], p. 329). A noteworthy example of Bohr's “non-normal” and rather metaphysical approach to physics is his scepticism in the face of the success of his own atomic model.
It has often been remarked that Bohr's writings on the interpretation of quantum mechanics make scant reference to the mathematical formalism of quantum theory; and it has not infrequently been suggested that this is another symptom of the general vagueness, obscurity and perhaps even incoherence of Bohr's ideas. Recent years have seen a reappreciation of Bohr, however. In this article we broadly follow this "rehabilitation program". We offer what we think is a simple and coherent reading of Bohr's statements about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, basing ourselves on primary sources and making use of and filling lacunas in|recent secondary literature. We argue that Bohr's views on quantum mechanics are more firmly connected to the structure of the quantum formalism than usually acknowledged, even though Bohr's explicit use of this formalism remains on a rather global and qualitative level. In our reading, Bohr's pronouncements on the meaning of quantum mechanics should first of all be seen as responses to concrete physical problems, rather than as expressions of a preconceived philosophical doctrine. In our final section we attempt a more detailed comparison with the formalism and conclude that Bohr's interpretation is not far removed from present-day non-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics.
After summarising a previously given analysis of Bohr's reply to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR), this chapter endorses the claim made by Everett himself that Everettian quantum mechanics `in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr'. On the one hand, it shows how Everett's theory provides a reconstruction of Bohr's viewpoint of complementarity as applied to the EPR case and a justi�cation of his criticism of EPR's `criterion of reality'. On the other hand, it includes a notion of physical reality that is independent of any observational context, and suggests a remaining shortcoming of Bohr's reply.
Quantum theory has passed through three distinct stages during its evolution. The first is generally referred to as ‘old quantum theory’. During a period roughly between 1900 and 1925 Planck, Bohr and Einstein, among others, grappled with various experimental and theoretical crises by patching up classical mechanics with some new quantum ideas applied as band-aids. This is not to disparage the work; it was vitally important, and you can only do what is possible at the time. The quantum world is very different to the picture painted by classical physics. That being the case and given the extreme nature of some of these differences, we might question the wisdom of accepting the quantum view. Scientists can be quite disparaging about philosophy, sometimes while in the process of espousing, quite stridently, a philosophical position of their own. The chapter also presents an overview on the key concepts discussed in this book.