Quantum mechanics notoriously faces the measurement problem, the problem that if read thoroughly, it implies the nonexistence of definite outcomes in measurement procedures. A plausible reaction to this and to related problems is to regard a system’s quantum state |ψ> merely as an indication of our lack of knowledge about the system, i.e., to interpret it epistemically. However, there are radically different ways to spell out such an epistemic view of the quantum state. We here investigate new developments in the branch that introduces hidden variables λ in addition to the quantum state |ψ> and has its roots in Einstein’s views. In particular, we confront purported achievements of the view in the light of recent no-go results. It will be demonstrated that, despite the debatability of the premises of such results, they force the hidden variable theorist to make ad hoc moves which undermine the very conceptual basis of his own approach.
Quantum mechanics notoriously faces the measurement problem, the problem that if read thoroughly, it implies the nonexistence of definite outcomes in measurement procedures. A plausible reaction to this and to related problems is to regard a system’s quantum state |ψ> merely as an indication of our lack of knowledge about the system, i.e., to interpret it epistemically. However, there are radically different ways to spell out such an epistemic view of the quantum state. We here investigate new developments in the branch that introduces hidden variables λ in addition to the quantum state |ψ> and has its roots in Einstein’s views. In particular, we confront purported achievements of the view in the light of recent no-go results. It will be demonstrated that, despite the debatability of the premises of such results, they force the hidden variable theorist to make ad hoc moves which undermine the very conceptual basis of his own approach.
ψ-Epistemic Models, Einsteinian Intuitions, and No-Gos. A Critical Study of Recent Developments on the Quantum State
Quantum mechanics notoriously faces the measurement problem, the problem that if read thoroughly, it implies the nonexistence of definite outcomes in measurement procedures. A plausible reaction to this and to related problems is to regard a system's quantum state ∣ψ⟩ merely as an indication of our lack of knowledge about the system, i.e., to interpret it epistemically. However, there are radically different ways to spell out such an epistemic view of the quantum state. We here investigate recent developments in the branch that introduces hidden variables λ in addition to the quantum state ∣ψ⟩ and has its roots in Einstein's views. In particular, we confront purported achievements of a concrete model that has been considered to serve as evidence for an epistemic view of the envisioned kind, as well as specific no-go results and their import. It will be argued that while an epistemic account of the particular kind is not straightforwardly ruled out by the no-go results, they demonstrate that the evidential character of the model(s) discussed rests on a rather shaky foundation, and that they make some achievements widely recognized in the literature appear worthy of doubt.
In this paper, I attempt a personal account of my understanding of the measurement problem in quantum mechanics, which has been largely in the tradition of the Copenhagen interpretation.I assume that (i) the quantum state is a representation of knowledge of a (real or hypothetical) observer relative to her experimental capabilities; (ii) measurements have definite outcomes in the sense that only one outcome occurs; (iii) quantum theory is universal and the irreversibility of the measurement process is only "for all practical purposes".These assumptions are analyzed within quantum theory and their consistency is tested in Deutsch's version of the Wigner's friend gedanken experiment, where the friend reveals to Wigner whether she observes a definite outcome without revealing which outcome she observes.The view that holds the coexistence of the "facts of the world" common both for Wigner and his friend runs into the problem of the hidden variable program.The solution lies in understanding that "facts" can only exist relative to the observer.
In this paper, we shall show how the theory of measurements is to be understood from the point of view of a physical interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of "hidden" variables, developed in a previous paper. We find that in principle, these "hidden" variables determine the precise results of each individual measurement process. In practice, however, in measurements that we now know how to carry out, the observing apparatus disturbs the observed system in an unpredictable and uncontrollable way, so that the uncertainty principle is obtained as a practical limitation on the possible precision of measurements. This limitation is not, however, inherent in the conceptual structure of our interpretation. We shall see, for example, that simultaneous measurements of position and momentum having unlimited precision would in principle be possible if, as suggested in the previous paper, the mathematical formulation of the quantum theory needs to be modified at very short distances in certain ways that are consistent with our interpretation but not with the usual interpretation.We give a simple explanation of the origin of quantum-mechanical correlations of distant objects in the hypothetical experiment of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, which was suggested by these authors as a criticism of the usual interpretation.Finally, we show that von Neumann's proof that quantum theory is not consistent with hidden variables does not apply to our interpretation, because the hidden variables contemplated here depend both on the state of the measuring apparatus and the observed system and therefore go beyond certain of von Neumann's assumptions.In two appendixes, we treat the problem of the electromagnetic field in our interpretation and answer certain additional objections which have arisen in the attempt to give a precise description for an individual system at the quantum level.
This paper should be read as a philosophical companion to recent formal results, where the technical derivations are presented. Here, the focus is on their conceptual and interpretative implications. Those results lead to a radically epistemic reading of quantum mechanics (QM): the theory emerges as an ineliminable logical necessity, even within classical, deterministic, and non-chaotic scenarios. This perspective allows QM to be reconciled with a strong—one might say Einsteinian—realism, and perhaps even to reinforce it. In this sense, QM is here reinterpreted as a certification of that very realism in a strictly epistemic sense.
In this article I raise a new problem for quantum mechanics, which I call the control problem. Like the measurement problem, the control problem places a fundamental constraint on quantum theories. The characteristic feature of the problem is its focus on state preparation. In particular, whereas the measurement problem turns on a premise about the completeness of the quantum state (‘no hidden variables’), the control problem turns on a premise about our ability to prepare or control quantum states. After raising the problem, I discuss some applications. I suggest that it provides a useful new lens through which to view existing theories or interpretations, in part because it draws attention to aspects of those theories that the measurement problem does not (such as the role of conditional and relative states). I suggest that it also helps clarify the physical significance of the well-known no-go result—the no-cloning theorem—on which it is based.
Quantum mechanics famously posits two distinct evolution rules for the state of a system: a deterministic, unitary time evolution under the Schr¨odinger equation, and a probabilistic “collapse” of the wavefunction upon measurement as dictated by the Born rule. The apparent inconsistency of these two dynamical laws – one continuous and one discontinuous – constitutes the quantum measurement problem. This foundational problem, which underlies the emergence of definite outcomes from quantum superpositions, has persisted since the theory’s inception. In this review, we present a comprehensive and rigorous examination of the measurement problem and survey the leading approaches that seek to resolve or circumvent it. We begin by formulating the measurement problem and its conceptual challenges. We then discuss in detail the major interpretations of quantum mechanics and theoretical frameworks addressing the problem: the Copenhagen interpretation, Everett’s many-worlds interpretation, de Broglie–Bohm pilot-wave theory, objective collapse models, the role of decoherence and environment-induced superselection, and epistemic approaches such as QBism. For each interpretation, we describe the core principles and mathematical formalism, assessing how (and whether) it attempts to solve the measurement problem. We also review modern developments and experiments relevant to quantum measurements, including tests of Bell inequalities, observations of decoherence and macroscopic superpositions, weak measurements and quantum eraser experiments, and thought experiments ‘a la Wigner’s friend. We highlight how these results inform the ongoing debate. Finally, we discuss open problems and challenges that remain in fully resolving the measurement problem.