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IEICE technical report. Information theory

A consideration on unconditionally secure key distribution schemes considering leakage of secret information of key distribution centers

Takahiro Yoshida, Hajime Jinushi, Toshiyasu Matsushima

Published Feb 24, 2011• 0 citations
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Known key exchange schemes offering information-theoretic (unconditional) security are complex and costly to implement. Nonetheless, they remain the only known methods for achieving unconditional security in key exchange. Therefore, the explorations for simpler solutions for information-theoretic security are highly justified. Lin et al. [1] proposed an interesting hardware key distribution scheme that utilizes thermal-noise-free resistances and DC voltages. A crypto analysis of this system is presented. It is shown that, if Eve gains access to the initial shared secret at any time in the past or future, she can successfully crack all the generated keys in the past and future, even retroactively, using passively obtained and recorded voltages and currents. Therefore, the scheme is not a secure key exchanger, but it is rather a key expander with no more information entropy than the originally shared secret at the beginning. We also point out that the proposed defense methods against active attacks do not function when the original shared secret is compromised because then the communication cannot be efficiently authenticated. However, they do work when an unconditionally secure key exchanger is applied to enable the authenticated communication protocol.

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A key distribution scheme is a method by means of which a trusted party distributes pieces of information among a set of users in such a way that each group of them can compute a common key for secure communication. In this paper we present a model for unconditionally secure key distribution schemes, i.e., schemes whose security is independent of the power of the adversary. We prove lower bounds on the amount of information the trusted party has to generate and each user has to keep secret in such schemes, and we show that some previous unconditionally secure models for key distribution fall in our model. As a consequence, the lower bounds given in the literature for these models can be seen as corollaries of our results. Hence, the main contribution of the paper consists in pointing out a sort of common structure underlying some apparently different key distribution techniques.
Threshold secret sharing schemes form the cryptographic backbone of distributed key management, multiparty computation, and decentralized custody systems. While classical (k, n)- threshold schemes—most notably Shamir's Secret Sharing (SSS)—provide unconditional information-theoretic security at rest, their practical deployment depends entirely on the security of the channels used to distribute shares from the dealer to participants. Quantum-Assisted Secret Sharing (QASS) addresses classical transport vulnerabilities to quantum-capable adversaries by using Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) links to establish unconditionally secure one-time pad (OTP) channels for share transmission. However, practical QKD implementations rely on attenuated laser sources emitting Weak Coherent Pulses (WCP) rather than ideal single-photon sources. This hardware imperfection exposes the share distribution phase to Photon-Number-Splitting (PNS) attacks. In this paper, we present a rigorous mathematical model and quantitative information leakage analysis of PNS attacks against a (3,5) (3,5) (3,5) -threshold QASS architecture. We derive the exact bit-leakage rate as a function of the mean photon number μ μ μ and fibre channel length L, evaluate the structural breakdown of the polynomial interpolation threshold under multi-channel eavesdropping, and quantify the exponential collapse in the adversary's secret reconstruction search space. Finally, we prove that integrating a three-intensity vacuum +weak decoy-state protocol restores full information-theoretic security of the (3,5) threshold across metropolitan and long-haul optical networks.
Known key exchange schemes offering information-theoretic (unconditional) security are complex and costly to implement. Nonetheless, they remain the only known methods for achieving unconditional security in key exchange. Therefore, the explorations for simpler solutions for information-theoretic security are highly justified. Lin et al. [1] proposed an interesting hardware key distribution scheme that utilizes thermal-noise-free resistances and DC voltages. A crypto analysis of this system is presented. It is shown that, if Eve gains access to the initial shared secret at any time in the past or future, she can successfully crack all the generated keys in the past and future, even retroactively, using passively obtained and recorded voltages and currents. Therefore, the scheme is not a secure key exchanger, but it is rather a key expander with no more information entropy than the originally shared secret at the beginning. We also point out that the proposed defense methods against active attacks do not function when the original shared secret is compromised because then the communication cannot be efficiently authenticated. However, they do work when an unconditionally secure key exchanger is applied to enable the authenticated communication protocol.