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Boston studies in the philosophy of science

Ontic Commitments of Quantum Mechanics

Edward M. MacKinnon

Published Jan 1, 1974• 5 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-94-010-2656-7_9

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The aim of this work is to study the ontological thesis defended by Ontic Structural Realism, which, in general, states that the ontological commitments should be focused in the relations and not on objects. This would be a more coherent realist stance towards modern physical theories. In first place we will study the ontological conception defended by the Ontic Structural Realism, which, broadly speaking, postulates that the ontological focus should be placed on relations rather than on objects. This, in turn, would constitute a realistic interpretation of the current physical theories. Secondly, as a possible defense to the position stated by Ontic Structural Realism, the concept of non-supervenient relations will be studied and it will be argued that it is this type of relations that acquires a fundamental character in Quantum Mechanics, as, for example, in phenomena such as the so-called quantum entanglement.

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This paper presents an interpretive boundary result concerning the relationship between general relativity and quantum mechanics under a closed admissibility framework. It argues that both theories are best understood not as competing ontologies or incomplete fragments of a deeper unification, but as projection regimes—distinct bookkeeping skins licensed over a shared admissible interior. The analysis is eliminative rather than constructive. It does not propose a unifying theory, new dynamics, or a reconciliation mechanism. Instead, it demonstrates that apparent incompatibilities between GR and QM arise from scope-relative representational commitments, not from ontic conflict. When admissibility, standing conservation, and reference stability are treated as fixed constraints, the demand for further unification collapses: each theory is shown to be internally coherent and mutually non-conflicting within its licensed expressive envelope. No new primitives are introduced. No procedural or operational framework is specified. The result functions as a boundary clarification, blocking a class of illicit inferences that treat representational artifacts as ontological commitments. In doing so, it reframes long-standing unification problems as category errors induced by projection overreach rather than as open foundational gaps. This work is intended as a structural constraint on interpretation, not as a program for further development. It closes, rather than advances, a line of inquiry by showing why certain questions are inadmissible once the boundary conditions of representation are made explicit.

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The aim of this work is to study the ontological thesis defended by Ontic Structural Realism, which, in general, states that the ontological commitments should be focused in the relations and not on objects. This would be a more coherent realist stance towards modern physical theories. In first place we will study the ontological conception defended by the Ontic Structural Realism, which, broadly speaking, postulates that the ontological focus should be placed on relations rather than on objects. This, in turn, would constitute a realistic interpretation of the current physical theories. Secondly, as a possible defense to the position stated by Ontic Structural Realism, the concept of non-supervenient relations will be studied and it will be argued that it is this type of relations that acquires a fundamental character in Quantum Mechanics, as, for example, in phenomena such as the so-called quantum entanglement.
Structural realism attempts to make a compromise between scientific realism and empiricism, by restricting our realist commitment to the relational structure of scientific theories. There are two main versions of the position: ontic, or epistemic. According to ontic structural realism, the nomological relations expressed by theories are the primitive entities of reality. This ontic version is motivated in particular by arguments to the effect that epistemic versions are not really distinct from mere empiricism. However according to some authors, it’s not clear that ontic structural realism can differentiate between physical and mathematical relations, and account for the relations between scientific theories and their experimental basis. These difficulties can be related to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics, which also concerns the link between theoretical models and experiments. It appears that epistemic structural realism is in a better position to respond to these difficulties. A compromise between both versions of structural realism could allow us to keep the advantages of both.
This paper presents an interpretive boundary result concerning the relationship between general relativity and quantum mechanics under a closed admissibility framework. It argues that both theories are best understood not as competing ontologies or incomplete fragments of a deeper unification, but as projection regimes—distinct bookkeeping skins licensed over a shared admissible interior. The analysis is eliminative rather than constructive. It does not propose a unifying theory, new dynamics, or a reconciliation mechanism. Instead, it demonstrates that apparent incompatibilities between GR and QM arise from scope-relative representational commitments, not from ontic conflict. When admissibility, standing conservation, and reference stability are treated as fixed constraints, the demand for further unification collapses: each theory is shown to be internally coherent and mutually non-conflicting within its licensed expressive envelope. No new primitives are introduced. No procedural or operational framework is specified. The result functions as a boundary clarification, blocking a class of illicit inferences that treat representational artifacts as ontological commitments. In doing so, it reframes long-standing unification problems as category errors induced by projection overreach rather than as open foundational gaps. This work is intended as a structural constraint on interpretation, not as a program for further development. It closes, rather than advances, a line of inquiry by showing why certain questions are inadmissible once the boundary conditions of representation are made explicit.