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The Harvard Review of Philosophy

What is the Problem of Measurement?

Simon Saunders, The Harvard Review of Philosophy

Published Jan 1, 1994• 18 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Q UANTUM MECHANICS, TOGETHER WITH RELATIVITY, are the basis of most of what we know of the very large, the very small, and the very fast.And in all of these areas our knowledge is extensive.It would be hard to say how good these theories are; arithmetic, one might say, is good mathematics.For all that, there is a problem, a strange and amorphous difficulty: it is the problem of measurement.This problem has become much more interesting, and much more pressing, as a result of some recent developments.Hitherto the difficulty has been so peculiar, and so formless, that physicists have on the whole thought it a matter of philosophy.But that is not quite right (or that is what I shall argue).It is certainly philosophical, but it is also a matter of methodology, a question of what physics is to do; and now the matter has come to seem quite pressing.In this sense the measurement problem has become a problem for physics.But what is the problem of measurement?As a first stab, we can say this: on the basis of quantum mechanics, there is a difficulty in accounting for the

DOI
10.5840/harvardreview1994411

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Philosophy, however, does not provide a “basis” for quantum mechanics; rather, quantum mechanics describes the phenomena, and then philosophy struggles with what the physical theory implies.Coale makes wide-ranging references to what quantum physicists, including Neils Bohr, have thought about these implications. Strangely, he does not include in his account Karen Barad's excellent Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. A former physicist, Barad develops the quantum philosophy of Neils Bohr into an approach she calls agential realism, which insists that humans and nonhumans are ineluctably bound together in the production of meaning. She argues that quantum mechanics demonstrates the “ontological inseparability of intra-acting agencies,” which emerge as separate entities only as a result of “cuts” we make to simplify phenomena and render them susceptible to measurement and analysis (148). Although her conclusions are similar to Coale's, her approach is distinguished by a deep knowledge of quantum mechanics as a mathematical theory, and her formulations are rigorous and precise. Her absence from Coale's book is the more notable because his analysis needs an infusion of the kind of deep thinking that Barad embodies. By contrast, his book engages in a discursive inflation of quantum physics, wherein the rigor and precision it has as a physical theory is buried under an avalanche of verbiage that makes quantum physics appear so broad and vague that almost anything can fit under its umbrella.A good example of this problem is the way in which Coale uses “entanglement.” In quantum mechanics, it refers to the correlation of the quantum characteristics of two subatomic particles. For example, when two photons interact (say, by pumping a laser beam through a nonlinear crystal such as beta-barium borate, which splits some of the photon stream into photon pairs with correlated polarizations), they can become entangled such that their wave functions (i.e., the eigenstates described by their superpositions) are coordinated. If they are then separated, measurement on one of them determines how the wave function for the other will collapse, even if they are by then far apart. The distance (and time intervals) separating the two photons can be quite large; entanglement has been shown to operate as far removed as fourteen miles. Moreover, it also operates on the macroscale, for example in the ability of migratory birds to sense the inclination of the earth's magnetic field (via entangled electrons in the molecules of their eyes). This is mysterious to the extent that no one knows how or why the particles become coordinated, but it is nevertheless quite distinct from such uses of “entanglement” that would include, for example, two lovers becoming entangled with one another or the World Bank becoming entangled in the global economic system. Citing Patrick O'Donnell, Coale appropriates the word to mean, following O'Donnell, “the complex relationship between self, objects, and the world” (164), which stretches the meaning so far that it leaves quantum mechanics (or quantum theory, as Coale would have it) far behind.In similar fashion, Coale assimilates to quantum theory most of deconstruction, especially the indeterminacy, undermining of origins, and undecidability that Jacques Derrida brilliantly developed in Of Grammatology and later works. 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He mentions in the introduction that he found several articles on quantum theory and references of quantum phenomena in DeLillo's notebooks at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center at the University of Texas at Austin. These bear fruit in his readings of DeLillo's novels, especially his fine reading of The Body Artist and the section on DeLillo's Underworld, arguably the best interpretation in the book. This section alone almost justifies the price of admission.Were Coale to frame his book as a contribution to postmodern literary criticism, it would take its place among many other such books and articles as a well-written and interesting contribution that makes good observations about a number of important authors and their works. By insisting that all of this fits under quantum theory, he overreaches what the theory can justly claim and, in the process, dilutes the effectiveness of his book. Without a doubt, we need more informed criticism of the interactions between literature, culture, and science, but such work is more effective when it focuses on the specificities of scientific theories and their complex entanglements with cultural and technological practices. Lest it fall under Coale's quantum umbrella, I should add that I do not intend in this formulation a reference to quantum theory!

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Q UANTUM MECHANICS, TOGETHER WITH RELATIVITY, are the basis of most of what we know of the very large, the very small, and the very fast.And in all of these areas our knowledge is extensive.It would be hard to say how good these theories are; arithmetic, one might say, is good mathematics.For all that, there is a problem, a strange and amorphous difficulty: it is the problem of measurement.This problem has become much more interesting, and much more pressing, as a result of some recent developments.Hitherto the difficulty has been so peculiar, and so formless, that physicists have on the whole thought it a matter of philosophy.But that is not quite right (or that is what I shall argue).It is certainly philosophical, but it is also a matter of methodology, a question of what physics is to do; and now the matter has come to seem quite pressing.In this sense the measurement problem has become a problem for physics.But what is the problem of measurement?As a first stab, we can say this: on the basis of quantum mechanics, there is a difficulty in accounting for the
In Quirks of the Quantum, Samuel Chase Coale argues that the twentieth century is the quantum era, riddled with all of the indeterminacies, blurriness, and entanglements that he attributes to quantum theory, which he describes as the “philosophical basis for quantum physics” (1). He acknowledges that “to truly understand quantum mechanics as a science, one would have to study mathematics,” which he readily admits his book does not undertake. Instead, he relies on the “tropes, metaphors and models” (ibid.) that scientists have published about the implications of quantum theory. He thus distinguishes mathematical formulae from philosophical constructions, privileging the latter over the former. Philosophy, however, does not provide a “basis” for quantum mechanics; rather, quantum mechanics describes the phenomena, and then philosophy struggles with what the physical theory implies.Coale makes wide-ranging references to what quantum physicists, including Neils Bohr, have thought about these implications. Strangely, he does not include in his account Karen Barad's excellent Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. A former physicist, Barad develops the quantum philosophy of Neils Bohr into an approach she calls agential realism, which insists that humans and nonhumans are ineluctably bound together in the production of meaning. She argues that quantum mechanics demonstrates the “ontological inseparability of intra-acting agencies,” which emerge as separate entities only as a result of “cuts” we make to simplify phenomena and render them susceptible to measurement and analysis (148). Although her conclusions are similar to Coale's, her approach is distinguished by a deep knowledge of quantum mechanics as a mathematical theory, and her formulations are rigorous and precise. Her absence from Coale's book is the more notable because his analysis needs an infusion of the kind of deep thinking that Barad embodies. By contrast, his book engages in a discursive inflation of quantum physics, wherein the rigor and precision it has as a physical theory is buried under an avalanche of verbiage that makes quantum physics appear so broad and vague that almost anything can fit under its umbrella.A good example of this problem is the way in which Coale uses “entanglement.” In quantum mechanics, it refers to the correlation of the quantum characteristics of two subatomic particles. For example, when two photons interact (say, by pumping a laser beam through a nonlinear crystal such as beta-barium borate, which splits some of the photon stream into photon pairs with correlated polarizations), they can become entangled such that their wave functions (i.e., the eigenstates described by their superpositions) are coordinated. If they are then separated, measurement on one of them determines how the wave function for the other will collapse, even if they are by then far apart. The distance (and time intervals) separating the two photons can be quite large; entanglement has been shown to operate as far removed as fourteen miles. Moreover, it also operates on the macroscale, for example in the ability of migratory birds to sense the inclination of the earth's magnetic field (via entangled electrons in the molecules of their eyes). This is mysterious to the extent that no one knows how or why the particles become coordinated, but it is nevertheless quite distinct from such uses of “entanglement” that would include, for example, two lovers becoming entangled with one another or the World Bank becoming entangled in the global economic system. Citing Patrick O'Donnell, Coale appropriates the word to mean, following O'Donnell, “the complex relationship between self, objects, and the world” (164), which stretches the meaning so far that it leaves quantum mechanics (or quantum theory, as Coale would have it) far behind.In similar fashion, Coale assimilates to quantum theory most of deconstruction, especially the indeterminacy, undermining of origins, and undecidability that Jacques Derrida brilliantly developed in Of Grammatology and later works. He does the same with postmodernism, so that it begins to seem almost a branch of quantum physics rather than a philosophical and cultural movement with complex roots in cultural, economic, and technological developments. For example, John Johnston in Information Multiplicity: American Fiction in the Age of Media Saturation argues persuasively that the postmodern American novel has been distinctively shaped by the glut of information that the Internet and contemporary communication media make available, a point also made by Fredric Jameson in his seminal study Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Yet for Coale, “that flow of information suggests the quantum flux, constantly in motion with islands of possible comprehension like the tracks and trails of ‘particles’ that are measured in individual experiments” (109). The importance of globalization, the complex economic structures emerging from late capitalism, the transformations the web has wrought—all these in Coale's analysis become subsets of quantum physics.Within the limits of his methodology, which are significant, Coale provides good readings of several postmodern authors, including Joan Didion, Tim O'Brien, Thomas Pynchon, Paul Auster, and Don DeLillo. Although many have discussed the fragmentation, nonlinear narratives, lack of coherent subjectivities, and indeterminacy of novels by these writers as postmodern constructions, for Coale they become manifestations of quantum theory (not surprisingly, since he sees postmodernism itself as a branch of the same). With chapters on the quantum flux, quantum style, and death as quantum dissolution, he combines good readings with inflated claims for them as manifestations of quantum theory. The exceptions to this quantum inflation are his discussions of DeLillo's novels. He mentions in the introduction that he found several articles on quantum theory and references of quantum phenomena in DeLillo's notebooks at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center at the University of Texas at Austin. These bear fruit in his readings of DeLillo's novels, especially his fine reading of The Body Artist and the section on DeLillo's Underworld, arguably the best interpretation in the book. This section alone almost justifies the price of admission.Were Coale to frame his book as a contribution to postmodern literary criticism, it would take its place among many other such books and articles as a well-written and interesting contribution that makes good observations about a number of important authors and their works. By insisting that all of this fits under quantum theory, he overreaches what the theory can justly claim and, in the process, dilutes the effectiveness of his book. Without a doubt, we need more informed criticism of the interactions between literature, culture, and science, but such work is more effective when it focuses on the specificities of scientific theories and their complex entanglements with cultural and technological practices. Lest it fall under Coale's quantum umbrella, I should add that I do not intend in this formulation a reference to quantum theory!
In this magisterial work, Roland Omnès takes us from the academies of ancient Greece to the laboratories of modern science as he seeks to do no less than rebuild the foundations of the philosophy of knowledge. One of the world's leading quantum physicists, Omnès reviews the history and recent development of mathematics, logic, and the physical sciences to show that current work in quantum theory offers new answers to questions that have puzzled philosophers for centuries: Is the world ultimately intelligible? Are all events caused? Do objects have definitive locations? Omnès addresses these profound questions with vigorous arguments and clear, colorful writing, aiming not just to advance scholarship but to enlighten readers with no background in science or philosophy. The book opens with an insightful and sweeping account of the main developments in science and the philosophy of knowledge from the pre-Socratic era to the nineteenth century. Omnès then traces the emergence in modern thought of a fracture between our intuitive, commonsense views of the world and the abstract and--for most people--incomprehensible world portrayed by advanced physics, math, and logic. He argues that the fracture appeared because the insights of Einstein and Bohr, the logical advances of Frege, Russell, and Gödel, and the necessary mathematics of infinity of Cantor and Hilbert cannot be fully expressed by words or images only. Quantum mechanics played an important role in this development, as it seemed to undermine intuitive notions of intelligibility, locality, and causality. However, Omnès argues that common sense and quantum mechanics are not as incompatible as many have thought. In fact, he makes the provocative argument that the "consistent-histories" approach to quantum mechanics, developed over the past fifteen years, places common sense (slightly reappraised and circumscribed) on a firm scientific and philosophical footing for the first time. In doing so, it provides what philosophers have sought through the ages: a sure foundation for human knowledge. Quantum Philosophy is a profound work of contemporary science and philosophy and an eloquent history of the long struggle to understand the nature of the world and of knowledge itself.
Quantum mechanics is certainly a strange place to start an investigation into the nature of the relationship between science and society. However, this article begins by integrating its history and proceeds through current conceptions of it by some physicists to examine quantum mechanics as an intersection of both science and knowledge. A famous thought experiment by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen pointed to an area that few physicists still research–a paradigm gone awry. Yet the vast majority of physiciststoday do not agonize over this uncertainty. Physics today presses forward with indominable speed and precision. But by questioning a small sample of physicists doing physics about their practice, this study aims at an everyday physicist’s understanding of the matter; a paradox that lies between the results of experiment and their interpretation or place as knowledge in society. For Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, the paradox was that we can only determine the spin of an entangled particle–it only becomes real–after measuring the spin of its partner particle. For a few contemporary physicists, the problem is how to understand the fact that a measured particle “teleports” its state instantaniously to another point in space. Practicing physicist resolve this, to put it simply, by just using it. Quantum mechanics, as with physics, is incredibly accurate–accepting it as truth yields results that physicists and society can use. By interrogating this process in its historicity and current formulation, this article sheds some light on the way physics works as knowledge. It provides a possibility for turning the scientific eye toward the very meaning of science.
The term "measurement" in quantum theory (as well as in other physical theories) is ambiguous: It is used to describe both an experience - e.g., an observation in an experiment - and an interaction with the system under scrutiny. If doing physics is regarded as a creative activity to develop a meaningful description of the world, then one has to carefully discriminate between the two notions: An observer's account of experience - consitutive to meaning - is hardly expressed exhaustively by the formal framework of an interaction within one particular theory. We develop a corresponding perspective onto central terms in quantum mechanics in general, and onto the measurement problem in particular.