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Physical Review A

Comment on “Secure multiparty computation with a dishonest majority via quantum means”

Yanbing Li, Qiaoyan Wen, Su‐Juan Qin

Published Jul 27, 2011• 14 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In a recent paper [K. Loukopoulos and D. E. Browne, Phys. Rev. A 81, 062336 (2010)], five schemes for secure multiparty computation utilizing the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) quantum correlation were presented, which were claimed to be secure in some kinds of security models. However, this study points out that schemes C and D2 could be attacked by corrupted parties replacing photon and exchanging classical information.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.84.016301

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In a recent paper [K. Loukopoulos and D. E. Browne, Phys. Rev. A 81, 062336 (2010)], five schemes for secure multiparty computation utilizing the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) quantum correlation were presented, which were claimed to be secure in some kinds of security models. However, this study points out that schemes C and D2 could be attacked by corrupted parties replacing photon and exchanging classical information.
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Recently, Yan and Gao [Phys. Rev. A 72, 012304 (2005)] presented a quantum secret sharing protocol which allows a secret message to be shared between two groups of parties (mmm parties in group 1 and nnn parties in group 2). Their protocol is claimed to be secure that, except with the cooperation of the entire group 1 or group 2, no subgroup of either group 1 or group 2 can extract the secret message. However, this study points out that the mthm\text{th}mth party (the last party to process the quantum state) of group 1 can maliciously replace the secret message with an arbitrary message without the detection of the other parties.