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Luoyang Shifan Xueyuan xuebao

Study on the Security of Quantum Key Distribution

Weimin Peng

Published Jan 1, 2010• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The security of quantum key distribution is based on the validity of quantum principle,then it is secure in physics.However an eavesdropper can interne in the legal users' communication without violate the physical principles.In this paper,we will give detailed discussions on some attack techniques by an eavesdropper,which including individual attack,collective attack,impersonal attack,photon-number-resolving attack and Trojan horse attack.

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The security of quantum key distribution is based on the validity of quantum principle,then it is secure in physics.However an eavesdropper can interne in the legal users' communication without violate the physical principles.In this paper,we will give detailed discussions on some attack techniques by an eavesdropper,which including individual attack,collective attack,impersonal attack,photon-number-resolving attack and Trojan horse attack.
Standard quantum key distribution protocols are provably secure against eavesdropping attacks, if quantum theory is correct. It is theoretically interesting to know if we need to assume the validity of quantum theory to prove the security of quantum key distribution, or whether its security can be based on other physical principles. The question would also be of practical interest if quantum mechanics were ever to fail in some regime, because a scientifically and technologically advanced eavesdropper could perhaps use postquantum physics to extract information from quantum communications without necessarily causing the quantum state disturbances on which existing security proofs rely. Here we describe a key distribution scheme provably secure against general attacks by a postquantum eavesdropper limited only by the impossibility of superluminal signaling. Its security stems from violation of a Bell inequality.
In this work,three security models of quantum key distribution are introduced.The practical characters of the light source,the modulator and the single photon detector are analyzed,and the corresponding differences between the perfect and the practical quantum key distribution system are estimated.The details of the attacking methods and measures are described and investigated.We also focus on the device-independent class quantum key distribution protocol,which is a new important aspect of this research area.
Abstract Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) disregard the effect of information leakage from the users’ devices, and, thus, do not protect against Trojan-horse attacks (THAs). In a THA, the eavesdropper injects strong light into the QKD apparatuses, and then analyzes the back-reflected light to learn information about their internal setting choices. Only a few recent works consider this security threat, but predict a rather poor performance of QKD unless the devices are strongly isolated from the channel. Here, we derive finite-key security bounds for decoy-state-based QKD schemes in the presence of THAs, which significantly outperform previous analyses. Our results constitute an important step forward to closing the existing gap between theory and practice in QKD.
Abstract Early security proofs of the keys in quantum cryptography systems were based on the assumption that the transmitting and receiving stations were completely isolated from the outside world—the eavesdropper. However, this condition cannot be implemented in practice, since quantum cryptography systems are open systems, in the sense that an eavesdropper can have indirect access, for example, through a fiber communication channel to critical equipment elements (phase modulators, intensity modulators, etc) using active sensing of the state of these elements—Trojan-horse attacks. A new Trojan-horse attack based on joint unambiguous measurements of reflected probing states from an intensity modulator and information states in a quantum communication channel is proposed. Estimates of attack parameters for a number of quantum key distribution protocols are given, when an attack leads to compromise of keys.
Cryptography is age old technique used for secret communication of messages. Quantum cryptography is providing cryptographic solutions based on laws of quantum physics. Quantum public key distribution is prominent solution using which two parties can communicate securely using quantum physics. Heisenberg uncertainty principle, no cloning theorem and photon polarization are used as basic properties for quantum key distribution. Photons are basic quantum particles and they are quantized for encryption. They are also known as qubits. This paper discusses concepts behind quantum key distribution and how it is secure against eavesdropper and future advances in technology.