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Lecture notes in computer science

Multiparty Computation from Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption

Ivan Damgård, Valerio Pastro, Nigel Paul Smart, Sarah Zakarias

Published Jan 1, 2012• 1,357 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We propose a general multiparty computation protocol secure against an active adversary corrupting up to $$n-1$$ of the n players. The protocol may be used to compute securely arithmetic circuits over any finite field $$\mathbb {F}_{p^k}$$ . Our protocol consists of a preprocessing phase that is both independent of the function to be computed and of the inputs, and a much more efficient online phase where the actual computation takes place. The online phase is unconditionally secure and has total computational (and communication) complexity linear in n, the number of players, where earlier work was quadratic in n. Moreover, the work done by each player is only a small constant factor larger than what one would need to compute the circuit in the clear. We show this is optimal for computation in large fields. In practice, for 3 players, a secure 64-bit multiplication can be done in 0.05 ms. Our preprocessing is based on a somewhat homomorphic cryptosystem. We extend a scheme by Brakerski et al., so that we can perform distributed decryption and handle many values in parallel in one ciphertext. The computational complexity of our preprocessing phase is dominated by the public-key operations, we need $$O(n^2/s)$$ operations per secure multiplication where s is a parameter that increases with the security parameter of the cryptosystem. Earlier work in this model needed $$\varOmega (n^2)$$ operations. In practice, the preprocessing prepares a secure 64-bit multiplication for 3 players in about 13 ms.

DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_38

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We present a protocol for securely computing a Boolean circuit C in presence of a dishonest and malicious majority. The protocol is unconditionally secure, assuming a preprocessing functionality that is not given the inputs. For a large number of players the work for each player is the same as computing the circuit in the clear, up to a constant factor. Our protocol is the first to obtain these properties for Boolean circuits. On the technical side, we develop new homomorphic authentication schemes based on asymptotically good codes with an additional multiplication property. We also show a new algorithm for verifying the product of Boolean matrices in quadratic time with exponentially small error probability, where previous methods only achieved constant error. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Abstract. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables secure computation over the encrypted data of a single party. We explore how to extend this to multiple parties, using threshold fully homomorphic encryption (TFHE). In such scheme, the parties jointly generate a common FHE public key along with a secret key that is shared among them; they can later cooperatively decrypt ciphertexts without learning anything but the plaintext. We show how to instantiate this approach efficiently, by extending the recent FHE schemes of Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan (CRYPTO ’11, FOCS ’11, ITCS ’12) based on the (ring) learning with errors assumption. Our main tool is to exploit the property that such schemes are additively homomorphic over their keys. Using TFHE, we construct simple multiparty computation protocols secure against fully malicious attackers, tolerating any number of corruptions, and providing security in the universal composability framework. Our protocols have the following properties: Low interaction: 3 rounds of interaction given a common random string, or 2 rounds with a public-key infrastructure. Low communication: independent of the function being computed (proportional to just input and output sizes). Cloud-assisted computation: the bulk of the computation can be efficiently outsourced to an external entity (e.g. a cloud service) so that the computation of all other parties is independent of the complexity of the evaluated function. 1