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IET Information Security

Low Noise LPN: Key dependent message secure public key encryption an sample amplification

Nico Döttling

Published Apr 11, 2016• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Cryptographic schemes based on the learning parity with noise (LPN) problem have several very desirable aspects: low computational overhead, simple implementation and conjectured post‐quantum hardness. Choosing the LPN noise parameter sufficiently low allows for public key cryptography. In this study, the authors construct the first standard model public key encryption scheme with key dependent message security based solely on the low‐noise LPN problem. Additionally, they establish a new connection between LPN with a bounded number of samples and LPN with an unbounded number of samples. In essence, they show that if LPN with a small error and a small number of samples is hard, then LPN with a slightly larger error and an unbounded number of samples is also hard. The key technical ingredient to establish both results is a variant of the LPN problem called the extended LPN problem.

DOI
10.1049/iet-ifs.2015.0495

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Cryptographic schemes based on the learning parity with noise (LPN) problem have several very desirable aspects: low computational overhead, simple implementation and conjectured post‐quantum hardness. Choosing the LPN noise parameter sufficiently low allows for public key cryptography. In this study, the authors construct the first standard model public key encryption scheme with key dependent message security based solely on the low‐noise LPN problem. Additionally, they establish a new connection between LPN with a bounded number of samples and LPN with an unbounded number of samples. In essence, they show that if LPN with a small error and a small number of samples is hard, then LPN with a slightly larger error and an unbounded number of samples is also hard. The key technical ingredient to establish both results is a variant of the LPN problem called the extended LPN problem.
Random classical codes have good error correcting properties, and yet they are notoriously hard to decode in practice. Despite many decades of extensive study, the fastest known algorithms still run in exponential time. The Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem, which can be seen as the task of decoding a random linear code in the presence of noise, has thus emerged as a prominent hardness assumption with numerous applications in both cryptography and learning theory. Is there a natural quantum analog of the LPN problem? In this work, we introduce the Learning Stabilizers with Noise (LSN) problem, the task of decoding a random stabilizer code in the presence of local depolarizing noise. We give both polynomial-time and exponential-time quantum algorithms for solving LSN in various depolarizing noise regimes, ranging from extremely low noise, to low constant noise rates, and even higher noise rates up to a threshold. Next, we provide concrete evidence that LSN is hard. First, we show that LSN includes LPN as a special case, which suggests that it is at least as hard as its classical counterpart. Second, we prove worst-case to average-case reductions for variants of LSN. We then ask: what is the computational complexity of solving LSN? Because the task features quantum inputs, its complexity cannot be characterized by traditional complexity classes. Instead, we show that the LSN problem lies in a recently introduced (distributional and oracle) unitary synthesis class. Finally, we identify several applications of our LSN assumption, ranging from the construction of quantum bit commitment schemes to the computational limitations of learning from quantum data.
Post-quantum cryptography currently rests on a small number of hardness assumptions, posing significant risks should any one of them be compromised. This vulnerability motivates the search for new and cryptographically versatile assumptions that make a convincing case for quantum hardness. In this work, we argue that decoding random quantum stabilizer codes---a quantum analog of the well-studied LPN problem---is an excellent candidate. This task occupies a unique middle ground: it is inherently native to quantum computation, yet admits an equivalent formulation with purely classical input and output, as recently shown by Khesin et al. (STOC '26). We prove that the average-case hardness of quantum stabilizer decoding implies the core primitives of classical Cryptomania, including public-key encryption (PKE) and oblivious transfer (OT), as well as one-way functions. Our constructions are moreover practically efficient: our PKE scheme achieves essentially the same efficiency as state-of-the-art LPN-based PKE. We also provide substantial evidence that stabilizer decoding does not reduce to LPN, suggesting that the former problem constitutes a genuinely new post-quantum assumption. Our primary technical contributions are twofold. First, we give a reduction from random quantum stabilizer decoding to an average-case problem closely resembling LPN, but which is equipped with additional symplectic algebraic structure. While this structure is essential to the quantum nature of the problem, it raises significant barriers to cryptographic security reductions. Second, we develop a new suite of scrambling techniques for such structured linear spaces, and use them to produce rigorous security proofs for all of our constructions.
In this work, we deal with cryptosystems which are provably secure even if we encrypt a key-dependent message. These cryptosystems are called KDM-secure. First, we define KDM-security and discuss its relationship with other kinds of security, especially IND-CPA-security. Thereafter, we construct the public- key and the symmetric-key encryption scheme of Applebaum et al. (CRYPTO 2009) and we prove KDM-security of these cryprosystems with respect to the set of affine functions. The security of our cryptosystems is based on the LWE problem and the LPN problem as its special case. We study these problems and their variants. Moreover, we give a brief introduction to lattices and hard lattice problems because there exist reductions from hard lattice problems to LWE. 1
Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) is a foundational cryptography primitive, which can provide secure symmetric cryptographic key material for transmission by using public key algorithms. Until now, many Chosen-Ciphertext (IND-CCA) secure KEM schemes are constructed from Chosen-Plaintext (IND-CPA) or One-Way (OW-CPA) secure PKE via the generic Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transformations (TCC 2017). However, the security relies on the Random Oracle Model (ROM). To the best of our knowledge, there are no IND-CCA secure KEM schemes based on Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption that can against post quantum attacks in the standard model. In this work, we propose the first direct construction of LPN-based KEM, which is secure in the standard model. In particular, we use double-trapdoor technique to answer adversary’s decryption queries correctly and a Target Collision Resistant (TCR) hash function to check the validity of the ciphertext. The encapsulated key is determined by a special LPN problem (with no random oracle required). The scheme is IND-CCA secure against post-quantum attacks under the low-noise LPN assumptions by a series of games and the security reduction is tight. Compared with previous schemes on 128-bit security level, our CCA-secure scheme only holds 50.78MB public keys, 62.50MB secret keys and 4.54KB ciphertexts, which is more efficient than the schemes of Döttlinget al.(ASIACRYPT 2012), Kiltzet al.(PKC 2014) and Yuet al.(CRYPTO 2016) ((7.27GB, 7.24GB, 7.03KB), (80.89MB, 46.23MB, 6.80KB) and (70.95MB, 70.65MB, 86.50KB) respectively).
In this paper we propose the first provably secure public key encryption scheme based on the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem, in which secrets and errors are sampled uniformly at random from a relatively small set rather than from the commonly used discrete Gaussian distribution. Using a uniform distribution, instead of a Gaussian, has the potential of improving computational efficiency a great deal due to its simplicity, thus making the scheme attractive for use in practice. At the same time our scheme features the strong security guarantee of being based on the hardness of worst-case lattice problems. After presenting the construction of our scheme we prove its security and propose asymptotic parameters. Finally, we compare our scheme on several measures to one of the most efficient LWE-based encryption schemes with Gaussian noise. We show that the expected efficiency improvement is debunked, due to the large blow-up of the parameter sets involved.
Abstract. In this paper we propose the first provably secure public key encryption scheme based on the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem, in which secrets and errors are sampled uniformly at random from a relatively small set rather than from the commonly used discrete Gaussian distribution. Using a uniform distribution, instead of a Gaussian, has the potential of improving computational efficiency a great deal due to its simplicity, thus making the scheme attractive for use in practice. At the same time our scheme features the strong security guarantee of being based on the hardness of worst-case lattice problems. After presenting the construction of our scheme we prove its security and propose asymptotic parameters. Finally, we compare our scheme on several measures to one of the most efficient LWE-based encryption schemes with Gaussian noise. We show that the expected efficiency improvement is debunked, due to the large blow-up of the parameter sets involved.