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A Principle for Cryptographic Protocols Beyond Security, Less Parameters.

Zhengjun Cao

Published Jan 1, 2010• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Abstract Almost cryptographic protocols are presented with security arguments. None of them, however, did explain why a protocol should like this, not like that. The reason is that there are short of any principles for designing and analyzing cryptographic protocols. In this paper, we put forth such a principle beyond security, called Less Parameters, which says that the involved parameters should be reduced as less as possible. Actually, the principle ensures a protocol better cost. In different scenarios, the principle is not easy to grasp. Intuitively, we advise to introduce public parameters as less as possible. In the light of the principle, we investigate some signatures. We believe the techniques developed in this paper will be helpful to better some cryptographic protocols.

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Abstract Almost cryptographic protocols are presented with security arguments. None of them, however, did explain why a protocol should like this, not like that. The reason is that there are short of any principles for designing and analyzing cryptographic protocols. In this paper, we put forth such a principle beyond security, called Less Parameters, which says that the involved parameters should be reduced as less as possible. Actually, the principle ensures a protocol better cost. In different scenarios, the principle is not easy to grasp. Intuitively, we advise to introduce public parameters as less as possible. In the light of the principle, we investigate some signatures. We believe the techniques developed in this paper will be helpful to better some cryptographic protocols.
The design of secure protocols that implement arbitrarily desired functionalities is a major part of modern cryptography. Taking the opposite perspective, the design of any cryptographic scheme may be viewed as the design of a secure protocol for implementing a suitable functionality. Still, we believe that it makes sense to differentiate between basic cryptographic primitives (which involve little interaction) like encryption and signature schemes, on the one hand, and general cryptographic protocols, on the other hand. In this chapter we consider general results concerning secure multi –party computations, where the two –party case is an important special case. In a nutshell, these results assert that one can construct protocols for securely computing any desirable multi–party functionality (see the following terminology). Indeed, what is striking about these results is their generality, and we believe that the wonder is not diminished by the (various alternative) conditions under which these results hold. Our focus on the general study of secure multi–party computation (rather than on protocols for solving specific problems) is natural in the context of the theoretical treatment of the subject matter. We wish to highlight the importance of this general study to practice. Firstly, this study clarifies fundamental issues regarding security in a multi–party environment. Secondly, it draws the lines between what is possible in principle and what is not. Thirdly, it develops general techniques for designing secure protocols. And last, sometimes it may even yield schemes (or modules) that may be incorporated in practical systems.
In this work, we investigate the security of interactive computations. The main emphasis is on the mathematical methodology that is needed to formalise and analyse various security properties. Differently from many classical treatments of secure multi-party computations, we always quantify security in exact terms. Although working with concrete time bounds and success probabilities is technically more demanding, it also has several advantages. As all security guarantees are quantitative, we can always compare different protocol designs. Moreover, these security guarantees also have a clear economical interpretation and it is possible to compare cryptographic and non-cryptographic solutions. The latter is extremely important in practice, since cryptographic techniques are just one possibility to achieve practical security. Also, working with exact bounds makes reasoning errors more apparent, as security proofs are less abstract and it is easier to locate false claims. The choice of topics covered in this thesis was guided by two principles. Firstly, we wanted to give a coherent overview of the secure multi-party computation that is based on exact quantification of security guarantees. Secondly, we focused on topics that emerged from the author's own research. In that sense, the thesis generalises many methodological discoveries made by the author. As surprising as it may seem, security definitions and proofs mostly utilise principles of hypothesis testing and analysis of stochastic algorithms. Thus, we start our treatment with hypothesis testing and its generalisations. In particular, we show how to quantify various security properties, using security games as tools. Next, we review basic proof techniques and explain how to structure complex proofs so they become easily verifiable. In a nutshell, we describe how to represent a proof as a game tree, where each edge corresponds to an elementary proof step. As a result, one can first verify the overall structure of a proof by looking at the syntactic changes in the game tree and only then verify all individual proof steps corresponding to the edges. The remaining part of the thesis is dedicated to various aspects of protocol design. Firstly, we discuss how to formalise various security goals, such as input-privacy, output-consistency and complete security, and how to choose a security goal that is appropriate for a specific setting. Secondly, we also explore alternatives to exact security. More precisely, we analyse connections between exact and asymptotic security models and rigorously formalise a notion of subjective security. Thirdly, we study in which conditions protocols preserve their security guarantees and how to safely combine several protocols. Although composability results are common knowledge, we look at them from a slightly different angle. Namely, it is irrational to design universally composable protocols at any cost; instead, we should design computationally efficient protocols with minimal usage restrictions. Thus, we propose a three-stage design procedure that leads to modular security proofs and minimises usage restrictions.
The secure pairing cryptographic protocols have become a strong paradigm to offer possessing security facilities of high level including identity-based encryptions, short signature and an effective key exchange in a distributed set up.The paper below gives a sketch of how to achieve secure two-way communication protocols based on the theory of bilinear maps and hardness assumptions such as Bilinear Diffie Hellman (BDH), Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) and Decisional Diffie Hellman (DDH).The proposed architecture possesses a strong key generation, secure distribution as well as effective encryption-decryption at the small scale (resource constrained) and large scale.Analytical analysis shows that security resiliency is better with adaptive adversaries and ensuring computational efficiency.Compared ideas provide less complexity of significant administration and greater scalability in contrast to customary public key infrastructures.This model can be applied to cloud security, IoT networks and decentralized systems and this provides a solid guideline on how to develop the next-generation cryptographic protocols.
The methods of cryptography can be successful only if they are properly incorporated into an application. A cryptographic technique can be unbreakable as such, and yet could still be insecure if it is used unwisely. This observation motivates the subject of security protocols. A security protocol consists of a formal method of using a cryptographic technique in a practical application. Without a well-defined security protocol, a perfectly secure cryptographic technique could be compromised by its use.