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Oxford University Press eBooks

The world according to quantum mechanics

Frank Arntzenius

Published Jan 1, 2012• 7 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This chapter discusses which quantities one should take to be fundamental in quantum mechanics. Five views are discussed: ‘configuration space realism’, ‘wave-function amplitude realism’, ‘density operator realism’, ‘Heisenberg operator realism’, and ‘flash-realism’. Arguments are given in favour of ‘Heisenberg operator realism’ which, contrary to perceived wisdom, makes quantum mechanics an entirely separable and local theory.

DOI
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696604.003.0003

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This chapter discusses which quantities one should take to be fundamental in quantum mechanics. Five views are discussed: ‘configuration space realism’, ‘wave-function amplitude realism’, ‘density operator realism’, ‘Heisenberg operator realism’, and ‘flash-realism’. Arguments are given in favour of ‘Heisenberg operator realism’ which, contrary to perceived wisdom, makes quantum mechanics an entirely separable and local theory.
Abstract What are the ontological implications of quantum theories, that is, what do they tell us about the fundamental objects that make up our world? How should quantum theories make us reevaluate our classical conceptions of the basic constitution of material objects and ourselves? Is there fundamental quantum nonlocality? This book articulates several rival approaches to answering these questions, ultimately defending the wave function realist approach. Wave function realism is a way of interpreting quantum theories so that the central object they describe is the quantum wave function, interpreted as a field in an extremely high-dimensional space. According to this approach, the nonseparability and nonlocality we seem to find in quantum mechanics are ultimately manifestations of a more intuitive, separable, and local picture in higher dimensions.
When we are presented with apparently bizarre properties of microsystems governed by quantum mechanics (as in our discussion of the double-slit experiment in the previous chapter), we naturally ask whether it might be possible to find another theory, or at least another story to go with the equations, that would make more sense to us. We might seek a theory and a view of fundamental physical processes that would accord more with our classically based, everyday common sense. This typically takes the form of the question of the possibility of the existence of a more detailed description of atomic processes than that afforded by the wave function (that is, by the Copenhagen interpretation of the previous chapter). In this chapter we discuss some of the central interpretive problems of the Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics. Then, in the next two chapters, we look at the severe, general restrictions that are placed on any such completion of quantum mechanics and at one particular extension of quantum mechanics. First, though, we begin here with the struggle that ensued over the status of causality in quantum theory.
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.
The belief that quantum mechanics (QM) does not admit a realistic interpretation is widespread. According to some scholars concerned with the foundations of QM all existing interpretations of this theory (except for the statistical interpretation) presuppose instead a form of realism which consists in assuming that QM deals with individual objects and their properties. We uphold in the present paper that the arguments supporting the contextuality and the nonlocality of QM are a significant clue to the implicit adoption of stronger forms of realism (realism of theoretical entities and realism of theories). If these kinds of realism are substituted by a simpler and more intuitive semantic realism one can contrive a noncontextual and local interpretation of the formalism of QM (SR interpretation). Moreover one can provide a model for such an interpretation (ESR model) in which local realism and QM do not conflict and some fundamental problems of the standard interpretation of QM are avoided.
Abstract This chapter presents the argument for wave function realism that it is the only realist interpretation of quantum theories that can maintain a fundamentally separable and local metaphysics. It is commonly seen as a consequence of entanglement and Bell’s Theorem that quantum mechanics entails quantum nonseparability and nonlocality. Yet although all rival realist ontological interpretations of quantum mechanics involve either a nonseparable or a nonlocal fundamental metaphysics, the metaphysics of wave function realism is fundamentally both separable and local, although the view also makes room for nonfundamental nonseparability and nonlocality. The chapter considers several arguments that could explain why one should prefer interpretations of quantum theories that are separable and local, and concludes with a defense of intuitions in quantum interpretation.