Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Journal of Mathematical Psychology

Quantum dynamical modeling of competition and cooperation between political parties: The coalition and non-coalition equilibrium model

Polina Khrennikova

Published Mar 31, 2016• 49 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.jmp.2016.02.009

Related papers

An Application of the Theory of Open Quantum Systems to Model the Dynamics of Party Governance in the US Political System

Polina Khrennikova, Emmanuel E. Haven, Andrei Yu. Khrennikov

arXiv:1206.2888•International Journal of Theoretical Physics•Nov 29, 2013•95 citations

A quantum-like model of political consensus via non self-adjoint Hamiltonians

Fabio Bagarello, Gloria Liarda

We discuss here how non self-adjoint Hamiltonians, and their related Heisenberg-like dynamics, can be used to model a political system consisting in a coalition $\C$ of different parties (forming a government) and by their (original) supporters $\Sc$. Our aim is to model how the opinion of these supporters changes depending on the efficiency, competence and coherence of the coalition $\C$, as these are perceived by $\Sc$ during their action while governing. After a rather general introduction we propose three specific models, and we describe and comment the dynamical behaviour of the { full} system, $\Sc\cup\C$. The role of the so-called {\em balanced Hamiltonians}, recently introduced by the authors in connection with integrals of motion, is discussed in details.

math-phCross-listedarXiv:2606.19014•Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications•Jun 18, 2026•0 citations

Using Quantum Game Theory to Model Competition

Vithala R. Rao, Nathan Yang, Saleh Zakerinia

•Jan 1, 2024•3 citations

A Hierarchical Game for Physical Layer Security Aware Cooperative Communications with Dynamic Interchangeable Relaying and Jamming

Denghui Liu, Ruoyang Chen, Changyan Yi +5 more

This paper investigates a dynamic game framework for physical layer security (PLS)-aware wireless network with third-party collaborative users (TCUs). In the considered system, legitimate users (LUs) aim to transmit secret signals under the threat of eavesdroppers (EVs). There exists TCUs rationally selecting to form coalitions with LUs or EVs, strategically enhancing the secrecy transmission rates for LUs or increasing eavesdropping rates for EVs to obtain rewards. Due to the unpredictability of wireless systems (e.g., time-varying channel conditions, user mobility), coalitions among the three parties may be unfixed and dynamically changing. A hierarchical game integrating a matching subgame with a coalition formation subgame is formulated to model the interactions among LUs, EVs, and TCUs. In order to derive the optimal long-term strategies while solving the equilibrium of the hierarchical game, we first introduce a constrained Gale-Shapley algorithm which determines the optimal power, mode, and channel selections of TCUs with the known coalition partition, and then propose a coalition selection algorithm for reaching the stability of coalition partitions. Moreover, we develop a deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based solution to concatenate the aforementioned algorithms, producing the long-term optimal strategies for LUs, EVs and TCUs over multiple time slots. Simulations evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, and demonstrate its superiority over counterparts.

IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology•Sep 11, 2024•44 citations

Quantum game theory

Taksu Cheon

•Jun 1, 2011•0 citations

Quantum Approach to Game Theory

Ramón Alonso‐Sanz

Emergence, complexity and computation•Jan 1, 2019•1 citation
We discuss here how non self-adjoint Hamiltonians, and their related Heisenberg-like dynamics, can be used to model a political system consisting in a coalition $\C$ of different parties (forming a government) and by their (original) supporters $\Sc$. Our aim is to model how the opinion of these supporters changes depending on the efficiency, competence and coherence of the coalition $\C$, as these are perceived by $\Sc$ during their action while governing. After a rather general introduction we propose three specific models, and we describe and comment the dynamical behaviour of the { full} system, $\Sc\cup\C$. The role of the so-called {\em balanced Hamiltonians}, recently introduced by the authors in connection with integrals of motion, is discussed in details.
This paper investigates a dynamic game framework for physical layer security (PLS)-aware wireless network with third-party collaborative users (TCUs). In the considered system, legitimate users (LUs) aim to transmit secret signals under the threat of eavesdroppers (EVs). There exists TCUs rationally selecting to form coalitions with LUs or EVs, strategically enhancing the secrecy transmission rates for LUs or increasing eavesdropping rates for EVs to obtain rewards. Due to the unpredictability of wireless systems (e.g., time-varying channel conditions, user mobility), coalitions among the three parties may be unfixed and dynamically changing. A hierarchical game integrating a matching subgame with a coalition formation subgame is formulated to model the interactions among LUs, EVs, and TCUs. In order to derive the optimal long-term strategies while solving the equilibrium of the hierarchical game, we first introduce a constrained Gale-Shapley algorithm which determines the optimal power, mode, and channel selections of TCUs with the known coalition partition, and then propose a coalition selection algorithm for reaching the stability of coalition partitions. Moreover, we develop a deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based solution to concatenate the aforementioned algorithms, producing the long-term optimal strategies for LUs, EVs and TCUs over multiple time slots. Simulations evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, and demonstrate its superiority over counterparts.