A quantum scheme is proposed which seals a classical string. Each bit of the string can be read out with an arbitrarily small error rate, while reading the string can be detected except with an exponentially small probability.
Abstract: A quantum sealing protocol is a quantum cryptographic protocol that can detect unsealing of a message. It is known that quantum bit sealing is insecure. However, this does not imply that quantum string sealing is also insecure. So the possibility of quantum string sealing has been studied. In this paper, we propose a quantum sealing protocol and give an information theoretic analysis. We also show that our protocol is almost optimal for uniformly distributed inputs in the sense that the upper bound of information leaks almost matches the trivial lower bound.
A quantum seal is a way of encoding a message into quantum states, so that anybody may read the message with little error, while authorized verifiers can detect that the seal has been broken. We present a simple extension to the Bechmann–Pasquinucci majority-voting scheme that is impervious to coherent attacks, and further, encompasses sealing quantum messages by means of quantum encryption. The scheme is relatively easy to implement, requiring neither entanglement nor controlled operations during the state preparation, reading or verification stages.
A quantum string seal encodes the value of a (bit) string as a quantum state in such a way that everyone can extract a non-negligible amount of available information on the string by a suitable measurement. Moreover, such measurement must disturb the quantum state and is likely to be detected by an authorized verifier. In this way, the intactness of the encoded quantum state plays the role of a wax seal in the digital world. Here we analyze the security of quantum string seal by studying the information disturbance trade-off of a measurement. This information disturbance trade-off analysis extends the earlier results of Bechamann-Pasquinucci, D'Ariano, and Macchiavello [Int. J. Quant. Inform. 3, 435 (2005)] and Chau [Phys. Lett. A 354, 31 (2006)] by concluding that all quantum string seals are insecure. Specifically, we find a way to obtain nontrivial available information on the string that escapes the verifier's detection with at least 50% chance.