The bounded quantum storage model aims to achieve security against computationally unbounded adversaries that are restricted only with respect to their quantum memories. In this work, we provide information-theoretic secure constructions in this model for the following powerful primitives: (1) CCA1-secure symmetric key encryption, message authentication codes, and one-time programs. These schemes require no quantum memory for the honest user, while they can be made secure against adversaries with arbitrarily large memories by increasing the transmission length sufficiently. (2) CCA1-secure asymmetric key encryption, encryption tokens, signatures, signature tokens, and program broadcast. These schemes are secure against adversaries with roughly em quantum memory where m is the quantum memory required for the honest user. All of the constructions additionally satisfy disappearing security, essentially preventing an adversary from storing and using a transmission later on.
Information Theoretic One-Time Programs from Geometrically Local QNC0 Adversaries
We show how to construct simulation secure one-time memories, and thus one-time programs, without computational assumptions in the presence of constraints on quantum hardware. Specifically, we build one-time memories from random linear codes and quantum random access codes (QRACs) when constrained to non-adaptive, constant depth, and D-dimensional geometrically-local quantum circuit for some constant D. We place no restrictions on the adversary's classical computational power, number of qubits it can use, or the coherence time of its qubits. Notably, our construction can still be secure even in the presence of fault tolerant quantum computation as long as the input qubits are encoded in a non-fault tolerant manner (e.g. encoded as high energy states in non-ideal hardware). Unfortunately though, our construction requires decoding random linear codes and thus does not run in polynomial time. We leave open the question of whether one can construct a polynomial time information theoretically secure one-time memory from geometrically local quantum circuits. Of potentially independent interest, we develop a progress bound for information leakage via collision entropy (Renyi entropy of order 2) along with a few key technical lemmas for a "mutual information" for collision entropies. We also develop new bounds on how much information a specific 2↦1 QRAC can leak about its input, which may be of independent interest as well.
We initiate the study of two-party cryptographic primitives \nwith unconditional security, assuming that the adversary’s \nquantum memory is of bounded size. We show that oblivious \ntransfer and bit commitment can be implemented in this \nmodel using protocols where honest parties need no quantum \nmemory, whereas an adversarial player needs quantum \nmemory of size at least n/2 in order to break the protocol, \nwhere n is the number of qubits transmitted. This is \nin sharp contrast to the classical bounded-memory model, \nwhere we can only tolerate adversaries with memory of size \nquadratic in honest players’ memory size. Our protocols \nare efficient, non-interactive and can be implemented using \ntoday’s technology. On the technical side, a new entropic \nuncertainty relation involving min-entropy is established.