Agr??t deal of so-called classical physics takes its cues from the work shop nd from the machinist' art. This is true no only in erms of generalities; it has often held in a very personal sense. For example, Isaac Newton was a passionate tinkerer in his younger years. Again, to take a more recent instance, this writer has had the privilege on two oc casions, of a lengthy scientific discussion with Albert Einstein. Although the specific subject matters were quite different, it was striking, each time, to see the way Einstein's mind was working through engineering images and how often he used the engineer's language. Interpolation of numberless other examples between these two giants of classical physics would be easy but the subject is too well known to insist upon it. To de scribe, as is customary, the philosophy of classical physics as mechanistic is apt phraseology. The introduction of statistical elements into physical theory became extensive about a century ago through kinetic theory, which was then mathematically organized into statistical mechanics. A much more radi cal penetration of statistical elements into physics occurred with the ad vent of quantum mechanics. The development of mathematical methods was rapid but the interpretation which constituted the breaking away from mechanistic types of thought was slower. Again, these matters are such a well-known part of scientific history that we need not dwell on them. Owing to the long-standing tradition of mechanistic models, sta tistical features have often been considered either as a nuisance or as a pretext for mathematical elegance in preference to the approach which we take here, namely, thinking of them as a class of remarkable natural phenomena in their own right. Along with the various mechanistic models of matter, there has throughout history existed another trend of natural philosophy: Its basic view is to think of matter as a creative agency. Since according to an age old adage nothing comes out of nothing, we need to state this proposition more clearly if it is to make sense. The possibility of its essentially abstract formulation will then become apparent in due turn. Because the mecha nist has at his disposal differential equations and the conservation laws which they imply, he can, and invariably does, push the problems of creation into the dim recesses of time and space. On the other hand, when we speak of creativity we must here imply that a material substrate is 502
Agr??t deal of so-called classical physics takes its cues from the work shop nd from the machinist' art. This is true no only in erms of generalities; it has often held in a very personal sense. For example, Isaac Newton was a passionate tinkerer in his younger years. Again, to take a more recent instance, this writer has had the privilege on two oc casions, of a lengthy scientific discussion with Albert Einstein. Although the specific subject matters were quite different, it was striking, each time, to see the way Einstein's mind was working through engineering images and how often he used the engineer's language. Interpolation of numberless other examples between these two giants of classical physics would be easy but the subject is too well known to insist upon it. To de scribe, as is customary, the philosophy of classical physics as mechanistic is apt phraseology. The introduction of statistical elements into physical theory became extensive about a century ago through kinetic theory, which was then mathematically organized into statistical mechanics. A much more radi cal penetration of statistical elements into physics occurred with the ad vent of quantum mechanics. The development of mathematical methods was rapid but the interpretation which constituted the breaking away from mechanistic types of thought was slower. Again, these matters are such a well-known part of scientific history that we need not dwell on them. Owing to the long-standing tradition of mechanistic models, sta tistical features have often been considered either as a nuisance or as a pretext for mathematical elegance in preference to the approach which we take here, namely, thinking of them as a class of remarkable natural phenomena in their own right. Along with the various mechanistic models of matter, there has throughout history existed another trend of natural philosophy: Its basic view is to think of matter as a creative agency. Since according to an age old adage nothing comes out of nothing, we need to state this proposition more clearly if it is to make sense. The possibility of its essentially abstract formulation will then become apparent in due turn. Because the mecha nist has at his disposal differential equations and the conservation laws which they imply, he can, and invariably does, push the problems of creation into the dim recesses of time and space. On the other hand, when we speak of creativity we must here imply that a material substrate is 502
It is possible that discussion of the perennial mind-body problem has been vitiated by a misunderstanding, not of the philosophy or psychology involved, but of the physics? Michael Lockwood thinks so. 'In the preface to mind, Brain and the Quantum he writes' 'In reflecting on the relation of consciousness to the matter of the brain, philosophers have been apt to take matter for granted, assuming that it is mind rather than matter that is philosophicallly problematic.' However,(p178) 'quantum mechanics is not to be regarded as just another scientific theory... it demands a complete revolution in our way of looking at the world.' His thesis, then, is that a proper re-orientation of our view of the physical world in the light of quantum mechanics (or, more precisely, of his preferred view of the interpretation of the quantum formalism) will go at least a long way towards resolving the problem of the nature of 'mental' phenomena and processes.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
Abstract In the first quarter of this century physicists were slowly and somewhat reluctantly forced to realize that the view of the physical world, so painstakingly built up over the preceding four centuries, was in serious need of revision. In particular, the laws that governed the motion of particles on the atomic scale were not those of classical mechanics. Physics found itself catapulted into the strange new world of quantum theory in which the very notion of position or velocity of a particle became blurred and statistical laws dominated everything.
Physics Within Nondual Consciousness Amit Goswami Introduction A basic problem of philosophy is to establish monism underlying all the apparent dualisms that exist around and about us. Some of these dualisms are consciousness/matter transcendent/immanent conscious/unconscious subject/object life/nonlife mind/brain exteriority/inferiority subject/person The straightforward approach, of course, is to consider all these as real dualities—this is the philosophy of dualism. However, the philosophy of dualism is not considered tenable if we take a scientific, explanatory, and verifiable approach. Take the dualism of consciousness and matter, for example. If consciousness and matter are truly dualistic, that is, made of two entirely different substances, then how do they interact? Their interaction requires a mediator. The obvious absence of a mediator speaks in favor of a monism. According to many physicists, scientists, and philosophers, physics must be carried out on the basis of the philosophy of material or scientific realism—the philosophy that only matter is real; all else, including consciousness, is an epiphenomenon of matter. It is assumed that such an approach serves to establish monism, based on material supremacy, over dualism. But material monism is a pseudomonism. In truth, material-realistic models of consciousness are unable to explain the hard questions of consciousness such as the subject/object split nature of experience (Chalmers 1995). Similarly, there are holistic approaches within the basic materialist ontology (Capra 1996) that try to resolve the consciousness/matter and transcendent/immanent dualisms by regarding consciousness as a holistic aspect of matter (the whole is greater than the parts), but this completely ignores the transcendent aspect of consciousness (Wilber 1996). The philosopher Daniel Dennet (1991) agrees that materialist cognitive-science models of consciousness in the brain do succumb to an underlying dualism, the implicit idea that a homunculus is looking at the computer output that the brain [End Page 535] generates. Dennet's own answer is operationalism (also called logical positivism). Consciousness is a purely operational concept; there is no substance to it and no causal efficacy, and thus no explanation is needed for the hard questions of consciousness. Operationalism does not work because consciousness does have causal efficacy as exhibited in such phenomena as creativity, ethics, and spirituality. But how does one include a causally potent consciousness in material-realist science, in which there is only upward causation—cause rising upwards in the hierarchical structures of matter? Elementary particles and their interactions cause all phenomena of the atoms; atoms and their interactions cause all phenomena of the molecules; molecules and their interactions cause all phenomena of the neurons; neurons are responsible for all phenomena of the brain; and the brain is the causal basis for consciousness. The physicist Henry Stapp (1995) has shown that in classical physics there are only two ways that consciousness can be treated: epiphenomenalism and dualism. But quantum physics has opened a way to introduce a causally efficacious consciousness in physics, and thus in all science (Goswami 1993; Herbert 1993; Stapp 1993; Eccles 1994). In particular, I have shown (Goswami 1989, 1990, 1993) that if quantum physics is interpreted on the basis of the primacy of consciousness as according to the philosophy of monistic idealism, then all the well-known paradoxes of quantum physics can be resolved satisfactorily. Like material realism, the philosophy of monistic idealism is also very old. The oldest known version is probably the Indian Vedānta, but the esoteric traditions behind all great religions are based on this philosophy. In the Western academy, Plato is perhaps the most easily identified monistic idealist. In monistic idealism, consciousness is the ground of all being and is transcendent. What we see as the immanent reality lies transcendent within consciousness until consciousness creates it by a power that Easterners call maya and that Plato identified as projection. The transcendent and the immanent are complementary aspects of one and the same thing; nama (name) and rupa (form) in Vedānta, yang and yin in Taoism, heaven and earth in Christianity, and the archetypes and the shadow show in the allegory of Plato's cave (Plato 1980) are some examples of such complementary pairs. This pair, along with consciousness (which transcends them both), makes up the trinity...
So far, this book has dealt almost exclusively with classical physics, which is a theoretical structure based on many brilliant and imaginative experiments performed on macroscopic objects, that is on objects of about our size or a few orders of magnitude smaller or larger. Classical physics was found to give good results when extrapolated downward to molecules and upward to planets, stars, and galaxies, and it was seriously suggested ate in the nineteenth century that all the major discoveries in physics had been made — that the physical basis of the universe was understood and that only minor tidying-up remained.