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Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

Weak Discernibility, Again

Thomas Møller-Nielsen

Published Feb 1, 2016• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the focus of much contemporary discussion concerning the proper role and philosophical significance of weak discernibility in the context of quantum mechanics (and other physical theories) is misplaced.In particular, I claim that metaphysicians' criticism of weak discernibility on the basis of its alleged inability to ground objects' numerical distinctness is orthogonal to Saunders's (2003a) main concern in his original paper, which is to use the notion of weak discernibility as part of a broader "logical aid" for interpreting physical theories.How exactly this "methodological" (as opposed to "metaphysical") construal of weak discernibility is supposed to work, however, is not immediately transparent.This paper therefore serves both as an attempt to gain a better understanding of Saunders's interpretational program, and also seeks to encourage a renewed emphasis on the set of issues and questions that such a program-at least on my understanding of it-would appear to raise.

DOI
10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.003

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In this paper I argue that the focus of much contemporary discussion concerning the proper role and philosophical significance of weak discernibility in the context of quantum mechanics (and other physical theories) is misplaced.In particular, I claim that metaphysicians' criticism of weak discernibility on the basis of its alleged inability to ground objects' numerical distinctness is orthogonal to Saunders's (2003a) main concern in his original paper, which is to use the notion of weak discernibility as part of a broader "logical aid" for interpreting physical theories.How exactly this "methodological" (as opposed to "metaphysical") construal of weak discernibility is supposed to work, however, is not immediately transparent.This paper therefore serves both as an attempt to gain a better understanding of Saunders's interpretational program, and also seeks to encourage a renewed emphasis on the set of issues and questions that such a program-at least on my understanding of it-would appear to raise.
Saunders' recent arguments in favour of the weak discernibility of (certain) quantum particles seem to be grounded in the 'generalist' view that science only provides general descriptions of the worlIn this paper, I introduce the ‘generalist’ perspective and consider its possible justification and philosophical basis; and then look at the notion of weak discernibility. I expand on the criticisms formulated by Hawley (2006) and Dieks and Veerstegh (2008) and explain what I take to be the basic problem: that the properties invoked by Saunders cannot be pointed to as ‘individuators’ of otherwise indiscernible (and thus numerically identical) entities because their ontological status remains underdetermined by the evidence and the established interpretation of the theory. In addition to to this, I suggest that Saunders does not deal adequately with bosons, and cannot do so exactly because he subscribes to PII and the generalist picture. The last part of the paper contains a critical examination of the claim (or at least implicit assumption) that the generalist picture should be regarded as obviously compelling by the modern-day empiricist.
Saunders has recently claimed that “identical quantum particles” with an anti-symmetric state (fermions) are weakly discernible objects , just like irreflexively related ordinary objects in situations with perfect symmetry (Black’s spheres, for example). Weakly discernible objects have all their qualitative properties in common but nevertheless differ from each other by virtue of (a generalized version of) Leibniz’s principle, since they stand in relations an entity cannot have to itself. This notion of weak discernibility has been criticized as question begging, but we defend and accept it for classical cases likes Black’s spheres. We argue, however, that the quantum mechanical case is different. Here the application of the notion of weak discernibility indeed is question begging and in conflict with standard interpretational ideas. We conclude that the introduction of the conceptual resource of weak discernibility does not change the interpretational status quo in quantum mechanics.
Muller and Saunders ([2008]) purport to demonstrate that, surprisingly, bosons and fermions are discernible; this article disputes their arguments, then derives a similar conclusion in a more satisfactory fashion. After briefly explicating their proof and indicating how it escapes earlier indiscernibility results, we note that the observables which Muller and Saunders argue discern particles are (i) non-symmetric in the case of bosons and (ii) trivial multiples of the identity in the case of fermions. Both problems undermine the claim that they have shown particles to be physically discernible. We then prove two results concerning observables that are truly physical: one showing when particles are discernible and one showing when they are not (categorically) discernible. Along the way we clarify some frequently misunderstood issues concerning the interpretation of quantum observables. 1 Background2 Criticisms 2.1 Bosons 2.2 Fermions3 Reformulating the Insight 3.1 What weakly discerns? 3.2 General results4 Conclusion
Some authors (Muller and Saunders, Huggett and Norton) have attempted to defend Leibniz’s Identity of Indiscernibles through weak discernibility. The idea is that if there is a symmetric, nonreflexive physical relation that holds between two particles, then those particles cannot be identical. In this article I focus only on Muller and Saunders’s account and argue that the means by which they achieve weak discernibility is not through a quantum mechanical observable but an alternate mathematical construction that is both unorthodox and incomplete.
Simon Saunders argues that, although distinct objects must be discernible, they need only be weakly discernible (Saunders 2003, 2006a). I will argue that this combination of views is unmotivated: if there can be objects which differ only weakly, there can be objects which don’t differ at all. Objects are weakly discernible if they stand in some irreflexive relation (Quine 1976). Max Black’s two spheres are weakly discernible: each is one mile from the other, but not one mile from itself (Black 1952). As Saunders points out, some entangled fermions seem to exhibit mere weak discernibility. Two maximally entangled fermions (electrons in the singlet state, for example) are indiscernible in some straightforward respects: same mass, same charge. They are indiscernible in less straightforward respects too: neither has a determinate location or momentum, but they are indeterminate in just the same ways. What about spin? Pick any line, say that running between your ears right now. For each electron in the pair, it is indeterminate whether it is spinning clockwise or anti-clockwise around that axis. Crucially, however, it is determinate that each is spinning in the opposite direction to the other: their collective state is anti-symmetric. Thus they are weakly discernible: each electron spins in the opposite direction to the other, but not in the opposite direction to itself (despite the fact that neither spins in any determinate direction at all).
Two entities are weakly discernible when an irreflexive and symmetric relation holds between them. That weak discernibility holds in quantum mechanics is fairly uncontroversial nowadays. The ontological consequences of weak discernibility, however, are far from clear. Part of the literature seems to imply that weak discernibility points to a definite metaphysics to quantum mechanics. In this paper we shall discuss the metaphysical contribution of weak discernibility to quantum mechanics and argue that, contrary to part of current literature, it does not provide for a fully naturalistic determination of metaphysics. Underdetermination of the metaphysics still plagues the way of the naturalist.