This chapter explores the relationships among reality, contextuality, and probability, especially in quantum theory and, brie y and by extension, in other fields where these concepts, in their quantum-like versions, may play key roles. The chapter contends, following Derrida's argument, that while no meaning or event could be determined apart from its context, no context ultimately permits saturation, that is, could ever be determined with certainty. Any such determination is ultimately provisional. However, because of its mathematical-experimental character, physics allows one, in classical physics and relativity, to disregard the role of the context of observation in describing the physical systems considered, and in quantum mechanics, where the context of observation cannot be so disregarded, to determine such a context sufficiently. While, however, classical physics or relativity and quantum mechanics can do so sufficiently for their disciplinary functioning and practice, they cannot do so entirely. Moreover, a given concept of this functioning, especially as concerns what is considered its proper functioning, still depends on a broader contextual field that defies saturation or guaranteed determination.
This chapter explores the relationships among reality, contextuality, and probability, especially in quantum theory and, brie y and by extension, in other fields where these concepts, in their quantum-like versions, may play key roles. The chapter contends, following Derrida's argument, that while no meaning or event could be determined apart from its context, no context ultimately permits saturation, that is, could ever be determined with certainty. Any such determination is ultimately provisional. However, because of its mathematical-experimental character, physics allows one, in classical physics and relativity, to disregard the role of the context of observation in describing the physical systems considered, and in quantum mechanics, where the context of observation cannot be so disregarded, to determine such a context sufficiently. While, however, classical physics or relativity and quantum mechanics can do so sufficiently for their disciplinary functioning and practice, they cannot do so entirely. Moreover, a given concept of this functioning, especially as concerns what is considered its proper functioning, still depends on a broader contextual field that defies saturation or guaranteed determination.
The origin and basis of the notion of quantum contextuality is identified in the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics, where context is automatically invoked by its requirement that the experimental arrangement involved in any measurements or set of measurements be taken into account while, in general, the outcome of a measurement may depend on other measurements immediately preceding or jointly performed on the same system. For Bohr, the specification of the experimental situation of any measurement is essential to its significance in light of complementarity and the omnipresence of the quantum of action in physics; for Heisenberg, the incompatibility of pairs of sharp measurements belonging to different situations coheres with both the completeness of the quantum state as an objective physical description and the principle of indeterminacy. Here, context in the Copenhagen approach is taken to be the equivalence class of experimental arrangements corresponding to a set of compatible measurements of quantum observables in standard quantum mechanics; the associated form of contextuality in quantum mechanics arises via the non-commutativity in general of sharp observables, proven by von Neumann, that can appear, providing different contexts. This notion is related to theoretical situations explored later by Bell, by Kochen and Specker, and by others in relation to the classification of hidden-variables theories and elsewhere in physics. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.
The presence of contextuality in quantum theory was first highlighted by Bell, Kochen and Specker, who discovered that for quantum systems of three or more dimensions, measurements could not be viewed as deterministically revealing pre-existing properties of the system. More precisely, no model can assign deterministic outcomes to the projectors of a quantum measurement in a way that depends only on the projector and not the context (the full set of projectors) in which it appeared, despite the fact that the Born rule probabilities associated with projectors are independent of the context. A more general, operational definition of contextuality introduced by Spekkens, which we will term 'probabilistic contextuality', drops the assumption of determinism and allows for operations other than measurements to be considered contextual. Even two-dimensional quantum mechanics can be shown to be contextual under this generalised notion. Probabilistic noncontextuality represents the postulate that elements of an operational theory that cannot be distinguished from each other based on the statistics of arbitrarily many repeated experiments (they give rise to the same operational probabilities) are ontologically identical. In this paper, we introduce a framework that enables us to distinguish between different noncontextuality assumptions in terms of the relationships between the ontological representations of objects in the theory given a certain relation between their operational representations. This framework can be used to motivate and define a 'possibilistic' analogue, encapsulating the idea that elements of an operational theory that cannot be unambiguously distinguished operationally can also not be unambiguously distinguished ontologically. We then prove that possibilistic noncontextuality is equivalent to an alternative notion of noncontextuality proposed by Hardy. Finally, we demonstrate that these weaker noncontextuality assumptions are sufficient to prove alternative versions of known 'no-go' theorems that constrain ψ -epistemic models for quantum mechanics.
The circumstances of measurement have more direct significance in quantum than in classical physics, where they can be neglected for well-performed measurements. In quantum mechanics, the dispositions of the measuring apparatus-plus-environment of the system measured for a property are a non-trivial part of its formalization as the quantum observable. A straightforward formalization of context, via equivalence classes of measurements corresponding to sets of sharp target observables, was recently given for sharp quantum observables. Here, we show that quantum contextuality, the dependence of measurement outcomes on circumstances external to the measured quantum system, can be manifested not only as the strict exclusivity of different measurements of sharp observables or valuations but via quantitative differences in the property statistics across simultaneous measurements of generalized quantum observables, by formalizing quantum context via coexistent generalized observables rather than only its subset of compatible sharp observables. Here, the question of whether such quantum contextuality follows from basic quantum principles is then addressed, and it is shown that the Principle of Indeterminacy is sufficient for at least one form of non-trivial contextuality. Contextuality is thus seen to be a natural feature of quantum mechanics rather than something arising only from the consideration of impossible measurements, abstract philosophical issues, hidden-variables theories, or other alternative, classical models of quantum behavior.
This article reconsiders the concept of physical reality in quantum theory and the concept of quantum measurement, following Bohr, whose analysis of quantum measurement led him to his concept of a (quantum) "phenomenon," referring to "the observations obtained under the specified circumstances," in the interaction between quantum objects and measuring instruments. This situation makes the terms "observation" and "measurement," as conventionally understood, inapplicable. These terms are remnants of classical physics or still earlier history, from which classical physics inherited it. As defined here, a quantum measurement does not measure any preexisting property of the ultimate constitution of the reality responsible for quantum phenomena. An act of measurement establishes a quantum phenomenon by an interaction between the instrument and the quantum object or in the present view the ultimate constitution of the reality responsible for quantum phenomena and, at the time of measurement, also quantum objects. In the view advanced in this article, in contrast to that of Bohr, quantum objects, such as electrons or photons, are assumed to exist only at the time of measurement and not independently, a view that redefines the concept of quantum object as well. This redefinition becomes especially important in high-energy quantum regimes and quantum field theory and allows this article to define a new concept of quantum field. The article also considers, now following Bohr, the quantum measurement as the entanglement between quantum objects and measurement instruments. The argument of the article is grounded in the concept "reality without realism" (RWR), as underlying quantum measurement thus understood, and the view, the RWR view, of quantum theory defined by this concept. The RWR view places a stratum of physical reality thus designated, here the reality ultimately responsible for quantum phenomena, beyond representation or knowledge, or even conception, and defines the corresponding set of interpretations quantum mechanics or quantum field theory, such as the one assumed in this article, in which, again, not only quantum phenomena but also quantum objects are (idealizations) defined by measurement. As such, the article also offers a broadly conceived response to J. Bell's argument "against 'measurement'".
Non-relativistic classical physics can be considered from a contextual perspective. At fi rst glance, the difference between classical physics (including special relativity) and quantum physics lies in the fact that the latter is indeterministic – that is, in general, the context of a quantum event cannot be controlled. However, within the framework of our contextual realism, we interpret physical theories – including classical ones – as grammars of corresponding scientifi c practices: rules of Wittgensteinian language games, that is, Wittgensteinian rules/norms (W-rule). Any theory, as a W-rule, is essentially probabilistic, since a W-rule allows for new (non-predetermined) uses. Th erefore, classical mechanics, like quantum mechanics, must be given an essentially probabilistic interpretation, and the problem of measurement – that is, the gap between the W-rule and its application – exists in classical mechanics as well.
In quantum physics, the term ‘contextual’ can be used in more than one way. One usage, here called ‘Bell contextual’ since the idea goes back to Bell, is that if A , B and C are three quantum observables, with A compatible (i.e. commuting) with B and also with C , whereas B and C are incompatible, a measurement of A might yield a different result (indicating that quantum mechanics is contextual) depending upon whether A is measured along with B (the { A , B } context) or with C (the { A , C } context). An analysis of what projective quantum measurements measure shows that quantum theory is Bell non-contextual: the outcome of a particular A measurement when A is measured along with B would have been exactly the same if A had, instead, been measured along with C . A different definition, here called ‘globally (non)contextual’ refers to whether or not there is (non-contextual) or is not (contextual) a single joint probability distribution that simultaneously assigns probabilities in a consistent manner to the outcomes of measurements of a certain collection of observables, not all of which are compatible. A simple example shows that such a joint probability distribution can exist even in a situation where the measurement probabilities cannot refer to properties of a quantum system, and hence lack physical significance, even though mathematically well defined. It is noted that the quantum sample space, a projective decomposition of the identity, required for interpreting measurements of incompatible properties in different runs of an experiment using different types of apparatus, has a tensor product structure, a fact sometimes overlooked. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.