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Post-Quantum Security of Authenticated Key Establishment Protocols

Jason T. LeGrow

Published Apr 20, 2016• 3 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

We present a security model for authenticated key establishment that allows for quantum interactions between the adversary and quantum oracles that emulate classical parties, resulting in a truly post-quantum security definition. We then give a generic construction for a secure protocol in the quantum random oracle model by combining a signature scheme which is existentially unforgeable under adaptive quantum chosen message attack in the quantum random oracle model (EUF-qCMA-QRO secure) with an unauthenticated key establishment protocol which is secure against a passive adversary. This construction allows us to give an explicit example of a secure protocol whose security is based on a variant of the Diffie-Hellman problem for isogenies of supersingular elliptic curves; in particular, generic security-strengthening transformations allow us to take a signature scheme which is EUF-CMA-RO secure against a quantum adversary and transform it into an EUF-qCMA-QRO signature scheme, which we combine with a standard secure unauthenticated key establishment protocol to achieve the desired result.

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We present a security model for authenticated key establishment that allows for quantum interactions between the adversary and quantum oracles that emulate classical parties, resulting in a truly post-quantum security definition. We then give a generic construction for a secure protocol in the quantum random oracle model by combining a signature scheme which is existentially unforgeable under adaptive quantum chosen message attack in the quantum random oracle model (EUF-qCMA-QRO secure) with an unauthenticated key establishment protocol which is secure against a passive adversary. This construction allows us to give an explicit example of a secure protocol whose security is based on a variant of the Diffie-Hellman problem for isogenies of supersingular elliptic curves; in particular, generic security-strengthening transformations allow us to take a signature scheme which is EUF-CMA-RO secure against a quantum adversary and transform it into an EUF-qCMA-QRO signature scheme, which we combine with a standard secure unauthenticated key establishment protocol to achieve the desired result.
We propose and develop new schemes for post-quantum cryptography based on isogenies over elliptic curves. First we show that ordinary elliptic curves are have less than exponential security against quantum computers. These results were used as the motivation for De Feo, Jao and Pl\\^ut's construction of public key cryptosystems using supersingular elliptic curve isogenies. We extend their construction and show that isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves can be used as the underlying hard mathematical problem for other quantum-resistant schemes. For our second contribution, we propose is an undeniable signature scheme based on elliptic curve isogenies. We prove its security under certain reasonable number-theoretic computational assumptions for which no efficient quantum algorithms are known. This proposal represents only the second known quantum-resistant undeniable signature scheme, and the first such scheme secure under a number-theoretic complexity assumption. Finally, we also propose a security model for evaluating the security of authenticated encryption schemes in the post-quantum setting. Our model is based on a combination of the classical Bellare-Namprempre security model for authenticated encryption together with modifications from Boneh and Zhandry to handle message authentication against quantum adversaries. We give a generic construction based on Bellare-Namprempre for producing an authenticated encryption protocol from any quantum-resistant symmetric-key encryption scheme together with any digital signature scheme or MAC admitting any classical security reduction to a quantum-computationally hard problem. We apply the results and show how we can explicitly construct authenticated encryption schemes based on isogenies.
Random oracle model is a general security analysis tool for rigorous security proof and effective cryptographic protocol design. In the quantum world, the attempts of constructing a quantum random oracle (QRO) have been made, such as quantum-accessible random oracle for post-quantum cryptography and quantum random oracle for quantum digital signature. As in the classical circumstance, it is crucial and challenging to design and instantiate the QRO model with an appropriate quantum hash function. In this work, we construct a QRO model for quantum public-key encryption against key-collision attack, due to the near-orthogonality property of the QRO. To explore a feasible instantiation procedure in the quantum setting, we distinctively give two instantiation examples of QRO by means of single-qubit rotation and quantum fingerprinting, and compare the numerical results of their performances under the key-collision attack. As a result, we extend the QRO model to the security analysis of quantum public-key encryption beyond quantum digital signature, and immunity from collision-type attacks.
Widely used communication and messaging protocols, e.g., TLS 1.3 and Signal, are insecure against an adversary with a quantum computer. We expect that post-quantum security will become mandatory for a new generation of cryptographic protocols in the nearest 10-15 years. The analysis of existing post-quantum secure cryptographic tools for key exchange, encryption and message authentication based on hard problems in codes, lattices, ring learning with errors and elliptic curve isogenies revealed their advantages and drawbacks. In particular, we conclude, that the main threat to communication and messaging protocols is only pre-quantum security of currently used Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocols. We summarize efficiency and safety results for each class of post-quantum cryptographic schemes and present an experimental implementation of isogeny-based Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange protocol as an illustration of their applicability.
Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) is a cryptographic protocol to share a common session key among multiple parties. Usually, PKI-based AKE schemes are designed to guarantee secrecy of the session key and mutual authentication. However, in practice, there are many cases where mutual authentication is undesirable such as in anonymous networks like Tor and Riffle, or difficult to achieve due to the certificate management at the user level such as the Internet. Goldberg et al. formulated a model of anonymous one-sided AKE which guarantees the anonymity of the client by allowing only the client to authenticate the server, and proposed a concrete scheme. However, existing anonymous one-sided AKE schemes are only known to be secure in the random oracle model. In this paper, we propose generic constructions of anonymous one-sided AKE in the random oracle model and in the standard model, respectively. Our constructions allow us to construct the first post-quantum anonymous one-sided AKE scheme from isogenies in the standard model.
We initiate the study of quantum-secure digital signatures and quantum chosen ciphertext security. In the case of signatures, we enhance the standard chosen message query model by allowing the adversary to issue quantum chosen message queries: given a superposition of messages, the adversary receives a superposition of signatures on those messages. Similarly, for encryption, we allow the adversary to issue quantum chosen ciphertext queries: given a superposition of ciphertexts, the adversary receives a superposition of their decryptions. These adversaries model a natural post-quantum environment where end-users sign messages and decrypt ciphertexts on a personal quantum computer. We construct classical systems that remain secure when exposed to such quantum queries. For signatures we construct two compilers that convert classically secure signatures into signatures secure in the quantum setting and apply these compilers to existing post-quantum signatures. We also show that standard constructions such as Lamport one-time signatures and Merkle signatures remain secure under quantum chosen message attacks, thus giving signatures whose quantum security is based on generic assumptions. For encryption, we define security under quantum chosen ciphertext attacks and present both public-key and symmetric-key constructions.