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Boston studies in the philosophy of science

Heisenberg’s Umdeutung: A Case for a (Quantum-)Dialogue Between History and Philosophy of Science

Adrian Wüthrich

Published Jan 1, 2016• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-30229-4_14

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One of the key figures in the development of quantum mechanics was Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976). Heisenberg developed both the first quantum mechanical mathematical framework, matrix mechanics. He also outlined the philosophical basis underpinning it, named thereafter the ???uncertainty principle.??? Even though the practical benefits of quantum mechanics have been unquestionable the philosophical foundations of this scientific theory have been debated since its beginning.\n\tAn examination of the philosophy of science from the early modern period to the early 20th century will be outlined in the introduction of the following text. A more circumscribed examination of the debate between scientific realism and skepticism concerning the philosophy of science will then be investigated. This analysis will give the necessary context for the intellectual environment that both Heisenberg and Quine found themselves in. Proceeding from this analysis, an examination of Heisenberg's philosophical maneuvering concerning the philosophy of quantum mechanics will follow in the next chapter. Heisenberg's philosophy will then be compared with that of the philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000). The abstract account of how science progresses that Quine provides will be demonstrated to match very closely with that of Heisenberg's philosophical ideas of just how science in general, and physics in particular, makes crucial advances.\n\tA process has been taking place within the history of scientific investigation. Scientific methods and theories are often generalized to other fields of inquiry. Crucial understanding of wider issues have been developed by scientists working on small, specialized problems. In this case Heisenberg's philosophy has been generalized by Quine. While both figures make use of positivism in their intellectual toolkit they both also qualify and modify it in several ways when applying this to empirical data. Heisenberg and Quine both opt instead for a pragmatic positivism rather than the more clearly identifiable early 20th century version, logical positivism. The relation between the two is an example of a scientist engaging with philosophy in order to make progress in a chosen field. Quine, as a philosopher, is then able to abstract from the particular case of how to understand quantum mechanics in a theoretical sense and generalize Heisenberg's approach to all of science.

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Quantum Dialogue: The Making of a Revolution

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`Science is rooted in conversations.' The word is from Heisenberg but it becomes with Mara Beller a thesis for reconsidering the philosophy and history of science: how conversations were a cradle for the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is the main topic of this book. This `dialogical' approach is moreover assumed to be quite general and it is proposed as a guideline for future investigations in the history of science. This work will certainly be important among historians of science. Its most valuable content is a wealth of information picked up from many sources, including the correspondence between the actors and later registered commentaries by many witnesses. There will be also undoubtedly much discussion of its conclusions and theses. They are extremely strong since, to mention but a few, one is told that the success of the Copenhagen interpretation is the result of a `fierce' propaganda strategy, and that Bohr could not really master physics (because of a weakness in mathematics), while the idea of complementarity, after a long discussion, is dismissed as `mythology'. Such new ideas will certainly find an enthusiastic approval from the adeherents of `new is beautiful', and will give rise to much discussion. What is missing most, however, in this book is a consideration of recent intensive renewals of interpretation arising from advances in both experiments and theory. The resulting conclusions are clearly different from Beller's: now that there are demonstrative versions of interpretation, one can fully appreciate why it was so difficult to justify logically and philosophically the Copenhagen interpretation (accordingly Bohr's stature would be enhanced rather than slighted). Mara Beller's inclination towards excessive statements is finally crowned when she says that her philosophical analysis `demonstrates the possibility and the need of a viable alternative to the orthodox interpretation' (most probably Bohmian mechanics). To have such an Aristotelian confidence in the power of philosophy and to be so assertive in a book where neither the word or notion of `decoherence' is mentioned indicate in my opinion the real nature of that book: too provocative to be wise.

European Journal of Physics•Mar 1, 2000•65 citations
One of the key figures in the development of quantum mechanics was Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976). Heisenberg developed both the first quantum mechanical mathematical framework, matrix mechanics. He also outlined the philosophical basis underpinning it, named thereafter the ???uncertainty principle.??? Even though the practical benefits of quantum mechanics have been unquestionable the philosophical foundations of this scientific theory have been debated since its beginning.\n\tAn examination of the philosophy of science from the early modern period to the early 20th century will be outlined in the introduction of the following text. A more circumscribed examination of the debate between scientific realism and skepticism concerning the philosophy of science will then be investigated. This analysis will give the necessary context for the intellectual environment that both Heisenberg and Quine found themselves in. Proceeding from this analysis, an examination of Heisenberg's philosophical maneuvering concerning the philosophy of quantum mechanics will follow in the next chapter. Heisenberg's philosophy will then be compared with that of the philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000). The abstract account of how science progresses that Quine provides will be demonstrated to match very closely with that of Heisenberg's philosophical ideas of just how science in general, and physics in particular, makes crucial advances.\n\tA process has been taking place within the history of scientific investigation. Scientific methods and theories are often generalized to other fields of inquiry. Crucial understanding of wider issues have been developed by scientists working on small, specialized problems. In this case Heisenberg's philosophy has been generalized by Quine. While both figures make use of positivism in their intellectual toolkit they both also qualify and modify it in several ways when applying this to empirical data. Heisenberg and Quine both opt instead for a pragmatic positivism rather than the more clearly identifiable early 20th century version, logical positivism. The relation between the two is an example of a scientist engaging with philosophy in order to make progress in a chosen field. Quine, as a philosopher, is then able to abstract from the particular case of how to understand quantum mechanics in a theoretical sense and generalize Heisenberg's approach to all of science.
`Science is rooted in conversations.' The word is from Heisenberg but it becomes with Mara Beller a thesis for reconsidering the philosophy and history of science: how conversations were a cradle for the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is the main topic of this book. This `dialogical' approach is moreover assumed to be quite general and it is proposed as a guideline for future investigations in the history of science. This work will certainly be important among historians of science. Its most valuable content is a wealth of information picked up from many sources, including the correspondence between the actors and later registered commentaries by many witnesses. There will be also undoubtedly much discussion of its conclusions and theses. They are extremely strong since, to mention but a few, one is told that the success of the Copenhagen interpretation is the result of a `fierce' propaganda strategy, and that Bohr could not really master physics (because of a weakness in mathematics), while the idea of complementarity, after a long discussion, is dismissed as `mythology'. Such new ideas will certainly find an enthusiastic approval from the adeherents of `new is beautiful', and will give rise to much discussion. What is missing most, however, in this book is a consideration of recent intensive renewals of interpretation arising from advances in both experiments and theory. The resulting conclusions are clearly different from Beller's: now that there are demonstrative versions of interpretation, one can fully appreciate why it was so difficult to justify logically and philosophically the Copenhagen interpretation (accordingly Bohr's stature would be enhanced rather than slighted). Mara Beller's inclination towards excessive statements is finally crowned when she says that her philosophical analysis `demonstrates the possibility and the need of a viable alternative to the orthodox interpretation' (most probably Bohmian mechanics). To have such an Aristotelian confidence in the power of philosophy and to be so assertive in a book where neither the word or notion of `decoherence' is mentioned indicate in my opinion the real nature of that book: too provocative to be wise.