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BRICS Report Series

A Quantum Cipher with Near Optimal Key-Recycling

Ivan Damgård, Thomas B. Pedersen, Louis Salvail

Published May 11, 2005• 16 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Assuming an insecure quantum channel and an authenticated classical channel, we propose an unconditionally secure scheme for encrypting classical messages under a shared key, where attempts to eavesdrop the ciphertext can be detected. If no eavesdropping is detected, we can securely re-use the entire key for encrypting new messages. If eavesdropping is detected, we must discard a number of key bits corresponding to the length of the message, but can re-use almost all of the rest. We show this is essentially optimal. Thus, provided the adversary does not interfere (too much) with the quantum channel, we can securely send an arbitrary number of message bits, independently of the length of the initial key. Moreover, the key-recycling mechanism only requires one-bit feedback. While ordinary quantum key distribution with a classical one time pad could be used instead to obtain a similar functionality, this would need more rounds of interaction and more communication.

DOI
10.7146/brics.v12i17.21883

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Assuming an insecure quantum channel and an authenticated classical channel, we propose an unconditionally secure scheme for encrypting classical messages under a shared key, where attempts to eavesdrop the ciphertext can be detected. If no eavesdropping is detected, we can securely re-use the entire key for encrypting new messages. If eavesdropping is detected, we must discard a number of key bits corresponding to the length of the message, but can re-use almost all of the rest. We show this is essentially optimal. Thus, provided the adversary does not interfere (too much) with the quantum channel, we can securely send an arbitrary number of message bits, independently of the length of the initial key. Moreover, the key-recycling mechanism only requires one-bit feedback. While ordinary quantum key distribution with a classical one time pad could be used instead to obtain a similar functionality, this would need more rounds of interaction and more communication.
We propose an information-theoretically secure encryption scheme for classical messages with quantum ciphertexts that offers detection of eavesdropping attacks, and re-usability of the key in case no eavesdropping took place: the entire key can be securely re-used for encrypting new messages as long as no attack is detected. This is known to be impossible for fully classical schemes, where there is no way to detect plain eavesdropping attacks. This particular application of quantum techniques to cryptography was originally proposed by Bennett, Brassard and Breidbart in 1982, even before proposing quantum-key-distribution, and a simple candidate scheme was suggested but no rigorous security analysis was given. The idea was picked up again in 2005, when Damgard, Pedersen and Salvail suggested a new scheme for the same task, but now with a rigorous security analysis. However, their scheme is much more demanding in terms of quantum capabilities: it requires the users to have a quantum computer. In contrast, and like the original scheme by Bennett et al., our new scheme merely requires to prepare and measure single BB84 qubits. As such, we not only show a provably-secure scheme that is within reach of current technology, but we also confirm Bennett et al.'s original intuition that a scheme in the spirit of their original construction is indeed secure.
Based on the quantum key recycling scheme, a novel efficient quantum cipher is proposed. Employing the u- niversal hashing functions to detect eavesdropping, if there is no any eavesdropping detected, then the two parties can recycling the whole key without comprising security, otherwise a key string with the length of plaintext block has to be discarded. The keys used to encrypt the remaining plaintext block in classical one time pad are also generated to avoid the feedback on whether there exists eavesdropping during the process of quantum encryptions. Such strategy improves the efficiency of the quantum key recycling scheme greatly.
We discuss aspects of secure quantum communication by proposing and analyzing a quantum analog of the Vernam cipher (one-time-pad). The quantum Vernam cipher uses entanglement as the key to encrypt quantum information sent through an insecure quantum channel. First, in sharp contrast with the classical Vernam cipher, the quantum key can be recycled securely. We show that key recycling is intrinsic to the quantum cipher-text, rather than using entanglement as the key. Second, the scheme detects and corrects for arbitrary transmission errors, and it does so using only local operations and classical communication (LOCC) between the sender and the receiver. The application to quantum message authentication is discussed. Quantum secret sharing schemes with similar properties are characterized. We also discuss two general issues, the relation between secret communication and secret sharing, the classification of secure communication protocols.
Quantum information is a valuable resource which can be encrypted in order to protect it. We consider the size of the one-time pad that is needed to protect quantum information in a number of cases. The situation is dramatically different from the classical case: we prove that one can recycle the one-time pad without compromising security. The protocol for recycling relies on detecting whether eavesdropping has occurred, and further relies on the fact that information contained in the encrypted quantum state cannot be fully accessed. We prove the security of recycling rates when authentication of quantum states is accepted, and when it is rejected. We note that recycling schemes respect a general law of cryptography which we introduce relating the size of private keys, sent qubits, and encrypted messages. We discuss applications for encryption of quantum information in light of the resources needed for teleportation. Potential uses include the protection of resources such as entanglement and the memory of quantum computers. We also introduce another application: encrypted secret sharing and find that one can even reuse the private key that is used to encrypt a classical message. In a number of cases, one finds that the amount of private key needed for authentication or protection is smaller than in the general case.
We show that a family of quantum authentication protocols introduced in [Barnum et al., FOCS 2002] can be used to construct a secure quantum channel and additionally recycle all of the secret key if the message is successfully authenticated, and recycle part of the key if tampering is detected. We give a full security proof that constructs the secure channel given only insecure noisy channels and a shared secret key. We also prove that the number of recycled key bits is optimal for this family of protocols, i.e., there exists an adversarial strategy to obtain all non-recycled bits. Previous works recycled less key and only gave partial security proofs, since they did not consider all possible distinguishers (environments) that may be used to distinguish the real setting from the ideal secure quantum channel and secret key resource. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
We answer an open question about Quantum Key Recycling (QKR): Is it possible to put the message entirely in the qubits without increasing the number of qubits compared to existing QKR schemes? We show that this is indeed possible. We introduce a prepare-and-measure QKR protocol where the communication from Alice to Bob consists entirely of qubits. As usual, Bob responds with an authenticated one-bit accept/reject classical message. Compared to Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), QKR has reduced round complexity. Compared to previous qubit-based QKR protocols, our scheme has far less classical communication. We provide a security proof in the universal composability framework and find that the communication rate is asymptotically the same as for QKD with one-way postprocessing.