The existence of unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment (QBC) is excluded by the Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go theorem. Here we look for the second-best: a QBC protocol that can defeat certain quantum attacks. By breaking the knowledge symmetry between the participants with quantum algorithm, a QBC protocol is proposed and is proven to be secure against a major kind of coherent attacks---the dummy attack, in which the participant makes an empty promise instead of committing to a specific bit. Therefore it surpasses previous QBC protocols which are secure against individual attacks only.
This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract I Introduction II Bit Commitment – from the Ancient to the Post-Modern World A Bit Commitment in the Ancient World B Bit Commitment in the Modern World C Bit Commitment in the Post-Modern World III Insecurity of Quantum Bit Commitment A General Form of a Quantum Bit Commitment Scheme B Unitary Description C Generality of the above Description D Schmidt Decomposition E Alice's Cheating Strategy IV Concluding Remarks A Secure Computations B Security Analysis of Composite Quantum Protocols C Lessons We Learn Acknowledgements References