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AN ENHANCED AND SECURE PROTOCOL FOR AUTHENTICATED KEY EXCHANGE

M. Prasad, A. Vinaya, Babu G. Satyanarayana

Published Jan 1, 2008• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

An enhanced authentication key exchange protocol was proposed to exchange multiple session keys between two participants at a time. This paper shows that this enhanced protocol is insecure under the known session key attack, known long-term private key attack, signature forgery attack, and replay attack. This paper also proposes an enhanced and secure key agreement protocol for exchanging multiple session keys in one run of the protocol. The protocol is secure against the attacks mentioned above. Besides, a formal proof is given to guarantee the security of the proposed protocol under other potential attacks. Keywords: Authentication, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, perfect forward secrecy, session key. 1.

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An enhanced authentication key exchange protocol was proposed to exchange multiple session keys between two participants at a time. This paper shows that this enhanced protocol is insecure under the known session key attack, known long-term private key attack, signature forgery attack, and replay attack. This paper also proposes an enhanced and secure key agreement protocol for exchanging multiple session keys in one run of the protocol. The protocol is secure against the attacks mentioned above. Besides, a formal proof is given to guarantee the security of the proposed protocol under other potential attacks. Keywords: Authentication, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, perfect forward secrecy, session key. 1.
Abstract An enhanced authentication key exchange protocol was proposed to exchange multiple session keys between two participants at a time. This paper shows that this enhanced protocol is insecure under the known session key attack, known long-term private key attack, signature forgery attack, and replay attack. This paper also proposes an enhanced and secure key agreement protocol for exchanging multiple session keys in one run of the protocol. The protocol is secure against the attacks mentioned above. Besides, a formal proof is given to guarantee the security of the proposed protocol under other potential attacks. Keywords Authentication, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, perfect forward secrecy, session key. 1.
Authenticated multiple key agreement protocols not only allow participants to agree the multiple session keys within one run of the protocol but also ensure the authenticity of the other party. In 2011, Dehkordi et al. proposed an identity-based authenticated multiple key agreement protocol. In this paper, we demonstrate that Dehkordi et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to impersonation attack. Furthermore, we have found that their protocol cannot provide perfect forward security or mutual security. Then we propose an identity-based multiple key agreement protocol which removes the weaknesses of the Dehkordi et al.’s protocol. Compared with the multiple key agreement protocols in the literature, the proposed protocol is more efficient and holds stronger security. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.itc.42.1.1381
Authenticated multiple key agreement protocols not only allow participants to agree the multiple session keys within one run of the protocol but also ensure the authenticity of the other party.In 2011, Dehkordi et al. proposed an identity-based authenticated multiple key agreement protocol.In this paper, we demonstrate that Dehkordi et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to impersonation attacks.Furthermore, we have found that their protocol cannot provide perfect forward security or mutual security.Then we propose an identity-based authenticated multiple key agreement protocol which removes the weaknesses of the Dehkordi et al.'s protocol.Compared with the multiple key agreement protocols in the literature, the proposed protocol is more efficient and holds stronger security.
The paper proposes a multi-party key exchange scheme with Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) which ensures that a session key derived from a set of long-term public and private keys used in the protocol to authenticate, does not compromise the secrecy of session key. In this protocol, each group establishes connection by communicating through a trusted third party. The trusted party acts as a group controller generates a public key and broadcasts it among the groups. Each group generate their public keys and send to trusted party. After receiving all the keys the group controller shares it among all the parties to generate the session key. Similarly, each group manager of individual group communicates with the members of the corresponding group. The security of the proposed scheme is analysed rigorously and proved to be resistant against non-repudiation attack, replay attack, chosen cipher attack, man-in-the middle attack. The scheme has wider applications such as, sending encrypted e-mail in a military environment to multiple users, securing submitted bids information in online tender, contract signing by many organizations, etc.
Authenticated key agreement protocol is used to set up the session key and establish secure channel for network communication in the open environment. So far, great deals of identity-based protocols have been proposed to provide robust mutual authentication and key establishment in the two-party setting. Majority of the existing identity-based key agreement protocols require expensive bilinear pairing operation and only provide limited security attributes. Therefore, such protocols are unsuitable for real-world applications that require stronger sense of secrecy. In this paper, we first analysis some of the schemes proposed recently, and then present a one-round ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol with enhanced security attributes, which doesn't need pairing operation and achieves most of the required security attributes, such as known-key secrecy, perfect forward secrecy, PKG Forward Secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience and no key control. In addition, it captures the enhanced security attributes-Known session-specific temporary key information secrecy.
In an open and distributed environment, authenticated key agreement protocol, as an important cryptographic primitive, is used to authenticate entities and establish session key in order to provide secure communications. Key escrow is essential in situations where confidentiality and audit trail are legal requirements, whilst perfect forward secrecy and known session-specific temporary information secrecy attributes are desirable to provide stronger security. In this paper, we give a cryptanalysis on the scheme due to Wang et al., which is based on the identity-based encryption scheme proposed by Gentry (Eurocrypt'06), and then present an enhanced secure two-party identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol. The new proposed protocol achieves most of the required security attributes and can be used properly in the escrow mode. Security analysis shows that it achieves the attributes of known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience and no key control. In addition, it captures the perfect forward secrecy and known session-specific temporary information secrecy attributes.