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Physical Review A

Counterfactual quantum cryptography based on weak coherent states

Zhen−Qiang Yin, Hong-Wei Li, Yao Yao, Chun-Mei Zhang, Shuang Wang, Wei Chen, Guang‐Can Guo, Zheng‐Fu Han

Published Aug 13, 2012• 37 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In the ``counterfactual quantum cryptography'' scheme [T.-G. Noh, Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 230501 (2009)], two legitimate distant peers may share secret-key bits even when the information carriers do not travel in the quantum channel. The security of this protocol with an ideal single-photon source has been proved by Yin et al. [Z.-Q. Yin, H. W. Li, W. Chen, Z. F. Han, and G. C. Guo, Phys. Rev. A 82, 042335 (2010)]. In this paper, we prove the security of the counterfactual-quantum-cryptography scheme based on a commonly used weak-coherent-laser source by considering a general collective attack. The basic assumption of this proof is that the efficiency and dark-counting rate of a single-photon detector are consistent for any $n$-photon Fock states. Then through randomizing the phases of the encoding weak coherent states, Eve's ancilla will be transformed into a classical mixture. Finally, the lower bound of the secret-key-bit rate and a performance analysis for the practical implementation are both given.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.86.022313

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In the ``counterfactual quantum cryptography'' scheme [T.-G. Noh, Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 230501 (2009)], two legitimate distant peers may share secret-key bits even when the information carriers do not travel in the quantum channel. The security of this protocol with an ideal single-photon source has been proved by Yin et al. [Z.-Q. Yin, H. W. Li, W. Chen, Z. F. Han, and G. C. Guo, Phys. Rev. A 82, 042335 (2010)]. In this paper, we prove the security of the counterfactual-quantum-cryptography scheme based on a commonly used weak-coherent-laser source by considering a general collective attack. The basic assumption of this proof is that the efficiency and dark-counting rate of a single-photon detector are consistent for any nnn-photon Fock states. Then through randomizing the phases of the encoding weak coherent states, Eve's ancilla will be transformed into a classical mixture. Finally, the lower bound of the secret-key-bit rate and a performance analysis for the practical implementation are both given.
Recently, a ``counterfactual'' quantum-key-distribution scheme was proposed by T.-G. Noh [Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 230501 (2009)]. In this scheme, two legitimate distant peers may share secret keys even when the information carriers are not traveled in the quantum channel. We find that this protocol is equivalent to an entanglement distillation protocol. According to this equivalence, a strict security proof and the asymptotic key bit rate are both obtained when a perfect single-photon source is applied and a Trojan horse attack can be detected. We also find that the security of this scheme is strongly related to not only the bit error rate but also the yields of photons. And our security proof may shed light on the security of other two-way protocols.
Counterfactual quantum cryptography, recently proposed by Noh, is featured with no transmission of signal particles. This exhibits evident security advantages, such as its immunity to the well-known photon-number-splitting attack. In this paper, the theoretical security of counterfactual quantum cryptography protocol against the general intercept-resend attacks is proved by bounding the information of an eavesdropper Eve more tightly than in Yin's proposal [ Phys. Rev. A 82 042335 (2010) ]. It is also shown that practical counterfactual quantum cryptography implementations may be vulnerable when equipped with imperfect apparatuses, by proving that a negative key rate can be achieved when Eve launches a time-shift attack based on imperfect detector efficiency.
Recently, counterfactual quantum cryptography proposed by T. G. Noh [Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 230501 (2009)] becomes an interesting direction in quantum cryptography, and has been realized by some researchers (such as Y. Liu et al's [Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 030501 (2012)]). However, we find out that it is insecure in practical high lossy channel setting. We analyze the secret key rates in lossy channel under a polarization-splitting-measurement attack. Analysis indicates that the protocol is insecure when the loss rate of the one-way channel exceeds 5050%50.
The phase-coding quantum cryptographic scheme using the homodyne detection and weak coherent state [Hirano et al., Phys. Rev. A 68, 042331 (2003)] provides the simplest continuous-variable quantum key distribution scheme from the experimental side. However, the inherent loss of the practical system will not only increase the bit error rate (BER) but also affect the security of the final key. In this paper, we propose a single-photon-detection attack, and then the security of the final key will be compromised in some parameter regimes. Our results show that the BER induced by Eve can be lower than the inherent BER induced by the loss of the system in some parameter regimes. Furthermore, our attack gives the maximal communication distance of this scheme for given experimental parameters.
Counterfactual quantum cryptography (CQC), recently proposed by Noh, is featured with no transmission of signal particles. This exhibits evident security advantage, such as its immunity to the well known PNS attack. In this paper, the theoretical security of CQC protocol against the general intercept-resend attacks is proved by bounding the information of an eavesdropper Eve more tightly than in Yin's proposal[Phys. Rev. A 82, 042335 (2010)]. It is also showed that practical CQC implementations may be vulnerable when equipped with imperfect apparatuses, by proving that a negative key rate can be achieved when Eve launches a time-shift attack based on imperfect detector efficiency.
The first quantum cryptography protocol, proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84), has been widely studied in recent years. This protocol uses four states (more precisely, two complementary bases) for the encoding of the classical bit. Recently, it has been noticed that by using the same four states, but a different encoding of information, one can define a protocol which is more robust in practical implementations, specifically when attenuated laser pulses are used instead of single-photon sources [V. Scarani et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004), referred to as the SARG04 protocol]. We present a detailed study of SARG04 in two different regimes. In the first part, we consider an implementation with a single-photon source: we derive bounds on the error rate QQQ for security against all possible attacks by the eavesdropper. The lower and the upper bound obtained for SARG04 ($Q\ensuremath{\lesssim}10.95%$ and $Q\ensuremath{\gtrsim}14.9%$, respectively) are close to those obtained for BB84 ($Q\ensuremath{\lesssim}12.4%$ and $Q\ensuremath{\gtrsim}14.6%$, respectively). In the second part, we consider a realistic source consisting of an attenuated laser and improve on previous analysis by allowing Alice to optimize the mean number of photons as a function of the distance. The SARG04 protocol is found to perform better than BB84, both in secret-key rate and in maximal achievable distance, for a wide class of Eve's attacks.