In this paper, we first construct a one-round Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol based on Ring-LWE.The security of our construction is based on the hardness of the Ring-LWE problem.Second, we adaptively extend our construction from Ring-LWE to LWE.Finally, we efficiently implement our key exchange protocols based on Ring-LWE and LWE.
Abstract. We use a variant of learning with errors (LWE) problem, a simple and direct extension of the original LWE problem to the case of a small secret, which we call a small LWE problem (SLWE), to build a new simple and provably secure key exchange scheme. The basic idea behind the construction can be viewed as certain type of bilinear pairing with errors (PE). We build a more efficient implementation of our scheme using a similar LWE problem but solely based on matrices, and we extend our construction further using the ring LWE problem, where the provable security is based on the hardness of the ring LWE problem. 1
The necessity of a secure key exchange protocol arises from the critical need to establish encrypted communication over an untrusted network. Over time, a multitude of key exchange mechanisms have been developed to counteract adversarial threats. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (DHKE) is one of the most widely used protocols for symmetric key sharing. However, this protocol exhibits certain inherent limitations that attackers may exploit. It lacks authentication mechanism and is susceptible to Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks and quantum attacks. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, we have designed a hybrid key exchange protocol combining DHKE with Learning With Errors (LWE), a lattice-based post-quantum primitive. This proposed protocol provides authentication via a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) together with CRYSTALS-Dilithium digital signature, resilience against MITM attacks, and robustness against classical and quantum threats. We have done a security analysis using the Dolev-Yao threat model, extended to quantum-equipped attackers, and showed that the protocol achieves mutual authentication, session key secrecy, and forward secrecy under the hardness of LWE and DHKE. Lastly, we provided detailed parameter recommendations based on NIST standards and shed light on side-channel attacks.
The only known threat to some symmetric cryptographic schemes like DES is Grover’s algorithm that proposes a square root speed-up over classical brute force algorithms. NIST [14] points out that if the key sizes are sufficient, symmetric cryptographic schemes (specifically the Advanced Encryption Standard-AES) are resistant to quantum computers. The development of quantum computer is on full pace, hopefully it might be available in a decade. Thus, it is necessary to develop efficient quantum secure public key cryptosystems to provide safe key exchange in quantum era. In this paper we presented an efficient implementation of a Ring-Learning with errors public key cryptosystem whose security is based on intractability of hard problem on lattices. And comparative analysis of proposed cryptosystem with RSA, ECDH and LWE based key exchange protocols is presented.
This note describes a key exchange method based on the ring-LWE (RLWE)
assumption. It builds upon several results, including Regev's
landmark quantum reduction from certain worst case lattice problems
(approx. GapSVP and SIVP) to random instances of the search variant of
a particular learning problem (LWE). It also builds on the follow on
work of Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev on the average case hardness
of the RLWE search variant for polynomially bounded numbers of RLWE
samples, along with novel applications of automorphism groups in
number fields for a RLWE search to decision reduction (thereby
demonstrating pseudorandomness of RLWE in these number fields).
Subsequently, these results were adopted for the construction of
Diffie-Hellman like key exchange methods by Peikert, and then by
Lindner and Peikert followed by Ding and then by Ding, Xie and Lin who
proposed efficient variants of such protocols. Subsequent work by
Peikert proposed another efficient variant, phrased as a key
encapsulation method, incorporating a low bandwidth reconciliation
technique allowing two parties to exactly agree on a uniformly
distributed secret value from noisy RLWE instances. This was followed
by a concrete instantiation with parameter sets by Bos, Costello,
Naehrig, Stebila, followed by another instantiation by Alkim, Ducas,
Poppelmann and Schwabe with the same ring polynomial but a smaller
modulus and a different reconciliation method. Unlike most other
public key cryptography based key exchange methods, it is believed
that RLWE based key exchange would remain secure in the event that an
adversary is able to build a quantum computer. This document is a
product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG).