We present a procedure which allows us to recover classical and nonclassical logical structures as \emph{concrete logics} associated with physical theories expressed by means of classical languages. This procedure consists in choosing, for a given theory
T and classical language
L expressing
T, an observative sublanguage
L of
L with a notion of truth as correspondence, introducing in
L a derived and theory-dependent notion of \emph{C-truth} (\emph{true with certainty}), defining a \emph{physical preorder} induced by C-truth, and finally selecting a set of sentences that are \emph{verifiable} (or \emph{testable}) according to
T, on which a \emph{weak complementation} is induced by
T. The triple consisting of the set of verifiable sentences, physical order and weak complementation is then the desired concrete logic. By applying our procedure we recover a classical logic as the concrete logic associated with classical mechanics and standard quantum logic as the concrete logic associated with quantum mechanics. We also show that our alternative view of standard quantum logic, which can be constructed in a purely formal way, can be provided with a physical meaning by adopting a recent interpretation of quantum mechanics that reinterprets quantum probabilities as conditional on detection rather than absolute. Our results then show that some nonstandard logics can be obtained as mathematical structures formalizing the properties of different notions of verifiability in different physical theories. More generally, they strongly support the idea that many nonclassical logics can coexist without conflicting with classical logic (\emph{global pluralism}), for they formalize metalinguistic notions that do not coincide with the notion of truth (described by Tarski's truth theory).
It is shown that for any quantum logic
L one can find a concrete logic
K and a surjective homomorphism
f from
K onto
L such that
f maps the centre of
K onto the centre of
L. Moreover, one can ensure that each finite set of compatible elements in
L is the image of a compatible subset of
K. This result is "best possible" - let a logic
L be the homomorphic image of a concrete logic under a homomorphism such that, if
F is a finite subset of the pre-image of a compatible subset of
L, then
F is compatible. Then
L must be concrete. In the second part one considers embeddings into concrete logics. It is shown that any concrete logic can be embedded into a concrete logic with preassigned centre and an abundance of two-valued measures. Finally, one proves that an arbitrary logic can be mapped into a concrete logic by a centrally additive mapping which preserves the ordering and complementation.
Abstract We argue that there is a simple, unique, reason for all quantum paradoxes, and that such a reason is not uniquely related to quantum theory. It is rather a mathematical question that arises at the intersection of logic, probability, and computation. We give our ‘weirdness theorem’ that characterises the conditions under which the weirdness will show up. It shows that whenever logic has bounds due to the algorithmic nature of its tasks, then weirdness arises in the special form of negative probabilities or non-classical evaluation functionals. Weirdness is not logical inconsistency, however. It is only the expression of the clash between an unbounded and a bounded view of computation in logic. We discuss the implication of these results for quantum mechanics, arguing in particular that its interpretation should ultimately be computational rather than exclusively physical. We develop in addition a probabilistic theory in the real numbers that exhibits the phenomenon of entanglement, thus concretely showing that the latter is not specific to quantum mechanics.