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Methods research of constructing simulator in UC security proof

Huang Zhou-jing

Published Jan 1, 2012• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The difficulty of every security proof of cryptographic protocols in UC framework(universally composable security analysis framework) is to construct a simulator correctly.However,there is no generally effective method used to construct a simulator.A desired method is proposed.Firstly,the building principle of UC framework is researched,and the essential requirement of UC security is analyzed.Secondly,the existence condition and simulation content of a simulator are given.Finally,an effective and universal solution to prove the security of cryptographic protocols in UC framework is formulated.The method is helpful understanding UC framework in-depth and in analyzing cryptographic protocols accurately using the framework.

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The difficulty of every security proof of cryptographic protocols in UC framework(universally composable security analysis framework) is to construct a simulator correctly.However,there is no generally effective method used to construct a simulator.A desired method is proposed.Firstly,the building principle of UC framework is researched,and the essential requirement of UC security is analyzed.Secondly,the existence condition and simulation content of a simulator are given.Finally,an effective and universal solution to prove the security of cryptographic protocols in UC framework is formulated.The method is helpful understanding UC framework in-depth and in analyzing cryptographic protocols accurately using the framework.
Beginning with the research of the basic concepts of Universally Composable(UC) framework,the requirement of UC security on commitment protocols is analyzed in this paper,and the reason of the problem that all UC commitment protocols do not exist in the plain model is pointed out that the security requirement of commitment protocol and the requirement of UC security are contradictory.On the basis of this,a UC secure commitment protocol UCCOM using tamper-proof hardware is proposed.Analysis result shows that UCCOM does not depend on any trusted third-party and uses fewer cryptographic operations compared with the related works,so it has higer efficiency.
The Universal Composability (UC) framework provides provable security guaranties for harsh application environment, where we want to construct protocols which keep security guarantees even when they are concurrently composed with arbitrary number of arbitrary (even hostile) protocols.This is a very strong guarantee.The UC-framework inherently supports the modular design, which allows secure composition of arbitrary number of UC-secure components with an arbitrary protocol.In contrast, traditional analysis and design is a stand alone analysis where security of a single instance is considered, i.e. an instance which is not in potential interaction with any concurrent instances.Furthermore, a typical traditional analysis is informal, i.e. without a formal proof.In spite of these facts, beyond the task of key-exchange this technology have not really took the attention of the community of applied cryptography.From practitioner's point of view the UC-world may seem more or less an academic interest of theoretical cryptographers.Accordingly we take a pragmatic approach, where we concentrate on meaningful compromises between the assumed adversarial strength, ideality wishes and realization complexity while keeping provable security guarantees within the UC-framework.We believe that even modest but provable goals (especially, if tunable to application scenarios) are interesting if a wider penetration of the UC-technology is desired into the daily-practice of protocol applications.
Recently, in the research field of cryptography, owing to complications on evolutions of newprotocols security proofs of these protocols have become challenging and difficult tasks. Thisdissertation focuses on simplifications of security proofs for cryptographic protocols with twoapproaches.One is constructing protocols which satisfy universally composable security. The universalcomposition (UC) framework provides strong and robust secure composability, i.e., the securityof a component protocol (primitive) which is UC secure in a stand-alone manner will alwaysbe preserved even when it is executed concurrently with other unbounded number of UC secureprimitives in an adversarial controlled manner. In this dissertation, we propose a ring signaturescheme which is an anonymous signature scheme and prove that the scheme satisfies universallycomposable security. By using our protocol we are able to ease the burden of security proofsfor an anonymous message authentication protocol which is constructed by composing with ringsignature.The other is automated or mechanizing security proofs based on formal methods by investigatingthe symbolic proof method. Though a framework in order to make mechanizing securityproofs for protocols based on computationally hardness assumptions was proposed in the previousstudy, there exists a problem that application methods for important protocols are unknownfor lack of case studies. In this dissertation, we propose applications to some important protocols(digital signature and key exchange) and show that mechanizing security proofs are possible.These two approaches enable to reduce costs of security proofs for new protocols respectively.
Introduced by Canetti in 2001, Universal Composability (UC) is a widely adopted security model that enables the specification and proof of security for a broad range of protocols, offering strong security guarantees. At its core lies the universal composition theorem (UC theorem), which ensures that protocols proven secure within the framework remain secure even when deployed in real-world environments with multiple instances of them. In this work, we present two key contributions. First, we identify several problems with the UC framework, in particular the UC Theorem. They include counterexamples, limitations that make it unusable for important classes of protocols, and weaknesses in its proof. These problems reveal flaws in nearly all the fundamental concepts of UC. Second, we propose a revised formulation of the main concepts of UC to address these issues. Although the resulting modifications are nontrivial, our updated definitions are designed to remain as faithful as possible to the structure and intent of the original model.
The universally composable symbolic analysis (UCSA) framework layers Dolev-Yao style symbolic analysis on top of the universally composable (UC) secure framework to construct computationally sound proofs of cryptographic protocol security. The original proposal of the UCSA framework by Canetti and Herzog (2004) focused on protocols that only use public key encryption to achieve 2-party mutual authentication or key exchange. This thesis expands the framework to include protocols that use digital signatures as well. In the process of expanding the framework, we identify a flaw in the framework’s use of UC ideal functionality Fpke. We also identify issues that arise when combining Fpke with the current formulation of ideal signature functionality Fsig. Motivated by these discoveries, we redefine the Fpke and Fsig functionalities appropriately. Thesis Supervisor: Ronald L. Rivest Title: Viterbi Professor of Computer Science Thesis Supervisor: Ran Canetti Title: Visiting Scientist
This work presents a general framework for describing cryptographic protocols and analyzing their security. The framework allows specifying the security requirements of practically any cryptographic task in a unified and systematic way. Furthermore, in this framework the security of protocols is preserved under a general composition operation, called universal composition. The proposed framework with its security-preserving composition operation allows for modular design and analysis of complex cryptographic protocols from simpler building blocks. Moreover, within this framework, protocols are guaranteed to maintain their security in any context, even in the presence of an unbounded number of arbitrary protocol sessions that run concurrently in an adversarially controlled manner. This is a useful guarantee, which allows arguing about the security of cryptographic protocols in complex and unpredictable environments such as modern communication networks.