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Chinese Physics Letters

Asymmetric Model of the Quantum Stackelberg Duopoly

Xia Wang, Di Liu, Junpei Zhang

Published Dec 1, 2013• 8 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A more efficient model of the quantum Stackelberg duopoly is proposed by using the asymmetric quantization scheme of Qin et al. In this model, two entanglement factors α and γ are introduced, which greatly expands the functions of the previously reported symmetric one. By choosing proper values of α and γ, one can better manage the market, such as suppressing the first-mover advantage and enhancing the second-mover profit to avoid abuse of oligopolistic competition, and optimizing the total quantity of the products, so to overcome the deficiencies of "first mover always wins" and "positive quantum entanglement always reduces the total quantity" in the symmetric model. The proposed model here is believed to be a good tool for the government and the department to improve the economic efficiency and develop the market.

DOI
10.1088/0256-307x/30/12/120302

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A more efficient model of the quantum Stackelberg duopoly is proposed by using the asymmetric quantization scheme of Qin et al. In this model, two entanglement factors α and γ are introduced, which greatly expands the functions of the previously reported symmetric one. By choosing proper values of α and γ, one can better manage the market, such as suppressing the first-mover advantage and enhancing the second-mover profit to avoid abuse of oligopolistic competition, and optimizing the total quantity of the products, so to overcome the deficiencies of "first mover always wins" and "positive quantum entanglement always reduces the total quantity" in the symmetric model. The proposed model here is believed to be a good tool for the government and the department to improve the economic efficiency and develop the market.
A general model of the quantum Stackelberg duopoly is constructed by introducing the "minimal" quantum structure into the Stackelberg duopoly with continuous distributed incomplete information, where both players only know the continuous distribution of the competitor's unit cost. In this model, the cases with complete information, discrete distributed incomplete information, and continuous distributed asymmetric information are all involved. Because of different roles played by the total information uncertainty and the information asymmetry, the game exhibits some new interesting features, such as the total information uncertainty can counteract or improve the first-mover advantage according to the value of the quantum entanglement. What's more, this general model will be helpful for the government to reduce the abuses of oligopolistic competition and to improve the economic efficiency.
The minimal quantization structure is employed to investigate the quantum version of the Stackelberg duopoly with continuous distributed asymmetric information, i.e. the first mover has incomplete information that obeys a continuous distribution while the second mover has complete information. It is found that the effects of the positive quantum entanglement on the outcomes exhibit many interesting features due to the information asymmetry. Moreover, although the first-mover advantage is counteracted by the information asymmetry, the positive quantum entanglement still enhances the first-mover advantage and improves the first-mover tolerance of the information asymmetry beyond the classical limit.
In this paper, we investigate the influence of entanglement and decoherence on the quantum Stackelberg duopoly (QSD) game. It is shown that the first-mover advantage can be weakened or enhanced due to the existence of entanglement for the QSD game without decoherence. The influence of decoherence induced by the amplitude damping and the phase damping are explicitly studied in the formalism of Kraus operator representations. We show that the amplitude damping drastically changes the Nash equilibrium of the QSD game and the profits of the two players while the phase damping does not affect the Nash equilibrium and the profits of the two players. It is found that under certain conditions there exists a 'critical point' of the damping parameter for the amplitude damping environment. At the 'critical point' the two players have the same moves and payoffs. The QSD game can change from the first-mover advantage game into the follower-mover advantage game when the damping parameter varies from the left-hand-side regime of the 'critical point' to the right-hand-side regime.
Abstract This letter explores the quantum version of a Cournot duopoly game with general isoelastic demand and asymmetric production costs by applying Li-Du-Massar's minimal quantization rules, and it especially analyzes the existence region of quantum equilibrium, and the influences of quantum entanglement , difference in marginal costs ( k ) and elasticity of demand on the optimal profits of both firms. The results show that the existence region decreases with γ and k increasing. A larger elasticity of demand can destroy the profits of both firms. If positive γ and k are more favourable to the profits of two firms. If the first firm's profit increases with γ increasing for fixed k , but decreases with k increasing for fixed γ . The second firm's profit increases with k increasing for any fixed γ . As to the influences of γ on the second firm's profit, when k is less than a critical value, it increases with γ increasing, otherwise it decreases with γ increasing for fixed k .