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Empty Diamonds & the Diamond Cutter Sutra: Mindful Reflections on Materialist Metaphysical Dogmatism II

Graham P. Smetham

Published Aug 1, 2012• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Whilst it is true that a great deal of the details of the experimental science which is presented in programmes presented by Cox, Al-Khalili and others is correct, the overall metaphysical perspective within which these details are presented is for the most part appallingly incorrect because they do not accord with the details of modern physics, quantum physics in particular. The metaphysical framework which underpins the general worldview of the programmes presented by both Cox and Al-Khalili largely corresponds to what Stapp refers to as a ‘known-to-be-false’ materialist perspective. The inappropriate materialist metaphysical dogmatism which underlies such programmes leads to some silly nonsense being presented without any challenge. This article cuts through the metaphysical madness.

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Whilst it is true that a great deal of the details of the experimental science which is presented in programmes presented by Cox, Al-Khalili and others is correct, the overall metaphysical perspective within which these details are presented is for the most part appallingly incorrect because they do not accord with the details of modern physics, quantum physics in particular. The metaphysical framework which underpins the general worldview of the programmes presented by both Cox and Al-Khalili largely corresponds to what Stapp refers to as a ‘known-to-be-false’ materialist perspective. The inappropriate materialist metaphysical dogmatism which underlies such programmes leads to some silly nonsense being presented without any challenge. This article cuts through the metaphysical madness.

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Whilst it is true that a great deal of the details of the experimental science which is presented in programmes presented by Cox, Al-Khalili and others is correct, the overall metaphysical perspective within which these details are presented is for the most part appallingly incorrect because they do not accord with the details of modern physics, quantum physics in particular. The metaphysical framework which underpins the general worldview of the programmes presented by both Cox and Al-Khalili largely corresponds to what Stapp refers to as a ‘known-to-be-false’ materialist perspective. The inappropriate materialist metaphysical dogmatism which underlies such programmes leads to some silly nonsense being presented without any challenge. This article cuts through the metaphysical madness.
Whilst it is true that a great deal of the details of the experimental science which is presented in programmes presented by Cox, Al-Khalili and others is correct, the overall metaphysical perspective within which these details are presented is for the most part appallingly incorrect because they do not accord with the details of modern physics, quantum physics in particular. The metaphysical framework which underpins the general worldview of the programmes presented by both Cox and Al-Khalili largely corresponds to what Stapp refers to as a ‘known-to-be-false’ materialist perspective. The inappropriate materialist metaphysical dogmatism which underlies such programmes leads to some silly nonsense being presented without any challenge. This article cuts through the metaphysical madness.
Whilst it is true that a great deal of the details of the experimental science which is presented in programmes presented by Cox, Al-Khalili and others is correct, the overall metaphysical perspective within which these details are presented is for the most part appallingly incorrect because they do not accord with the details of modern physics, quantum physics in particular. The metaphysical framework which underpins the general worldview of the programmes presented by both Cox and Al-Khalili largely corresponds to what Stapp refers to as a ‘known-to-be-false’ materialist perspective. The inappropriate materialist metaphysical dogmatism which underlies such programmes leads to some silly nonsense being presented without any challenge. This article cuts through the metaphysical madness.
In recent years there has developed a movement in the West which seeks to convince people that the original teachings of the Buddha were far more mundane than his later followers would have us believe. An extreme recent example of this is the book The Trouble with Buddhism in which Dr. Robert Ellis claims that every Buddhist who has ever lived has been ‘scandalously” confused about the central doctrines of Buddhism, especially the ‘Middle Way’ philosophy, which is a central teaching of all Buddhist schools. He also claims that if one takes Humean scepticism ‘seriously’, as he thinks one should do, it follows that it is impossible to know anything with any certainty. Metaphysics therefore become a ‘foolish’ dream. In fact according to Ellis it is “foolish” to think that quantum physics supplies “evidence about the universe itself.” This article considers Ellis’s claims regarding metaphysics and physics in detail, particularly focusing on the implications of the quantum violation of Bell’s theorem, in order to show that we must be sceptical of extreme scepticism.
Great revolutions in the study of nature in the past century have brought forth an onslaught of philosophical complications to the clarity of the classical perspective to which natural science was espoused prior to the twentieth century. The objective, intuitive principles by which we determined the reality of the world were beset by the ontological implications that flowed out of quantum mechanics and relativistic law. Wary of philosophical problems, a great number of the physical sciences lodge themselves in the comfort of empirical dogmatism as its only means of progression. But in light of the success of quantum systems, the ambiguity that buds must be taken into greater consideration. This paper discusses the background, development, objections, and interpretations of quantum mechanics and concurrent ontological premises to argue that such a philosophical tenet is inherent to nature, and, as such, is capable of producing results and predictions consistent with its physical and mathematical counterparts. To do so, the properties of measurement and the premises of causality are treated in terms of their physical terminology and foundations. The frameworks of Carroll, Everett, Heisenberg, Popper, and others analyze established interpretations and abstractions of quantum mechanics; its ties to the metaphysical and ontological descriptions of an existing entity are explored by means of the contrived spacetime allegory, which in principle determines the parameters that bound real systems. It is evident that ontological accounts for physical phenomena are not only viable and admissible but are necessary as our ability to describe the universe surpasses our ability to test and quantify these descriptions. These realizations allow us to better understand our world and move beyond empirical data when it is technologically unattainable, enabling us to build on statistical bases and approach the structure of realism through its essence of ambiguity.
Quantum Mechanics (QM) has faced deep controversies and debates since its origin when Werner Heisenberg proposed the first mathematical formalism capable to operationally account for what had been recently discovered as the new field of quantum phenomena. Today, even though we have reached a standardized version of QM which is taught in Universities all around the world, there is still no consensus regarding the conceptual reference of the theory and, if or if not, it can refer to something beyond measurement outcomes. In this work we will argue that the reason behind the impossibility to reach a meaningful answer to this question is strictly related to the 20th Century Bohrian-positivist re-foundation of physics which is responsible for having introduced within the theory of quanta a harmful combination of metaphysical dogmatism and naive empiricism. We will also argue that the possibility of understanding QM is at plain sight, given we return to the original framework of physics in which the meaning of understanding has always been clear.
We saw in Part I that in addition to explaining consciousness there is another hard problem for the modern scientific worldview – understanding what quantum physics is telling us about reality. And if anything this one is harder. In philosophy of mind there is at least consensus enough for an orthodox position to exist (materialism), and a widespread expectation that it will be vindicated by future neuroscience. By contrast, in philosophy of physics all sides understand that quantum theory is compatible with a variety of metaphysical interpretations, and have little hope that new empirical discoveries will settle the matter. But both problems are “hard” in the sense that, despite tremendous intellectual effort over many decades, no clear progress has been made toward solving them.