Abstract This chapter compares the relation of emergent branching structure to the quantum state to the fundamental ontology with philosophically more familiar examples of emergence — of ordinary objects, in relation to classical atomism, and of mental properties or attributes, in relation to material bodies. It is argued that there remain ‘explanatory gaps’ in all such cases, and that these are likely to be particularly acute in the case of the Everett interpretation.
Abstract This chapter compares the relation of emergent branching structure to the quantum state to the fundamental ontology with philosophically more familiar examples of emergence — of ordinary objects, in relation to classical atomism, and of mental properties or attributes, in relation to material bodies. It is argued that there remain ‘explanatory gaps’ in all such cases, and that these are likely to be particularly acute in the case of the Everett interpretation.
Abstract This chapter argues for the view that the Everett (‘many worlds’) interpretation is nothing more or less than a literal reading of the formalism of unitary quantum mechanics. The central component of this story is decoherence: the process by which the evolution of the quantum state acquires a branching structure. The chapter gives a conceptual introduction to decoherence and its conceptual role, emphasizing the significance of its effects on the dynamics of degrees of freedom which are undergoing decoherence. It then argues that, although the branching structure generated by decoherence is ‘for all practical purposes’ in the sense that it is not part of the microscopic formalism of quantum theory, nonetheless it is a perfectly real, observer-independent feature of reality — it is emergent from that microscopic formalism in a way very familiar from many other parts of science.
According to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, the apparent paradoxes of quantum theory require no change either in our philosophical attitude toward scientific theories or in the formalism of quantum mechanics itself. Rather, the unaltered theory can be understood as a literal description of physical reality. But the physical reality thus described is one of many noninteracting, approximately classical worlds. These worlds enter the theory not at the fundamental level—they are nowhere to be found in the basic formalism—but at a higher, emergent level; in this sense they are (ontologically speaking) on a par with the ontology of the special sciences.
This chapter considers some philosophical problems posed by the Everett interpretation: should someone expecting to undergo quantum-mechanical branching be uncertain about the result of that branching? And how are we to think about identity over time — for people, for objects, and for whole branches — in the face of continual, persistent branching? Using considerations from philosophy of language, the chapter argues for a conservative approach to these questions: properly understood, the Everett interpretation leaves these and other everyday concepts essentially untouched, even as it does violence to what philosophers have normally taken to be their metaphysical underpinnings.
The article continues the debate about whether classical “pure” metaphysics can explain scientific theories or science can generate its own metaphysical concepts. Two camps have emerged in modern analytic philosophy. The “metaphysician” camp defends the metaphysics of science by arguing that the fundamental concepts of classical metaphysics can be enriched, illustrated, or justified by examples from scientific theories. The “philosophers of science” camp views this as yet another invasion of metaphysics into their scientific territory. They advocate a scientific or naturalized metaphysics that strictly corresponds to modern scientific theories. Since the concept of possible worlds is a key element of mainstream analytic metaphysics, proponents of the metaphysics of science find it natural to appeal to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory. In turn, proponents of naturalized metaphysics often use popular metaphysical systems to justify the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. I will argue that the interpretation originally proposed by H. Everett remains only one of the ontologies of quantum theory, and attempts by philosophers of science to build a metaphysical construct on its basis encounter serious difficulties.
The aim of this chapter is to explain how the ‘many worlds’ of the Everett interpretation can emerge from the underlying physics of quantum theory, without being put in by hand at the microscopic level. The discussion is conceptually focussed: in the main the chapter is concerned with sketching the way in which higher-level ontology emerges, in general, from lower-level scientific theories. When this general framework is applied to quantum theory in particular, the chapter shows that it leads to a continual branching of physical reality at the emergent, macroscopic level.
Abstract What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.