The concept of potentia as proposed by Heisenberg to understand the structure of quantum mechanics, has just remained a fanciful speculation as of now. In this paper we provide a physically consistent and a mathematically justified ontology of this model based on a fundamental role played by the discrete subgroups of the relevant Lie groups. We show that as such, the space of potentia arises as a coexisting dual space to the real three dimensional space, while these two sit piggyback on each other, such that the collapse of wave function can be understood in a natural manner. Quantum nonlocality and quantum jumps arise as a natural consequence of this model.
The concept of potentia as proposed by Heisenberg to understand the structure of quantum mechanics, has just remained a fanciful speculation as of now. In this paper we provide a physically consistent and a mathematically justified ontology of this model based on a fundamental role played by the discrete subgroups of the relevant Lie groups. We show that as such, the space of potentia arises as a coexisting dual space to the real three dimensional space, while these two sit piggyback on each other, such that the collapse of wave function can be understood in a natural manner. Quantum nonlocality and quantum jumps arise as a natural consequence of this model.
It is argued that quantum theory is best understood as requiring an ontological duality of res extensa and res potentia, where the latter is understood per Heisenberg's original proposal, and the former is roughly equivalent to Descartes' 'extended substance.' However, this is not a dualism of mutually exclusive substances in the classical Cartesian sense, and therefore does not inherit the infamous 'mind-body' problem. Rather, res potentia and res extensa are proposed as mutually implicative ontological extants that serve to explain the key conceptual challenges of quantum theory; in particular, nonlocality, entanglement, null measurements, and wave function collapse. It is shown that a natural account of these quantum perplexities emerges, along with a need to reassess our usual ontological commitments involving the nature of space and time.
Abstract Heisenberg was a very dedicated Kantian, and viewed the discoveries of early twentieth century physics as disqualifying of the Kantian metaphysical worldview. He made an effort – not an especially successful one – to reconfigure the Kantian critique by replacing noumena with the quantum-level reality, and proposed a new entity as mediative between the quantum realm and the subject. The new entity, potentia (borrowed from Aristotle, and altered to serve Heisenberg’s purpose) fulfills that role by means of its hybrid nature: it’s partly mental, partly a reification of probabilities. This dual nature allows epistemic access to the probabilistic nature of quantum-level interactions, out of which our phenomenal world is realized when a measurement is made. How well this notion serves the purpose of rehabilitating the Kantian critique is questionable, as Heisenberg’s conception is problematic and, perhaps, internally inconsistent. My dissertation follows Heisenberg’s development of potentia, examines how well it addresses the failure of the Kantian problem, and asks whether his proposal is an obscurum per obscurius. Thereafter I introduce a number of other, similar proposals to potentia, consider them on their own merits, compare them to Heisenberg’s conception, and use this conjunction of potentia proposals to made a judgment regarding whether the use of potentia is a philosophically defensible way of addressing the recondite problems of quantum mechanics.
I build upon Heisenberg’s proposal in 1958 that quantum states are ontologically real “potentia.” On this view reality consists in ontologically real Possibles and ontologically real Actuals. Then measurement converts Possibles to Actuals. This ontological hypothesis, explicit in Heisenberg’s proposal, suggests a natural place for “mind.” Mind converts Possibles to Actuals. This role for mind is a scientific hypothesis open to test. Modest evidence now supports the hypothesis. If very well confirmed, such results alter the foundations of quantum mechanics and afford a role of mind in the becoming of the universe. More, the ontological proposal is not a substance dualism, for potentia are not substances. Thus, this proposal for the role of mind does not seem to inherit many of the problems raised in a substance dualism such as Descartes’ Res cogitans and Res extensa, (Descartes), or in a substance neutral monism such as Russell, (Russell). The proposal is radical. Far more evidence is needed.
In 1968, Dashen and Sharp obtained a certain singular Lie algebra of local densities and currents from canonical commutation relations in nonrelativistic quantum field theory. The corresponding Lie group is infinite dimensional: the natural semidirect product of an additive group of scalar functions with a group of diffeomorphisms. Unitary representations of this group describe a wide variety of quantum systems, and have predicted previously unsuspected possibilities – notably, anyons and nonabelian anyons in two space dimensions. We present here foundational reasons why this semidirect product group serves as a universal kinematical group for quantum mechanics. We obtain thus a unified account of all possible quantum kinematics for systems with mass in an arbitrary physical space, and clarify the role played by topology in quantum mechanics. Our development does not require quantization of classical phase space; rather, the classical limit follows from the quantum mechanics. We also consider the relationship of our development to Heisenberg quantization.
IF, AS HEISENBERG SUGGESTED, potentia indeed constitute an ontologically fundamental species of reality, then the mathematical representation of the quantum mechanical evolution of the matrix of potentia to the matrix of probabilities-that is, the valuation of potentia as probabilities between zero and one-ought to be heuristically useful in understanding the ontological implications of this evolution.The mathematical representation should prove helpful in visualizing not only the process described by quantum mechanics but also, as we shall see in the following chapters, the process described by Whitehead.The basic formalism introduced and explored in this chapter is intended to be comprehensible to readers unfamiliar with mathematics.Some familiarity with the Pythagorean theorem and the addition of vectors will be useful, but not necessary.
In recent years, there has been a controversial debate in the literature regarding the choice among many interpretations of quantum mechanics. Based on certain realist desiderata, this debate has been partly addressed in the context of the choice between two opposite views about the mathematical space in which the fundamental ontology of this theory lives. Indeed, some scholars advocate a worldview in which this ontology lives in the abstract high-dimensional space, whilst others advocate a three-dimensional worldview, according to which the ontology lives in the physical space of our everyday experience. In this contribution, I will critically evaluate the tenability of solving the resulting underdetermination between the three/high-dimensional worldviews in the context of one particular quantum theory: the Bohmian approach. In so doing, I will be following two strategies: firstly, I will undermine the assumption that a set of theoretical or metaphysical virtues blocks the underdetermination problem associated with the mathematical space in which the fundamental Bohmian ontology lives; and secondly, I will propose a structural Bohmian interpretation through the use of dynamical symmetries (symplectic Lie groups), according to which the three/high-dimensional space distinction is just apparent as both spaces are grounded by the same dynamical, group-theoretic structure.