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Cambridge University Press eBooks

Illusion or reality?

Alastair I. M. Rae

Published Oct 7, 2004• 7 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Now that we have completed our survey of the conceptual problems of quantum physics, what are we to make of it all? One thing that should be clear is that there is considerable scope for us all to have opinions and there is a disappointing lack of practicable experimental tests to confirm or falsify our ideas. Because of this, I intend to drop the use of the conventional scientific ‘we’ in this chapter and to use the first person singular pronoun wherever I am stating an opinion rather than describing an objective fact or a widely accepted scientific idea. This is not to say that everything in the earlier chapters has been free of personal bias, but I have tried to maintain a greater basis of objectivity there than will be appropriate from now on. I first want to refer briefly to a way of thinking about philosophical problems known as ‘positivism’. Encapsulated in Wittgenstein's phrase ‘of what we cannot speak thereof should we be silent’, positivism asserts that questions that are incapable of verification are ‘non-questions’, which it is meaningless to try to answer. Thus the famous, if apocryphal, debate between mediaeval scholars about how many angels can dance on the point of a pin has no content because angels can never be observed or measured so no direct test of any conclusion we might reach about them is ever possible. Opinions about such unobservable phenomena are therefore a matter of choice rather than logical necessity.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9780511535284.013

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Illusion or reality?

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Now that we have completed our survey of the conceptual problems of quantum physics, what are we to make of it all? One thing that should be clear is that there is considerable scope for us all to have opinions and there is a disappointing lack of practicable experimental tests to confirm or falsify our ideas. Because of this, I intend to drop the use of the conventional scientific ‘we’ in this chapter and to use the first person singular pronoun wherever I am stating an opinion rather than describing an objective fact or a widely accepted scientific idea. This is not to say that everything in the earlier chapters has been free of personal bias, but I have tried to maintain a greater basis of objectivity there than will be appropriate from now on. I first want to refer briefly to a way of thinking about philosophical problems known as ‘positivism’. Encapsulated in Wittgenstein's phrase ‘of what we cannot speak thereof should we be silent’, positivism asserts that questions that are incapable of verification are ‘non-questions’, which it is meaningless to try to answer. Thus the famous, if apocryphal, debate between mediaeval scholars about how many angels can dance on the point of a pin has no content because angels can never be observed or measured so no direct test of any conclusion we might reach about them is ever possible. Opinions about such unobservable phenomena are therefore a matter of choice rather than logical necessity.

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During the first half of the century, positivism had a firm hold on the great majority of physicists. It appeared, however, in recent years that this method of analysis has lost its early creativity. Professor Hooker is among the increasing number of philosophers of physics who are concerned about this situation. His determination to redirect philosophical study to significant human problems is most re­ freshing. Unfortunately, I am afraid that his technique does not measure up to the difficulty of this task. He polarizes the issue by formulating two comprehensive and mutually incompatible world views and then pro­ ceeds to destroy positivism and vindicate realism. Since he cannot discern any merit in positivism, it is hard to avoid the implication that Einstein, Bohr, and Heisenberg were utterly misguided when they used positivist arguments to challenge classical dogmas. Instead of analyzing his paper point by point, I prefer to discuss the problem from my point of view. Let me start by clarifying first how I intend to use the terms 'real' and 'reality'. Curiously, the commonsense usage serves as a good point of departure. We usually know what 'reality' means in contrast to 'dream', 'illusion', 'deception' or 'error'. We know how to compare a photograph or a map with reality. There are situations in physics which are quite similar. We distinguish a real object from a hologram, and we know how to tell a 'real' effect from an experimental error, at least in the long run.

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The present discussion arose from the desire to explain, to an audience of non-physicists,i the epistemology to which one is forced if one pursues the quantum mechanical theory of observation to its ultimate consequences. However, the con-clusions will not be derived from the aforementioned theory but obtained on the basis of a rather general analysis of what we mean by real. Quantum theory will form the background but not the basis for the analysis. The concept of the real to be arrived at shows considerable similarity to that of the idealist. As the title indicates, it is formulated as a dualism. It is quite possible that it will soon be rejected not only by the community of the philosophers but also by that of the scientists. If this should be the case, the attempt to derive an epistemology from physics will prove to have been premature. Naturally, the author hopes that this will not be the case because, quite apart from the quantum theoretical background, the concepts to be presented ap-pear natural also as an outgrowth of common sense considerations. They have been arrived at by many (including Schrodinger) who did not accept the epistemology of quantum mechanics. Disclaimer of Authority The problems of the present inquiry have been grappled with by the keenest minds, and for much longer periods than the present writer has devoted to them. His only qualification for speaking about them is that he believes to represent the views at which most physicists would arrive if they were suffi-ciently pressed for their opinions on the subject. He realizes the profundity of his ignorance of the thinking of some of the greatest philosophers and is under no illusion that the views to be presented will be very novel. His hope is that they will ap-pear sensible. by guest on A

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ENERAL philosophy claims to be the critical subject which lays down for all of us what we may be allowed to think, and yet it has played no part whatever in the great revolutions of human thought of the present century-those connected with relativity and the quantum theory. It might have been expected that the scientists would have been constantly consulting the philosophers as to the legitimacy of their various speculations, but nothing of the kind has happened. Since no one can dispense with some sort of metaphysic, each scientist has made one for himself, and no doubt they contain many crudities, but it would seem that a deep interest in metaphysic is a disadvantage rather than an advantage to the physicist-at least I have the impression that those of my friends who are most inclined to speculate on the ultimate things appear to be the ones whose scientific work is most hampered by doing so. Now I propose to risk a similar indiscretion. I want to embody in it the practical philosophy of a physicist, and I do not mean it as an attack on the pure philosophers, who are very reasonable people, only chargeable with the minor offence of not having made me want to read their books! I had better begin by stating shortly the ideas I intend to discuss. There is a notable contrast between the way we think about things and the way we think we ought to think about them.

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The assumption of an objective world underlying all our experiences is deeply embedded in our everyday thinking and in our language, and has been an unquestioned presupposition of the scientific enterprise for at least four centuries. Yet it is well known that quantum physics raises some highly problematic questions in this respect, questions that are still open, almost a century from the inception of the theory. I would like to propose that these questions stem from deep philosophical assumptions and can be answered in a much more coherent way if we understand the notion of an objective world not as a primary reality, but as an emergent aspect of a primary process that can be described as “experiencing”. A coherent description of the appearance of an objective world in the process of experiencing relies on a certain understanding of what is technically known as the “quantum measurement problem”, i.e. the description of the process of observation in quantum physics, which is the key problematic aspect of the theory. I will propose that the basic features that characterize a quantum observation have a much wider scope, and describe in fact all acquisition of information by an “embodied observer”, in short all experiencing happening in the world. By applying to this larger context work I have done in the more technical frame of the quantum measurement problem it can be shown that the nature of the process of experiencing is such as to inevitably generate the appearance of an objective world. Thus the objectivity of the world, although not primary and ultimately real, is an intrinsic consequence of our “experiential embodiment”, i.e. of the fact that we are in the world and all our experiences correspond to physical happenings in the world. When examined in this perspective, the “paradoxes” of quantum physics are an invitation to abandon the metaphysical assumption of the primacy of the objective dimension of reality. A philosophical position much more in tune with quantum physics views the process of experiencing as the primary source of both subject and object, consciousness and world.

Open Journal of Philosophy•Jan 1, 2014•1 citation
Now that we have completed our survey of the conceptual problems of quantum physics, what are we to make of it all? One thing that should be clear is that there is considerable scope for us all to have opinions and there is a disappointing lack of practicable experimental tests to confirm or falsify our ideas. Because of this, I intend to drop the use of the conventional scientific ‘we’ in this chapter and to use the first person singular pronoun wherever I am stating an opinion rather than describing an objective fact or a widely accepted scientific idea. This is not to say that everything in the earlier chapters has been free of personal bias, but I have tried to maintain a greater basis of objectivity there than will be appropriate from now on. I first want to refer briefly to a way of thinking about philosophical problems known as ‘positivism’. Encapsulated in Wittgenstein's phrase ‘of what we cannot speak thereof should we be silent’, positivism asserts that questions that are incapable of verification are ‘non-questions’, which it is meaningless to try to answer. Thus the famous, if apocryphal, debate between mediaeval scholars about how many angels can dance on the point of a pin has no content because angels can never be observed or measured so no direct test of any conclusion we might reach about them is ever possible. Opinions about such unobservable phenomena are therefore a matter of choice rather than logical necessity.
Now that we have completed our survey of the conceptual problems of quantum physics, what are we to make of it all? One thing that should be clear is that there is considerable scope for us all to have opinions and there is a disappointing lack of practicable experimental tests to confirm or falsify our ideas. Because of this, I intend to drop the use of the conventional scientific ‘we’ in this chapter and to use the first person singular pronoun wherever I am stating an opinion rather than describing an objective fact or a widely accepted scientific idea. This is not to say that everything in the earlier chapters has been free of personal bias, but I have tried to maintain a greater basis of objectivity there than will be appropriate from now on. I first want to refer briefly to a way of thinking about philosophical problems known as ‘positivism’. Encapsulated in Wittgenstein's phrase ‘of what we cannot speak thereof should we be silent’, positivism asserts that questions that are incapable of verification are ‘non-questions’, which it is meaningless to try to answer. Thus the famous, if apocryphal, debate between mediaeval scholars about how many angels can dance on the point of a pin has no content because angels can never be observed or measured so no direct test of any conclusion we might reach about them is ever possible. Opinions about such unobservable phenomena are therefore a matter of choice rather than logical necessity.
Today, many concepts from the dictionaries of academic psychology have entered the language of everyday communication. Perhaps the most common are the concepts of «subjective» and «objective». In many textbooks of psychology, «objective» is understood as something that belongs to the object itself, something that does not depend on the subject. The objective is opposed to the subjective-personal. Experimental research in the field of quantum physics questioned the division of the world into an impartial «objective reality» and its «subjective» (not impartial, biased) reflection, which provoked a crisis in this field of knowledge and the methodology of science as a whole. The main methodological problems of psychology are the question of the place of the mental in nature; on the relationship of mental and material phenomena, on the possibilities of human cognition - questions that also arose in the depths of quantum physics and were predetermined by the internal logic of their development. An excursion into quantum physics was necessary, firstly, for a deep understanding that reality is given to us in our sensations, perceptions, ideas and mental constructs (this was evidenced by the so-called «double slit experiment» and its interpretations) and we cannot say anything about reality as it is «in itself»; secondly, the realization that the foundations on which our knowledge is built differ from those in quantum physics. Currently, there is a dichotomy between material (physical) and conceptual reality. Thus, the principle of locality, which professes ordinary consciousness and according to which specific objects occupy a specific place in time and space, contradicts the principle of non-locality, according to which isolated systems do not exist at all and every particle of the universe is in «instantaneous» communication with all other particles. The world is created from the same quantum substance and it is impossible to say that one is the cause of the other. (This statement implies, in particular, a rethinking of the «principle of determinism» which requires the establishment of unambiguous causal relationships). The reality in which we live is not quantum, our language and stereotypes of thinking do not correspond to the nature of the phenomena described by quantum physics. It is about the deep properties of matter. Personally, I got the impression that the deeper you plunge into the world of atomic and subatomic, the more the outlines of the specific, material world familiar to us become blurred and the thinner the line between the physical and conceptual world, between the material and the spiritual becomes. The purpose of this article is to define the concepts of "objective" and "subjective" based on the analysis of achievements in quantum physics in the context of psychology.
During the first half of the century, positivism had a firm hold on the great majority of physicists. It appeared, however, in recent years that this method of analysis has lost its early creativity. Professor Hooker is among the increasing number of philosophers of physics who are concerned about this situation. His determination to redirect philosophical study to significant human problems is most re­ freshing. Unfortunately, I am afraid that his technique does not measure up to the difficulty of this task. He polarizes the issue by formulating two comprehensive and mutually incompatible world views and then pro­ ceeds to destroy positivism and vindicate realism. Since he cannot discern any merit in positivism, it is hard to avoid the implication that Einstein, Bohr, and Heisenberg were utterly misguided when they used positivist arguments to challenge classical dogmas. Instead of analyzing his paper point by point, I prefer to discuss the problem from my point of view. Let me start by clarifying first how I intend to use the terms 'real' and 'reality'. Curiously, the commonsense usage serves as a good point of departure. We usually know what 'reality' means in contrast to 'dream', 'illusion', 'deception' or 'error'. We know how to compare a photograph or a map with reality. There are situations in physics which are quite similar. We distinguish a real object from a hologram, and we know how to tell a 'real' effect from an experimental error, at least in the long run.
The present discussion arose from the desire to explain, to an audience of non-physicists,i the epistemology to which one is forced if one pursues the quantum mechanical theory of observation to its ultimate consequences. However, the con-clusions will not be derived from the aforementioned theory but obtained on the basis of a rather general analysis of what we mean by real. Quantum theory will form the background but not the basis for the analysis. The concept of the real to be arrived at shows considerable similarity to that of the idealist. As the title indicates, it is formulated as a dualism. It is quite possible that it will soon be rejected not only by the community of the philosophers but also by that of the scientists. If this should be the case, the attempt to derive an epistemology from physics will prove to have been premature. Naturally, the author hopes that this will not be the case because, quite apart from the quantum theoretical background, the concepts to be presented ap-pear natural also as an outgrowth of common sense considerations. They have been arrived at by many (including Schrodinger) who did not accept the epistemology of quantum mechanics. Disclaimer of Authority The problems of the present inquiry have been grappled with by the keenest minds, and for much longer periods than the present writer has devoted to them. His only qualification for speaking about them is that he believes to represent the views at which most physicists would arrive if they were suffi-ciently pressed for their opinions on the subject. He realizes the profundity of his ignorance of the thinking of some of the greatest philosophers and is under no illusion that the views to be presented will be very novel. His hope is that they will ap-pear sensible. by guest on A
ENERAL philosophy claims to be the critical subject which lays down for all of us what we may be allowed to think, and yet it has played no part whatever in the great revolutions of human thought of the present century-those connected with relativity and the quantum theory. It might have been expected that the scientists would have been constantly consulting the philosophers as to the legitimacy of their various speculations, but nothing of the kind has happened. Since no one can dispense with some sort of metaphysic, each scientist has made one for himself, and no doubt they contain many crudities, but it would seem that a deep interest in metaphysic is a disadvantage rather than an advantage to the physicist-at least I have the impression that those of my friends who are most inclined to speculate on the ultimate things appear to be the ones whose scientific work is most hampered by doing so. Now I propose to risk a similar indiscretion. I want to embody in it the practical philosophy of a physicist, and I do not mean it as an attack on the pure philosophers, who are very reasonable people, only chargeable with the minor offence of not having made me want to read their books! I had better begin by stating shortly the ideas I intend to discuss. There is a notable contrast between the way we think about things and the way we think we ought to think about them.
The assumption of an objective world underlying all our experiences is deeply embedded in our everyday thinking and in our language, and has been an unquestioned presupposition of the scientific enterprise for at least four centuries. Yet it is well known that quantum physics raises some highly problematic questions in this respect, questions that are still open, almost a century from the inception of the theory. I would like to propose that these questions stem from deep philosophical assumptions and can be answered in a much more coherent way if we understand the notion of an objective world not as a primary reality, but as an emergent aspect of a primary process that can be described as “experiencing”. A coherent description of the appearance of an objective world in the process of experiencing relies on a certain understanding of what is technically known as the “quantum measurement problem”, i.e. the description of the process of observation in quantum physics, which is the key problematic aspect of the theory. I will propose that the basic features that characterize a quantum observation have a much wider scope, and describe in fact all acquisition of information by an “embodied observer”, in short all experiencing happening in the world. By applying to this larger context work I have done in the more technical frame of the quantum measurement problem it can be shown that the nature of the process of experiencing is such as to inevitably generate the appearance of an objective world. Thus the objectivity of the world, although not primary and ultimately real, is an intrinsic consequence of our “experiential embodiment”, i.e. of the fact that we are in the world and all our experiences correspond to physical happenings in the world. When examined in this perspective, the “paradoxes” of quantum physics are an invitation to abandon the metaphysical assumption of the primacy of the objective dimension of reality. A philosophical position much more in tune with quantum physics views the process of experiencing as the primary source of both subject and object, consciousness and world.