Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Ecient Fair Exchange with Veriable Conrmation of Signatures

Liqun Chen

Published Jan 1, 1998• 2 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

We propose a new ecient protocol, which allows a pair of potentially mistrusting parties to exchange digital signatures over the Internet in a fair way, such that after the protocol is running, either each party obtains the other's signature, or neither of them does. The pro- tocol relies on an o-line Trusted Third Party (TTP), which does not take part in the exchange unless any of the parties behaves improperly or other faults occur. Eciency of the protocol is achieved by using a cryptographic primitive, called conrmable signatures (or designated con- rmer signatures in its original proposal (9)). We recommend using a new ecient conrmable signature scheme in the proposed fair exchange pro- tocol. This scheme combines the family of discrete logarithm (DL) based signature algorithms and a zero-knowledge (ZK) proof on the equality of two DLs. The protocol has a practical level of performance: only a moderate number of communication rounds and ordinary signatures are required. The security of the protocol can be established from that of the underlying signature algorithms and that of the ZK proof used.

Related papers

A New Fair Exchange Protocol Using Designated Confirmer Signatures

LU Song-nian

we propose a new efficient protocol. which allows a pair of potentially mistrusting parties to exchange digital signatures over the Internet in a fair way. The protocol relies on an off-line Trusted Third Party (TTP). which does not take part in the exchange unless any of the parties behaves improperly or other faults occur. Efficiency of the protocol is achieved by using a cryptographic primitive, called designated confirmer signatures. The confirmer commitment schemes and ordinary signatures are combines to form the confirmer signatures. The security of the protocol is analyzed and the fairness of it is guaranteed.

Jisuanji gongcheng•Jan 1, 2000•0 citations

Efficient and practical fair exchange protocols with off-line TTP

Feng Bao, Robert Huijie Deng, Wenbo Mao

We present protocols for fair exchange of electronic data (digital signatures, payment and confidential data) between two parties A and B. Novel properties of the proposed protocols include: 1) offline trusted third party (TTP), i.e., TTP does not take part in the exchange unless one of the parties behaves improperly; 2) only three message exchanges are required in the normal situation; 3) true fair exchange, i.e., either A and B obtain each other's data or no party receives anything useful; no loss can be incurred to a party no matter how maliciously the other party behaves during the exchange. This last property is in contrast to previously proposed protocols with offline TTP ([1] and [21]), where a misbehaving party may get another party's data while refusing to send his document to the other party, and the TTP can provide affidavits attesting to what happened during the exchange. To our knowledge, the protocols presented here are the first exchange protocols which use offline TTP and at the same time guarantee true fair exchange of digital messages. We introduce a novel cryptographic primitive, called the Certificate of Encrypted Message Being a Signature (CEMBS), as the basic building block of the fair exchange protocols. It is used to prove that an encrypted message is a certain party's signature on a public file, without revealing the signature. We also give two examples to show in detail how the certificate can be constructed.

IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P)•Nov 27, 2002•291 citations

Verifiable encryption of digital signatures and applications

Giuseppe Ateniese

This paper presents a new simple schemes for verifiable encryption of digital signatures. We make use of a trusted third party (TTP) but in an optimistic sense, that is, the TTP takes part in the protocol only if one user cheats or simply crashes. Our schemes can be used as primitives to build efficient fair exchange and certified e-mail protocols.

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security•Feb 1, 2004•95 citations

An Abuse-Free Fair Contract-Signing Protocol Based on the RSA Signature

Guilin Wang

A fair contract-signing protocol allows two potentially mistrusted parities to exchange their commitments (i.e., digital signatures) to an agreed contract over the Internet in afairway, so that either each of them obtains the other's signature, or neither party does. Based on the RSA signature scheme, a new digital contract-signing protocol is proposed in this paper. Like the existing RSA-based solutions for the same problem, our protocol is not only fair, but also optimistic, since the trusted third party is involved only in the situations where one party is cheating or the communication channel is interrupted. Furthermore, the proposed protocol satisfies a new property-abuse-freeness. That is, if the protocol is executed unsuccessfully, none of the two parties can show the validity of intermediate results to others. Technical details are provided to analyze the security and performance of the proposed protocol. In summary, we present the first abuse-free fair contract-signing protocol based on the RSA signature, and show that it is both secure and efficient.

IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security•Nov 13, 2009•50 citations

A fair exchange protocol based on short signature with the off-line semi-trusted third party

Xiangjun Xin, Fagen Li

Based on a short signature scheme and discrete logarithm problem,a new fair exchange protocol with the off-line semi-Trusted Third Party(TTP) is proposed.The off-line semi-TTP intervenes into the protocol in case of trouble,which makes the fair exchange optimistic.The off-line TTP need not be completely trusted,since it can get neither signature exchanged when disputation is solved.Because this protocol is based on short signature,which needs low storage and little communication,it can be used in low-bandwidth communication and low-storage environments.

Journal of Xidian University•Jan 1, 2007•0 citations

Contributions on fair exchange of digital signatures

Yang Wang

Fair exchange protocols aim to allow two parties to exchange digital items in a fair manner. Optimistic fair exchange (OFE) is a kind of protocols that solves the fair exchange problem with the help of a trusted third party (TTP), usually referred to as an `arbitrator'. The participation of the arbitrator is only required when there is a dispute between the exchanging parties. In the literature, the highest level of security of optimistic fair exchange is the multi-user security in the chosen-key model, proposed by Huang, Yang, Wong and Susilo in CT-RSA 2008. They showed that an efficient optimistic fair exchange scheme, secure in this sense, can be constructed generically from a conventional signature and a ring signature. In particular, the underlying ring signature is required to be unforgeable under an adaptive attack, against a static adversary in the 2-user setting.\nConcurrent signatures, introduced by Chen, Kudla and Paterson in Eurocrypt 2004, allow two parties to produce two ambiguous signatures until an extra piece of information, the keystone, is released by one of the parties. Upon the release of the keystone, the ambiguity will be revoked and the signatures bind to their true signers concurrently. Concurrent signatures, however, are known to fall just short of fully solving the long standing fair exchange of signatures problem. The price for not requiring any TTP is that the party who holds the keystone always has an advantage over the other party in controlling when and whether the protocol completes or not.\nIn this thesis, the fair exchange of digital signatures problem is studied. In the first part of this thesis, the OFE security is strengthened and a more practical model which is called enhanced chosen-key model is proposed. Unlike the existing multiuser setting and chosen-key model, an adversary in the enhanced chosen-key model is further provided with the signing oracle that outputs full signatures generated by the signer, and may even be allowed to have access to the arbitrator's secret key. The necessity for the new model is demonstrated. It is shown that two existing methodologies for constructing optimistic fair exchange schemes remain valid in the enhanced chosen-key model.\nNext, the efficiency of OFE constructions is improved. A model for 2-user ring signatures called `unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks' is proposed and it is shown that the new ring model is strictly weaker than the model of unforgeability under an adaptive attack, against a static adversary in the 2-user setting. Based on the finding that 2-user ring signatures secure in this weaker model will suffice to guarantee the security of the resulting OFE schemes in the enhanced chosenkey model, the most efficient OFE scheme whose security does not rely on random oracles is proposed.\nNew situations in OFE are also investigated, and the applications of OFE are extended. The scenarios where the digital items to be exchanged are threshold signatures are considered, and the notion of threshold-oriented OFE (TOFE) together with a security model and an efficient concrete scheme is proposed. It is identified that in some scenarios, it is required that prior to the completion of the protocol, no information about the actual exchange should be revealed to an outsider. To achieve this purpose, the notion of perfect ambiguous optimistic fair exchange (PAOFE) is introduced, the security model for PAOFE is proposed and a generic construction based on existing primitives is offered. OFE in the attribute-based setting is considered and the notion of attribute-based optimistic fair exchange (ABOFE) is proposed. The security model and a construction for ABOFE are presented as well.\nFinally, concurrent signatures is revisited. It is showed that theoretically the party who controls the keystone in a concurrent signature scheme has more advantages than previously thought. In particular, the notion is examined and the advantages are classified into three levels.It is demonstrated that concurrent signatures may be abused in practical applications if one fails to take these advantages into account.

•Jan 1, 2014•0 citations
We propose a new ecient protocol, which allows a pair of potentially mistrusting parties to exchange digital signatures over the Internet in a fair way, such that after the protocol is running, either each party obtains the other's signature, or neither of them does. The pro- tocol relies on an o-line Trusted Third Party (TTP), which does not take part in the exchange unless any of the parties behaves improperly or other faults occur. Eciency of the protocol is achieved by using a cryptographic primitive, called conrmable signatures (or designated con- rmer signatures in its original proposal (9)). We recommend using a new ecient conrmable signature scheme in the proposed fair exchange pro- tocol. This scheme combines the family of discrete logarithm (DL) based signature algorithms and a zero-knowledge (ZK) proof on the equality of two DLs. The protocol has a practical level of performance: only a moderate number of communication rounds and ordinary signatures are required. The security of the protocol can be established from that of the underlying signature algorithms and that of the ZK proof used.
we propose a new efficient protocol. which allows a pair of potentially mistrusting parties to exchange digital signatures over the Internet in a fair way. The protocol relies on an off-line Trusted Third Party (TTP). which does not take part in the exchange unless any of the parties behaves improperly or other faults occur. Efficiency of the protocol is achieved by using a cryptographic primitive, called designated confirmer signatures. The confirmer commitment schemes and ordinary signatures are combines to form the confirmer signatures. The security of the protocol is analyzed and the fairness of it is guaranteed.
We present protocols for fair exchange of electronic data (digital signatures, payment and confidential data) between two parties A and B. Novel properties of the proposed protocols include: 1) offline trusted third party (TTP), i.e., TTP does not take part in the exchange unless one of the parties behaves improperly; 2) only three message exchanges are required in the normal situation; 3) true fair exchange, i.e., either A and B obtain each other's data or no party receives anything useful; no loss can be incurred to a party no matter how maliciously the other party behaves during the exchange. This last property is in contrast to previously proposed protocols with offline TTP ([1] and [21]), where a misbehaving party may get another party's data while refusing to send his document to the other party, and the TTP can provide affidavits attesting to what happened during the exchange. To our knowledge, the protocols presented here are the first exchange protocols which use offline TTP and at the same time guarantee true fair exchange of digital messages. We introduce a novel cryptographic primitive, called the Certificate of Encrypted Message Being a Signature (CEMBS), as the basic building block of the fair exchange protocols. It is used to prove that an encrypted message is a certain party's signature on a public file, without revealing the signature. We also give two examples to show in detail how the certificate can be constructed.
A fair contract-signing protocol allows two potentially mistrusted parities to exchange their commitments (i.e., digital signatures) to an agreed contract over the Internet in afairway, so that either each of them obtains the other's signature, or neither party does. Based on the RSA signature scheme, a new digital contract-signing protocol is proposed in this paper. Like the existing RSA-based solutions for the same problem, our protocol is not only fair, but also optimistic, since the trusted third party is involved only in the situations where one party is cheating or the communication channel is interrupted. Furthermore, the proposed protocol satisfies a new property-abuse-freeness. That is, if the protocol is executed unsuccessfully, none of the two parties can show the validity of intermediate results to others. Technical details are provided to analyze the security and performance of the proposed protocol. In summary, we present the first abuse-free fair contract-signing protocol based on the RSA signature, and show that it is both secure and efficient.
Based on a short signature scheme and discrete logarithm problem,a new fair exchange protocol with the off-line semi-Trusted Third Party(TTP) is proposed.The off-line semi-TTP intervenes into the protocol in case of trouble,which makes the fair exchange optimistic.The off-line TTP need not be completely trusted,since it can get neither signature exchanged when disputation is solved.Because this protocol is based on short signature,which needs low storage and little communication,it can be used in low-bandwidth communication and low-storage environments.
Fair exchange protocols aim to allow two parties to exchange digital items in a fair manner. Optimistic fair exchange (OFE) is a kind of protocols that solves the fair exchange problem with the help of a trusted third party (TTP), usually referred to as an `arbitrator'. The participation of the arbitrator is only required when there is a dispute between the exchanging parties. In the literature, the highest level of security of optimistic fair exchange is the multi-user security in the chosen-key model, proposed by Huang, Yang, Wong and Susilo in CT-RSA 2008. They showed that an efficient optimistic fair exchange scheme, secure in this sense, can be constructed generically from a conventional signature and a ring signature. In particular, the underlying ring signature is required to be unforgeable under an adaptive attack, against a static adversary in the 2-user setting.\nConcurrent signatures, introduced by Chen, Kudla and Paterson in Eurocrypt 2004, allow two parties to produce two ambiguous signatures until an extra piece of information, the keystone, is released by one of the parties. Upon the release of the keystone, the ambiguity will be revoked and the signatures bind to their true signers concurrently. Concurrent signatures, however, are known to fall just short of fully solving the long standing fair exchange of signatures problem. The price for not requiring any TTP is that the party who holds the keystone always has an advantage over the other party in controlling when and whether the protocol completes or not.\nIn this thesis, the fair exchange of digital signatures problem is studied. In the first part of this thesis, the OFE security is strengthened and a more practical model which is called enhanced chosen-key model is proposed. Unlike the existing multiuser setting and chosen-key model, an adversary in the enhanced chosen-key model is further provided with the signing oracle that outputs full signatures generated by the signer, and may even be allowed to have access to the arbitrator's secret key. The necessity for the new model is demonstrated. It is shown that two existing methodologies for constructing optimistic fair exchange schemes remain valid in the enhanced chosen-key model.\nNext, the efficiency of OFE constructions is improved. A model for 2-user ring signatures called `unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks' is proposed and it is shown that the new ring model is strictly weaker than the model of unforgeability under an adaptive attack, against a static adversary in the 2-user setting. Based on the finding that 2-user ring signatures secure in this weaker model will suffice to guarantee the security of the resulting OFE schemes in the enhanced chosenkey model, the most efficient OFE scheme whose security does not rely on random oracles is proposed.\nNew situations in OFE are also investigated, and the applications of OFE are extended. The scenarios where the digital items to be exchanged are threshold signatures are considered, and the notion of threshold-oriented OFE (TOFE) together with a security model and an efficient concrete scheme is proposed. It is identified that in some scenarios, it is required that prior to the completion of the protocol, no information about the actual exchange should be revealed to an outsider. To achieve this purpose, the notion of perfect ambiguous optimistic fair exchange (PAOFE) is introduced, the security model for PAOFE is proposed and a generic construction based on existing primitives is offered. OFE in the attribute-based setting is considered and the notion of attribute-based optimistic fair exchange (ABOFE) is proposed. The security model and a construction for ABOFE are presented as well.\nFinally, concurrent signatures is revisited. It is showed that theoretically the party who controls the keystone in a concurrent signature scheme has more advantages than previously thought. In particular, the notion is examined and the advantages are classified into three levels.It is demonstrated that concurrent signatures may be abused in practical applications if one fails to take these advantages into account.