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Cambridge University Press eBooks

Selection of special states

Lawrence S. Schulman

Published Jul 31, 1997• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Why should special states occur as initial conditions in every physical situation in which they are needed? Half this book has been devoted to making the points that initial conditions may not be as controllable as they seem; that there may be constraints on microscopic initial conditions; that this would not have been noticed; that such constraints can arise from two-time or future conditioning; that in our universe such future conditioning may well be present, although, as remarked, cryptic . In this chapter I will take up more detailed questions: what future conditions could give rise to the need for our ‘special’ states, and why should those particular future conditions be imposed. Before going into this there is a point that needs to be made. Everything in the present chapter could be wrong and the thesis of Chapter 6 nevertheless correct. It is one thing to avoid grotesque states (and solve the quantum measurement problem) by means of special states and it is another provide a rationale for their occurrence. I say this not only to highlight the conceptual dependencies of the theses in this book, but also because there is a good deal of hand waving in the coming chapter and I don't want it to reflect unfavorably on the basic proposal. As pointed out earlier, the usual thermodynamic arrow of time can be phrased as follows: initial states are arbitrary, final states special.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9780511622878.009

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If even some of the ideas presented here are correct, the world is different from what it seems. The major theses of the book, on time's arrows and on quantum measurement theory, are unified by the notion of cryptic constraints. We see, sense, specify, macroscopic states, but what we predict about these states depends on an important assumption concerning their microscopic situation. The assumption is that the actual microstate is equally likely to be any of those consistent with the macrostate. And I say, not so. For various reasons, both classical and quantum, many otherwise-possible microstates are eliminated. As presented in detail in previous chapters, such elimination impacts many areas of physics, from the cosmos to the atom. But we also make the point that this elimination can be difficult to notice and in particular there is no experimental evidence that confirms the usual assumption. By an explicit example on a model (Fig. 4.3.2), we show that a future constraint eliminating 98% of the microstates can go completely unnoticed.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jul 31, 1997•0 citations

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Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jul 31, 1997•0 citations

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Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jul 31, 1997•0 citations

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Condensed matter theory is a massive field to which no book or books can do full justice. Every chapter in this book is possible material for a book or books. So it is clearly neither my intention nor within my capabilities to give an overview of the entire subject. Instead I will focus on certain techniques that have served me well over the years and whose strengths and limitations I am familiar with. My presentation is at a level of rigor I am accustomed to and at ease with. In any topic, say the renormalization group (RG) or bosonization, there are treatments that are more rigorous. How I deal with this depends on the topic. For example, in the RG I usually stop at one loop, which suffices to make the point, with exceptions like wave function renormalization where you need a minimum of two loops. For non-relativistic fermions I am not aware of anything new one gets by going to higher loops. I do not see much point in a scheme that is exact to all orders (just like the original problem) if in practice no real gain is made after one loop. In the case of bosonization I work in infinite volume from the beginning and pay scant attention to the behavior at infinity. I show many examples where this is adequate, but point to cases where it is not and suggest references. In any event I think the student should get acquainted with these more rigorous treatments after getting the hang of it from the treatment in this book. I make one exception in the case of the two-dimensional Ising model where I pay considerable attention to boundary conditions, without which one cannot properly understand how symmetry breaking occurs only in the thermodynamic limit. This book has been a few years in the writing and as a result some of the topics may seem old-fashioned; on the other hand, they have stood the test of time. Ideally the chapters should be read in sequence, but if that is not possible, the reader may have to go back to earlier chapters when encountering an unfamiliar notion. I am grateful to the Aspen Center for Physics (funded by NSF Grant 1066293) and the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras for providing the facilities to write parts of this book.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Aug 31, 2017•0 citations
Why should special states occur as initial conditions in every physical situation in which they are needed? Half this book has been devoted to making the points that initial conditions may not be as controllable as they seem; that there may be constraints on microscopic initial conditions; that this would not have been noticed; that such constraints can arise from two-time or future conditioning; that in our universe such future conditioning may well be present, although, as remarked, cryptic . In this chapter I will take up more detailed questions: what future conditions could give rise to the need for our ‘special’ states, and why should those particular future conditions be imposed. Before going into this there is a point that needs to be made. Everything in the present chapter could be wrong and the thesis of Chapter 6 nevertheless correct. It is one thing to avoid grotesque states (and solve the quantum measurement problem) by means of special states and it is another provide a rationale for their occurrence. I say this not only to highlight the conceptual dependencies of the theses in this book, but also because there is a good deal of hand waving in the coming chapter and I don't want it to reflect unfavorably on the basic proposal. As pointed out earlier, the usual thermodynamic arrow of time can be phrased as follows: initial states are arbitrary, final states special.
If even some of the ideas presented here are correct, the world is different from what it seems. The major theses of the book, on time's arrows and on quantum measurement theory, are unified by the notion of cryptic constraints. We see, sense, specify, macroscopic states, but what we predict about these states depends on an important assumption concerning their microscopic situation. The assumption is that the actual microstate is equally likely to be any of those consistent with the macrostate. And I say, not so. For various reasons, both classical and quantum, many otherwise-possible microstates are eliminated. As presented in detail in previous chapters, such elimination impacts many areas of physics, from the cosmos to the atom. But we also make the point that this elimination can be difficult to notice and in particular there is no experimental evidence that confirms the usual assumption. By an explicit example on a model (Fig. 4.3.2), we show that a future constraint eliminating 98% of the microstates can go completely unnoticed.
The existence of ‘special’ states can be established with ordinary quantum mechanics. We seek particular microscopic states of large systems that have the property that they evolve to only one or another macroscopic outcome, when other microstates of a more common sort (having the same initial macrostate) would have given grotesque states. Justifying the hypothesis that Nature chooses these special states as initial conditions is another matter. In this chapter we stick to the narrower issue of whether there exist states that can do the job, irrespective of whether they occur in practice. In Section 7.1 we give several explicit examples. In Section 6.2 we exhibited an apparatus model and its special states. Here we look at the decay of an unstable quantum state, not as a single degree of freedom in a potential, but with elements of the environment taken into account as well. We also study another popular many-body system, the spin boson model. This has extensive physical applications and especially with respect to Josephson junctions has been used to address quantum measurement questions. A single degree of freedom in a potential, by the way, does not generally lend itself to ‘specializing,’ and an example is shown below. In recent years, exotic non-local effects of quantum mechanics have been exhibited experimentally. Behind many of these lies entanglement , the property of a wave function of several variables that it does not factor into a product of functions of these variables separately.
In Chapter 6 I presented a proposal for how and why grotesque states do not occur in Nature. In subsequent chapters I explored consequences and found subsidiary requirements, such as Cauchy distributed kicks. To find out whether all or part of our scheme is the way Nature works, we turn to experiment. How to turn to experiment is not so obvious, since the basic dynamical law, ψ → exp(− iHt/ħ )ψ, is the same as for most other theories. Our basic assertion concerns not the dynamical law but the selection of states. Therefore it is that assertion that must be tested. For example, one way is to set up a situation where the states we demand, the ‘special’ states, cannot occur. Then what happens? Another part of our theory is the probability postulate, and this deals not only with the existence of special states but with their abundance. It enters in the recovery of standard probabilities but has far reaching consequences that may well lead to the best tests of the theory. Such tests arise in the context of EPR situations. The experimental tests fall into the following categories. Precluding a class of special states . This should prevent a class of outcomes. If the changes in the system (due to precluding the class of special states) do not change the predictions of the Copenhagen interpretation, then this provides a test. In particular, with a class of special states precluded, our theory forbids the associated outcome.
There are several theories or processes which may underlie quantum mechanics and make it deterministic. Some references are given in the main text. Any such theory, plus a number of reasonable assumptions, implies the existence of what I have called ``special" states. The assumptions are conservation laws, obedience (up to a point) of Schrodinger's equation, and a single world, in the sense of the many worlds interpretation (the last one a consequence of any deterministic theory). This article also, for clarity, gives an example of a ``special" state. There is an experimental test of the ``special" state theory.
Pure quantum evolution is deterministic, ψ → exp (—iHt/ħ)ψ , but as for classical mechanics probability enters because a given macroscopic initial condition contains microscopic states that lead to different outcomes; the relative probability of those outcomes equals the relative abundance of the microscopic states for each outcome. This is the postulated basis for the recovery of the usual quantum probabilities, as discussed in Chapter 6. In this chapter we take up the question of whether the allowable microstates (the ‘special’ states) do indeed come with the correct abundance. To recap: ‘special’ states are microstates not leading to superpositions of macroscopically different states (‘grotesque’ states). For a given experiment and for each macroscopically distinct outcome of that experiment these states form a subspace. We wish to show that the dimension of that subspace is the relative probability of that outcome. This is an ambitious goal, especially considering the effort needed to establish that there are any special states—the subject of Chapter 7. As remarked there, the special states exhibited are likely to be only a small and atypical fraction of all special states in the physical apparatus being modeled (e.g., the cloud chamber). In one example (the decay model) there is a remarkable matching of dimension and conventional probability, but I would not make too much of that. What is especially challenging about the present task is that we seek a universal distribution.
Condensed matter theory is a massive field to which no book or books can do full justice. Every chapter in this book is possible material for a book or books. So it is clearly neither my intention nor within my capabilities to give an overview of the entire subject. Instead I will focus on certain techniques that have served me well over the years and whose strengths and limitations I am familiar with. My presentation is at a level of rigor I am accustomed to and at ease with. In any topic, say the renormalization group (RG) or bosonization, there are treatments that are more rigorous. How I deal with this depends on the topic. For example, in the RG I usually stop at one loop, which suffices to make the point, with exceptions like wave function renormalization where you need a minimum of two loops. For non-relativistic fermions I am not aware of anything new one gets by going to higher loops. I do not see much point in a scheme that is exact to all orders (just like the original problem) if in practice no real gain is made after one loop. In the case of bosonization I work in infinite volume from the beginning and pay scant attention to the behavior at infinity. I show many examples where this is adequate, but point to cases where it is not and suggest references. In any event I think the student should get acquainted with these more rigorous treatments after getting the hang of it from the treatment in this book. I make one exception in the case of the two-dimensional Ising model where I pay considerable attention to boundary conditions, without which one cannot properly understand how symmetry breaking occurs only in the thermodynamic limit. This book has been a few years in the writing and as a result some of the topics may seem old-fashioned; on the other hand, they have stood the test of time. Ideally the chapters should be read in sequence, but if that is not possible, the reader may have to go back to earlier chapters when encountering an unfamiliar notion. I am grateful to the Aspen Center for Physics (funded by NSF Grant 1066293) and the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras for providing the facilities to write parts of this book.