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Generalized secret sharing

Alexander Dibert

Published Jan 1, 2011• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this thesis we discussed secret haring for infinite secret domains. The first part of the thesis is devoted to the result by Chor and Kushilevitz. We proved an impossibility of secret haring over countable set of secrets and shares. Our result is slightly more general the the one by Chor and Kushilevitz. Also we gave several counterexamples which show an importance of assumptions in our theorem. Later we discussed possible definition of secret sharing over continuum set of secrets. Particularly, using the idea by Gabor Tardos, we constructed a scheme that shows that the definition by Chor and Kushilevitz is ”intuitively incorrect”. Namely, it is possible that an unqualified set of players can reconstruct the secret. We suggested a modified definition and showed that the positive result by Chor and Kushilevitz holds for the new definition. Finally we gave an introduction to Lebesgue-Rokhlin probability spaces and showed that a secret from such spaces can be shared. We suggest a further research in this direction. It seems that the converse is true. Namely, if a secret sharing scheme exists for a secret picked up from a probability space, then this space is Lebesgue-Rokhlin. As a short digression we presented a nice scheme for the situation when a secret is a branch of a binary tree(possible infinite). This scheme seems to be useful as it allows to compute several primitives on a secret without any communication between participants. In the last part of the thesis we presented our concept of perfect uniform non-probabilistic secret sharing, in which we avoid the idea of probability and concentrate on cardinalities. We showed that there exists a perfect uniform non-probabilistic secret sharing scheme for any secret domain and any access structure(possibly infinite).

DOI
10.60644/4875

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Secret sharing, which refers to methods of distributing a secret value among a group of participants, is a very important primitive in cryptology. This thesis contains some contribution to this topic. The results that are presented herein deal with two of the main open problems in secret sharing: the characterization of the ideal access structures and the optimization of the length of the shares. For both open problems, polymatroids are a powerful tool. On one hand, ideal\n\n\n\nmultipartite secret sharing schemes are strongly connected to polymatroids. On the other hand, the entropies of shares of a scheme determine a polymatroid, and because of that, they are fundamental in the search of lower bounds of the length of the shares. For the first open problem, some new and useful families of ideal multipartite access structures are found by using integer polymatroids. As a result the proofs for the existence of ideal secret sharing schemes for them are simplified in great measure. Regarding the second open problem, we present positive and negative results about the only known technique to find lower bounds: linear programming. The positive result are obtained by strengthening this method. The negative ones show the limitation of this method trying to improve the asymptotic lower bounds.

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Secret-sharing schemes are a tool used in many cryptographic protocols. In these schemes, a dealer holding a secret string distributes shares to the parties such that only authorized subsets of participants can reconstruct the secret from their shares. The collection of authorized sets is called an access structure. An access structure is ideal if there is a secret-sharing scheme realizing it such that the shares are taken from the same domain as the secrets. Brickell and Davenport (Journal of Cryptology, 1991) have shown that ideal access structures are closely related to matroids. They give a necessary condition for an access structure to be ideal-the access structure must be induced by a matroid. Seymour (Journal of Combinatorial Theory B, 1992) has proved that the necessary condition is not sufficient: There exists an access structure induced by a matroid that does not have an ideal scheme. The research on access structures induced by matroids is continued in this work. The main result in this paper is strengthening the result of Seymour. It is shown that in any secret-sharing scheme realizing the access structure induced by the Vamos matroid with domain of the secrets of size k, the size of the domain of the shares is at least k + Omega(radic(k)). The second result considers nonideal secret-sharing schemes realizing access structures induced by matroids. It is proved that the fact that an access structure is induced by a matroid implies lower and upper bounds on the size of the domain of shares of subsets of participants even in nonideal schemes (as long as the shares are still relatively short). This generalized results of Brickell and Davenport for ideal schemes. Finally, an example of a nonideal access structure that is nearly ideal is presented.

IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•May 29, 2008•20 citations
In this thesis we discussed secret haring for infinite secret domains. The first part of the thesis is devoted to the result by Chor and Kushilevitz. We proved an impossibility of secret haring over countable set of secrets and shares. Our result is slightly more general the the one by Chor and Kushilevitz. Also we gave several counterexamples which show an importance of assumptions in our theorem. Later we discussed possible definition of secret sharing over continuum set of secrets. Particularly, using the idea by Gabor Tardos, we constructed a scheme that shows that the definition by Chor and Kushilevitz is ”intuitively incorrect”. Namely, it is possible that an unqualified set of players can reconstruct the secret. We suggested a modified definition and showed that the positive result by Chor and Kushilevitz holds for the new definition. Finally we gave an introduction to Lebesgue-Rokhlin probability spaces and showed that a secret from such spaces can be shared. We suggest a further research in this direction. It seems that the converse is true. Namely, if a secret sharing scheme exists for a secret picked up from a probability space, then this space is Lebesgue-Rokhlin. As a short digression we presented a nice scheme for the situation when a secret is a branch of a binary tree(possible infinite). This scheme seems to be useful as it allows to compute several primitives on a secret without any communication between participants. In the last part of the thesis we presented our concept of perfect uniform non-probabilistic secret sharing, in which we avoid the idea of probability and concentrate on cardinalities. We showed that there exists a perfect uniform non-probabilistic secret sharing scheme for any secret domain and any access structure(possibly infinite).
Abstract. The motivation for extending secret sharing schemes to cases when either the set of players is infinite or the domain from which the secret and/or the shares are drawn is infinite or both, is similar to the case when switching to abstract probability spaces from classical combinatorial probability. It might shed new light on old problems, could connect seemingly unrelated problems, and unify diverse phenomena. Definitions equivalent in the finitary case could be very much different when switching to infinity, signifying their difference. The standard requirement that qualified subsets should be able to determine the secret has different interpretations in spite of the fact that, by assumption, all participants have infinite computing power. The requirement that unqualified subsets should have no or limited information on the secret suggests that we also need some probability distribution. In the infinite case events with zero probability are not necessarily impossible, and we should decide whether bad events with zero probability are allowed or not. In this paper, rather than giving precise definitions, we enlist an abundance of hopefully interesting infinite secret sharing schemes. These schemes touch quite diverse areas of mathematics such as projective geometry, stochastic processes and Hilbert spaces. Nevertheless our main tools are from probability theory. The examples discussed here serve as foundation and illustration to the more theory oriented companion paper [arXiv:1310.7423].
The study of probabilistic secret sharing schemes using arbitrary probability spaces and possibly infinite number of participants lets us investigate abstract properties of such schemes. It highlights important properties, explains why certain definitions work better than others, connects this topic to other branches of mathematics, and might yield new design paradigms. A probabilistic secret sharing scheme is a joint probability distribution of the shares and the secret together with a collection of secret recovery functions for qualified subsets. The scheme is measurable if the recovery functions are measurable. Depending on how much information an unqualified subset might have, we define four scheme types: perfect, almost perfect, ramp, and almost ramp. Our main results characterize the access structures which can be realized by schemes of these types. We show that every access structure can be realized by a non-measurable perfect probabilistic scheme. The construction is based on a paradoxical pair of independent random variables which determine each other. For measurable schemes we have the following complete characterization. An access structure can be realized by a (measurable) perfect, or almost perfect scheme if and only if the access structure, as a subset of the Sierpiński space {0, 1} P, is open, if and only if it can be realized by a span program. The access structure can be realized by a (measurable) ramp or almost ramp scheme if and only if the access structure is a Gδ set (intersection of countably many open sets) in the Sierpiński topology, if and only if it can be realized by a Hilbert-space program.
A probabilistic secret sharing scheme is a joint probability distribution of the shares and the secret together with a collection of secret recovery functions.The study of schemes using arbitrary probability spaces and unbounded number of participants allows us to investigate their abstract properties, to connect the topic to other branches of mathematics, and to discover new design paradigms.A scheme is perfect if unqualified subsets have no information on the secret, that is, their total share is independent of the secret.By relaxing this security requirement, three other scheme types are defined.Our first result is that every (infinite) access structure can be realized by a perfect scheme where the recovery functions are non-measurable.The construction is based on a paradoxical pair of independent random variables which determine each other.Restricting the recovery functions to be measurable ones, we give a complete characterization of access structures realizable by each type of the schemes.In addition, either a vector-space or a Hilbert-space based scheme is constructed realizing the access structure.While the former one uses the traditional uniform distributions, the latter one uses Gaussian distributions, leading to a new design paradigm.
Secret sharing, which refers to methods of distributing a secret value among a group of participants, is a very important primitive in cryptology. This thesis contains some contribution to this topic. The results that are presented herein deal with two of the main open problems in secret sharing: the characterization of the ideal access structures and the optimization of the length of the shares. For both open problems, polymatroids are a powerful tool. On one hand, ideal\n\n\n\nmultipartite secret sharing schemes are strongly connected to polymatroids. On the other hand, the entropies of shares of a scheme determine a polymatroid, and because of that, they are fundamental in the search of lower bounds of the length of the shares. For the first open problem, some new and useful families of ideal multipartite access structures are found by using integer polymatroids. As a result the proofs for the existence of ideal secret sharing schemes for them are simplified in great measure. Regarding the second open problem, we present positive and negative results about the only known technique to find lower bounds: linear programming. The positive result are obtained by strengthening this method. The negative ones show the limitation of this method trying to improve the asymptotic lower bounds.
While classically cryptography is concerned with the problem of private communication among two entities, say players, in modern cryptography multi-player protocols play an important role.And among these, it is probably fair to say that secret sharing, and its stronger version verifiable secret sharing (VSS), as well as multi-party computation (MPC) belong to the most appealing and/or useful ones.The former two are basic tools to achieve better robustness of cryptographic schemes against malfunction or misuse by "decentralizing" the security from one single to a whole group of individuals (captured by the term threshold cryptography).The latter allows-at least in principle-to execute any collaboration among a group of players in a secure way that guarantees the correctness of the outcome but simultaneously respects the privacy of the participants.In this work, we study three aspects of secret sharing, VSS and MPC, which we denote by fundamentals, generality, and efficiency.By fundamentals we mean the quest for understanding why a protocol works and is secure in abstract (and hopefully simple) mathematical terms.By generality we mean generality with respect to the underlying mathematical structure, in other words, minimizing the mathematical axioms required to do some task.And efficiency of course deals with the improvement of protocols with respect to some meaningful complexity measure.We briefly summarize our main results.(1) We give a complete characterization of blackbox secret sharing in terms of simple algebraic conditions on the integer sharing coefficients, and we propose a black-box secret sharing scheme with minimal expansion factor.Note that, in contrast to the classical field-based secret sharing schemes, a black-box secret sharing scheme allows to share a secret sampled from an arbitrary Abelian group and requires only black-box access to the group operations and to random group elements.Such a scheme may be very useful in the construction of threshold cryptosystems based on groups with secret order (like RSA).(2) We show that without loss of efficiency, MPC can be based on arbitrary finite rings.This is in sharp contrast to the literature where essentially all MPC protocols require a much stronger mathematical structure, namely a field.Apart from its theoretical value, this can lead to efficiency improvements since it allows a greater freedom in the (mathematical) representation of the task that needs to be securely executed.(3) We propose a unified treatment of perfectly secure linear VSS and distributed commitments (a weaker version of the former), and we show that the security of such a scheme can be reduced to a linear algebra condition.The security of all known schemes follows as corollaries whose proofs are pure linear algebra arguments, in contrast v to some hybrid arguments used in the literature.(4) We construct a new unconditionally secure VSS scheme with minimized reconstruction complexity in the setting of a dishonest minority.This improves on the reconstruction complexity of the previously best known scheme without affecting the (asymptotic) complexity of the sharing phase.In the context of MPC with pre-processing, our scheme allows to improve the computation phase of earlier protocols without increasing the complexity of the pre-processing.(5) Finally, we consider commitment multiplication proofs, which allow to prove a multiplicative relation among three commitments, and which play a crucial role in computationally secure MPC.We study a non-interactive solution which works in a distributed-verifier setting and essentially consists of a few executions of Pedersen's VSS.We simplify and improve the protocol, and we point out a (previously overlooked) property which helps to construct non-interactive proofs of partial knowledge in this setting.This allows for instance to prove the knowledge of ℓ out of m given secrets, without revealing which ones.We also construct a noninteractive distributed-verifier proof of circuit satisfiability, which-in principle-allows to prove anything that can be proven without giving away the proof.
Secret-sharing schemes are a tool used in many cryptographic protocols. In these schemes, a dealer holding a secret string distributes shares to the parties such that only authorized subsets of participants can reconstruct the secret from their shares. The collection of authorized sets is called an access structure. An access structure is ideal if there is a secret-sharing scheme realizing it such that the shares are taken from the same domain as the secrets. Brickell and Davenport (Journal of Cryptology, 1991) have shown that ideal access structures are closely related to matroids. They give a necessary condition for an access structure to be ideal-the access structure must be induced by a matroid. Seymour (Journal of Combinatorial Theory B, 1992) has proved that the necessary condition is not sufficient: There exists an access structure induced by a matroid that does not have an ideal scheme. The research on access structures induced by matroids is continued in this work. The main result in this paper is strengthening the result of Seymour. It is shown that in any secret-sharing scheme realizing the access structure induced by the Vamos matroid with domain of the secrets of size k, the size of the domain of the shares is at least k + Omega(radic(k)). The second result considers nonideal secret-sharing schemes realizing access structures induced by matroids. It is proved that the fact that an access structure is induced by a matroid implies lower and upper bounds on the size of the domain of shares of subsets of participants even in nonideal schemes (as long as the shares are still relatively short). This generalized results of Brickell and Davenport for ideal schemes. Finally, an example of a nonideal access structure that is nearly ideal is presented.