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IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)

Keyless covert communication over Multiple-Access Channels

Keerthi Suria Kumar Arumugam, Matthieu R. Bloch

Published Jul 1, 2016• 84 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We consider a scenario in which two legitimate transmitters attempt to communicate with a legitimate receiver over a discrete memoryless Multiple-Access Channel (MAC), while escaping detection from an adversary who observes their communication through another discrete memoryless MAC. If the MAC to the legitimate receiver is “better” than the one to the adversary, in a sense that we make precise, then the legitimate users can reliably communicate on the order of √n bits per n channel uses with arbitrarily Low Probability of Detection (LPD) without using a secret key. We also identify the pre-constants of the scaling, which leads to a characterization of the covert capacity region.

DOI
10.1109/isit.2016.7541695

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We consider a scenario in which two legitimate transmitters attempt to communicate with a legitimate receiver over a discrete memoryless Multiple-Access Channel (MAC), while escaping detection from an adversary who observes their communication through another discrete memoryless MAC. If the MAC to the legitimate receiver is “better” than the one to the adversary, in a sense that we make precise, then the legitimate users can reliably communicate on the order of √n bits per n channel uses with arbitrarily Low Probability of Detection (LPD) without using a secret key. We also identify the pre-constants of the scaling, which leads to a characterization of the covert capacity region.
We consider a scenario in which K transmitters attempt to communicate covert messages reliably to a legitimate receiver over a discrete memoryless multiple-access channel (MAC) while simultaneously escaping detection from an adversary who observes their communication through another discrete memoryless MAC. We assume that each transmitter may use a secret key that is shared only between itself and the legitimate receiver. We show that each of the K transmitters can transmit on the order of √n reliable and covert bits per n channel uses, exceeding which, the warden will be able to detect the communication. We identify the optimal pre-constants of the scaling, which leads to a complete characterization of the covert capacity region of the K-user binary-input MAC. We show that, asymptotically, all sum-rate constraints are inactive unlike the traditional MAC capacity region. We also characterize the channel conditions that have to be satisfied for the transmitters to operate without a secret key.
This paper characterizes the covert capacity-key tradeoffs for discrete memoryless channels (DMC) and discrete memoryless multiple-access channels (DMMAC). The focus is on channels where communication rates are measured as the number of transmitted bits divided by the square-root of the blocklength and by the square-root of the covertness constraint. Previous results had determined the largest achievable covert rates for these channels, as well as the minimum key rates required to achieve these largest covert rates. In this work, we additionally determine the minimum key rates required at reduced covert rates. Stated differently, we determine the set of all covert rates that are achievable for a given set of key rates. This is termed thecovert capacity-key tradeoff. Our results on the covert capacity-key tradeoffs over DMCs and DMMACs show that for small key rates and when the adversary observes the inputs through a better channel than the legitimate receiver, binary signalling at all transmitters is optimal even for larger input alphabets and the capacity-key tradeoff grows linearly. Moreover, in this regime the covert capacity-key tradeoff of DMMACs is square implying that each of the transmitters can simultaneously achieve its own largest covert rate depending only on its own available key rate, irrespective of the other transmitter. For larger key rates or when the adversary is not uniformly stronger than the legitimate receiver over all inputs, the covert capacity-key tradeoff region of DMMACs is non-square and a tradeoff arises between the rates of the various transmitters.
We consider the situation in which a transmitter attempts to communicate reliably over a discrete memoryless channel, while simultaneously ensuring covertness (low probability of detection) with respect to a warden, who observes the signals through another discrete memoryless channel. We develop a coding scheme based on the principle of channel resolvability, which generalizes and extends prior work in several directions. First, it shows that irrespective of the quality of the channels, it is possible to communicate on the order of √n reliable and covert bits over n channel uses if the transmitter and the receiver share on the order of √n key bits. This improves upon earlier results requiring on the order of √n log n key bits. Second, it proves that if the receiver's channel is better than the warden's channel in a sense that we make precise, it is possible to communicate on the order of √n reliable and covert bits over n channel uses without a secret key. This generalizes earlier results established for binary symmetric channels. We also identify the fundamental limits of covert and secret communications in terms of the optimal asymptotic scaling of the message size and key size, and we extend the analysis to Gaussian channels. The main technical problem that we address is how to develop concentration inequalities for low-weight sequences. The crux of our approach is to define suitably modified typical sets that are amenable to concentration inequalities.
We analyze a two-receiver binary-input discrete memoryless broadcast channel, in which the transmitter communicates a common message simultaneously to both users and a covert message to only one of them while treating the other as an adversary. This model captures the problem of embedding covert messages in an innocuous codebook and generalizes previous models in which the innocent behavior corresponds to the absence of communication between legitimate users. We identify the exact asymptotic behavior of the number of reliable and covert bits when the rate of the innocuous codebook is close to the channel capacity of the adversary. In particular, our results characterize the dependence of the number of covert bits on the channel parameters and the characteristics of the innocent codebook.
We study communication over a Multiple Access Channel (MAC) where users can possibly be adversarial. The receiver is unaware of the identity of the adversarial users (if any). When all users are non-adversarial, we want their messages to be decoded reliably. When a user behaves adversarially, we require that the honest users’ messages be decoded reliably. An adversarial user can mount an attack by sending any input into the channel rather than following the protocol. It turns out that the 2-user MAC capacity region follows from the point-to-point Arbitrarily Varying Channel (AVC) capacity. For the 3-user MAC in which at most one user may be malicious, we characterize the capacity region for deterministic codes and randomized codes (where each user shares an independent random secret key with the receiver). These results are then generalized for thekkk-user MAC where the adversary may control all users in one out of a collection of given subsets.
This paper explores the tradeoff between covert communication capacity and secret key requirements over discrete memoryless channels (DMCs). We focus on settings where under a covertness constraint both communication and key rates are measured as the number of bits per square root of the block-length. While previous work has identified the maximum covert communication rates and the corresponding minimum key rates needed to achieve them, our study characterizes the minimum key rates necessary for all of desired covert communication rates. In equivalent terms, we determine, for any given key rate, the set of achievable covert rates. This relationship defines what we call the covert capacity-key tradeoff.Our analysis reveals several new insights. In scenarios where only small key rates are available and the adversary has a stronger channel than the intended receiver, binary signaling is optimal—regardless of the specific channel characteristics or input alphabets. In these cases, the covert capacity increases linearly with the available key rate. In other cases and for larger key rates, the covert capacity-key tradeoff grows sublinearly.We also extend our findings to multi-access channels (MACs) with binary inputs.