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Cambridge University Press eBooks

Causality and observation

George Jaroszkiewicz

Published Apr 17, 2014• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1017/cbo9781139525381.030

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Modern approaches to causal modeling give a central role to interventions, which require the active input of an observer and introduces an explicit `causal arrow of time'. Causal models typically adopt a mechanistic interpretation, according to which the direction of the causal arrow is intrinsic to the process being studied. Here we investigate whether the direction of the causal arrow might be a contribution from the observer, rather than an intrinsic property of the process. Working within a counterfactual and non-mechanistic interpretation of causal modeling developed in arXiv:1806.00895, we propose a definition of a `quantum observational scheme' that we argue characterizes the observer-invariant properties of a causal model. By restricting to quantum processes that preserve the maximally mixed state (unbiasedness) we find that the statistics is symmetric under reversal of the time-ordering. The resulting model can therefore accommodate the idea that the causal arrow is observer-dependent, indicating a route towards reconciling the causal arrow with time-symmetric laws of physics.

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Causal Physics 101 Part VI: Measurement, Observables, and Epistemic Access

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This sixth volume of Causal Physics 101 completes the operational layer of the CT–United framework by introducing a rigorous theory of measurement, observables, and epistemic access. While Parts I–V established the ontology of natural and reflective causes, will dynamics, attractors, and macro-causal systems, this paper formalizes how causal quantities are accessed, measured, inferred, and compared—without collapsing or confusing ontological structure with epistemic procedure. Causal observables are defined as functionals on the causal field and its derived quantities, and measurement is modeled as a reflective coupling between an observing system and the causal field. Measurement is shown to be a reflective causal act that perturbs the system it probes, yet does not alter the ontological classification of the cause being measured: natural causes remain natural even when accessed reflectively. This clean separation between ontological causation and epistemic access resolves long-standing ambiguities surrounding entities that are fundamental yet indirectly observed, such as neutrinos, black holes, vacuum tension, and the speed of light. The paper further develops measurement noise and resolution limits in terms of coherence alignment, introduces the statistical structure of Causal Physics as an epistemic construct rather than an ontological one, and assigns causal weight to observation itself based on alignment with coherence gradients. By closing the measurement loop, Part VI renders Causal Physics a complete, operationally closed physical theory and prepares the ground for causal thermodynamics and cosmology.

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Causal Order Cannot Be An Observable

Declan Maguire, Fabio Costa

Recent developments in the formalisation of quantum causal structures have made it possible to test and compare hypotheses about causal structure empirically, rather than being a-priori assumptions. Such differences in causal structure may be leveraged to distinguish between the processes they belong to, akin to distinguishing between quantum states known to belong to different eigenspaces of an observable. So how far this analogy can be pushed? Can causal order be interpreted as a kind of observable? Can it be measured? To this end we construct a completely operational definition of observables in terms of `discrimination tasks'. This begins with some base set of classes (analogous to a quantum observable's eigenspaces) before we impose three conditions on how these classes relate under discrimination tasks. These conditions recover the properties of a standard observable, letting us apply this definition to non-state entities such as quantum processes, which naturally encode causal structure. These conditions can be described in plain language as (1) `members of any class are perfectly distinguishable from members of any other' (i.e. our classes are `sharp'), (2) `entities perfectly distinguishable pairwise are all perfectly distinguishable by a joint intervention', and (3) `if all members of a class are perfectly distinguishable from an entity, then the whole class is perfectly distinguishable from it jointly'. By analysing classes of quantum processes having strict causal orders, we find causal classes which are sharp but violate condition 2, and classes which violate condition 3. This implies that causal order cannot be an observable. We note cases in the literature which claim to prove the opposite, and discuss them. We find their analyses presume special circumstances equivalent to conditions (2) and (3), and so do not contradict our own findings.

quant-pharXiv:2605.25302•Classical and Quantum Gravity•May 26, 2026•1 citation
Modern approaches to causal modeling give a central role to interventions, which require the active input of an observer and introduces an explicit `causal arrow of time'. Causal models typically adopt a mechanistic interpretation, according to which the direction of the causal arrow is intrinsic to the process being studied. Here we investigate whether the direction of the causal arrow might be a contribution from the observer, rather than an intrinsic property of the process. Working within a counterfactual and non-mechanistic interpretation of causal modeling developed in arXiv:1806.00895, we propose a definition of a `quantum observational scheme' that we argue characterizes the observer-invariant properties of a causal model. By restricting to quantum processes that preserve the maximally mixed state (unbiasedness) we find that the statistics is symmetric under reversal of the time-ordering. The resulting model can therefore accommodate the idea that the causal arrow is observer-dependent, indicating a route towards reconciling the causal arrow with time-symmetric laws of physics.
This sixth volume of Causal Physics 101 completes the operational layer of the CT–United framework by introducing a rigorous theory of measurement, observables, and epistemic access. While Parts I–V established the ontology of natural and reflective causes, will dynamics, attractors, and macro-causal systems, this paper formalizes how causal quantities are accessed, measured, inferred, and compared—without collapsing or confusing ontological structure with epistemic procedure. Causal observables are defined as functionals on the causal field and its derived quantities, and measurement is modeled as a reflective coupling between an observing system and the causal field. Measurement is shown to be a reflective causal act that perturbs the system it probes, yet does not alter the ontological classification of the cause being measured: natural causes remain natural even when accessed reflectively. This clean separation between ontological causation and epistemic access resolves long-standing ambiguities surrounding entities that are fundamental yet indirectly observed, such as neutrinos, black holes, vacuum tension, and the speed of light. The paper further develops measurement noise and resolution limits in terms of coherence alignment, introduces the statistical structure of Causal Physics as an epistemic construct rather than an ontological one, and assigns causal weight to observation itself based on alignment with coherence gradients. By closing the measurement loop, Part VI renders Causal Physics a complete, operationally closed physical theory and prepares the ground for causal thermodynamics and cosmology.
Recent developments in the formalisation of quantum causal structures have made it possible to test and compare hypotheses about causal structure empirically, rather than being a-priori assumptions. Such differences in causal structure may be leveraged to distinguish between the processes they belong to, akin to distinguishing between quantum states known to belong to different eigenspaces of an observable. So how far this analogy can be pushed? Can causal order be interpreted as a kind of observable? Can it be measured? To this end we construct a completely operational definition of observables in terms of `discrimination tasks'. This begins with some base set of classes (analogous to a quantum observable's eigenspaces) before we impose three conditions on how these classes relate under discrimination tasks. These conditions recover the properties of a standard observable, letting us apply this definition to non-state entities such as quantum processes, which naturally encode causal structure. These conditions can be described in plain language as (1) `members of any class are perfectly distinguishable from members of any other' (i.e. our classes are `sharp'), (2) `entities perfectly distinguishable pairwise are all perfectly distinguishable by a joint intervention', and (3) `if all members of a class are perfectly distinguishable from an entity, then the whole class is perfectly distinguishable from it jointly'. By analysing classes of quantum processes having strict causal orders, we find causal classes which are sharp but violate condition 2, and classes which violate condition 3. This implies that causal order cannot be an observable. We note cases in the literature which claim to prove the opposite, and discuss them. We find their analyses presume special circumstances equivalent to conditions (2) and (3), and so do not contradict our own findings.