Quantum computers can break the RSA, El Gamal, and elliptic curve public-key cryptosystems, as they can efficiently factor integers and extract discrete logarithms. The power of such quantum attacks lies in \emph{quantum Fourier sampling}, an algorithmic paradigm based on generating and measuring coset states. %This motivates the investigation of the power or limitations of quantum Fourier sampling, especially in attacking candidates for ``post-quantum'' cryptosystems -- classical cryptosystems that can be implemented with today's computers but will remain secure even in the presence of quantum attacks. In this article we extend previous negative results of quantum Fourier sampling for Graph Isomorphism, which corresponds to hidden subgroups of order two (over S_n, to several cases corresponding to larger hidden subgroups. For one case, we strengthen some results of Kempe, Pyber, and Shalev on the Hidden Subgroup Problem over the symmetric group. In another case, we show the failure of quantum Fourier sampling on the Hidden Subgroup Problem over the general linear group GL_2(\FF_q). The most important case corresponds to Code Equivalence, the problem of determining whether two given linear codes are equivalent to each other up to a permutation of the coordinates. Our results suggest that for many codes of interest---including generalized Reed Solomon codes, alternant codes, and Reed-Muller codes---solving these instances of Code Equivalence via Fourier sampling appears to be out of reach of current families of quantum algorithms.
Quantum computers can break the RSA and El Gamal public-key cryptosystems, since they can factor integers and extract discrete logarithms. If we believe that quantum computers will someday become a reality, we would like to have \emph{post-quantum} cryptosystems which can be implemented today with classical computers, but which will remain secure even in the presence of quantum attacks. In this article we show that the McEliece cryptosystem over \emph{well-permuted, well-scrambled} linear codes resists precisely the attacks to which the RSA and El Gamal cryptosystems are vulnerable---namely, those based on generating and measuring coset states. This eliminates the approach of strong Fourier sampling on which almost all known exponential speedups by quantum algorithms are based. Specifically, we show that the natural case of the Hidden Subgroup Problem to which the McEliece cryptosystem reduces cannot be solved by strong Fourier sampling, or by any measurement of a coset state. We start with recent negative results on quantum algorithms for Graph Isomorphism, which are based on particular subgroups of size two, and extend them to subgroups of arbitrary structure, including the automorphism groups of linear codes. This allows us to obtain the first rigorous results on the security of the McEliece cryptosystem in the face of quantum adversaries, strengthening its candidacy for post-quantum cryptography.
The Code Equivalence problem is that of determining whether two given linear codes are equivalent to each other up to a permutation of the coordinates. This problem has a direct reduction to a nonabelian hidden subgroup problem (HSP), suggesting a possible quantum algorithm analogous to Shor's algorithms for factoring or discrete log. However, we recently showed that in many cases of interest---including Goppa codes---solving this case of the HSP requires rich, entangled measurements. Thus, solving these cases of Code Equivalence via Fourier sampling appears to be out of reach of current families of quantum algorithms. Code equivalence is directly related to the security of McEliece-type cryptosystems in the case where the private code is known to the adversary. However, for many codes the support splitting algorithm of Sendrier provides a classical attack in this case. We revisit the claims of our previous article in the light of these classical attacks, and discuss the particular case of the Sidelnikov cryptosystem, which is based on Reed-Muller codes.
The dramatic exponential speedups of quantum algorithms over their best existing classical counterparts were ushered in by the technique of Fourier sampling, introduced by Bernstein and Vazirani and developed by Simon and Shor into an approach to the hidden subgroup problem. This approach has proved successful for abelian groups, leading to efficient algorithms for factoring, extracting discrete logarithms, and other number-theoretic problems. We show, however, that this method cannot resolve the hidden subgroup problem in the symmetric groups, even in the weakest, information-theoretic sense. In particular, we show that the Graph Isomorphism problem cannot be solved by this approach. Our work implies that any quantum approach based upon the measurement of coset states must depart from the original framework by using entangled measurements on multiple coset states.
Part I of this paper showed that the hidden subgroup problem over the symmetric group--including the special case relevant to Graph Isomorphism--cannot be efficiently solved by strong Fourier sampling, even if one may perform an arbitrary POVM on the coset state. In this paper, we extend these results to entangled measurements. Specifically, we show that the hidden subgroup problem on the symmetric group cannot be solved by any POVM applied to pairs of coset states. In particular, these hidden subgroups cannot be determined by any polynomial number of one- or two-register experiments on coset states.
Many quantum algorithms, including Shor's celebrated factoring and discrete log algorithms, proceed by reduction to a hidden subgroup problem, in which an unknown subgroup H of a group G must be determined from a quantum state
ψ over G that is uniformly supported on a left coset of H. These hidden subgroup problems are typically solved by Fourier sampling: the quantum Fourier transform of
ψ is computed and measured. When the underlying group is nonabelian, two important variants of the Fourier sampling paradigm have been identified: the weak standard method, where only representation names are measured, and the strong standard method, where full measurement (i.e., the row and column of the representation, in a suitably chosen basis, as well as its name) occurs. It has remained open whether the strong standard method is indeed stronger, that is, whether there are hidden subgroups that can be reconstructed via the strong method but not by the weak, or any other known, method. In this article, we settle this question in the affirmative. We show that hidden subgroups H of the q-hedral groups, i.e., semidirect products
Zq⋉Zp, where
q∣(p−1), and in particular the affine groups
Ap, can be information-theoretically reconstructed using the strong standard method. Moreover, if
∣H∣=p/polylog(p), these subgroups can be fully reconstructed with a polynomial amount of quantum and classical computation. We compare our algorithms to two weaker methods that have been discussed in the literature—the “forgetful” abelian method, and measurement in a random basis—and show that both of these are weaker than the strong standard method. Thus, at least for some families of groups, it is crucial to use the full power of representation theory and nonabelian Fourier analysis, namely, to measure the high-dimensional representations in an adapted basis that respects the group's subgroup structure. We apply our algorithm for the hidden subgroup problem to new families of cryptographically motivated hidden shift problems, generalizing the work of van Dam, Hallgren, and Ip on shifts of multiplicative characters. Finally, we close by proving a simple closure property for the class of groups over which the hidden subgroup problem can be solved efficiently.
Abstract The hidden subgroup problem (HSP) is a cornerstone problem in quantum computing, which captures many problems of interest and provides a standard framework algorithm for their study based on Fourier sampling, one class of techniques known to provide quantum advantage, and which succeeds for some groups but not others. The quantum hardness of the HSP problem for the dihedral group is a critical question for post-quantum cryptosystems based on learning with errors and also appears in subexponential algorithms for constructing isogenies between elliptic curves over a finite field. In this article, we give an updated overview of the dihedral hidden subgroup problem as approached by the “standard” quantum algorithm for HSP on finite groups, detailing the obstructions for strong Fourier sampling to succeed and summarizing other known approaches and results. In our treatment, we “contrast and compare” as much as possible the cyclic and dihedral cases, with a view to determining bounds for the success probability of a quantum algorithm that uses m m coset samples to solve the HSP on these groups. In the last sections, we prove a number of no-go results for the dihedral coset problem (DCP), motivated by a connection between DCP and cloning of quantum states. The proofs of these no-go results are then adapted to give nontrivial upper bounds on the success probability of a quantum algorithm that uses m m coset samples to solve DCP.