Abstract: There are many wonderful protocols in cryptography which are still waiting for their realization. Here we consider efficient solutions for secure electronic card games. Our contribution seems to be the first known practical implementation that requires no trusted third-party and simultaneously keeps the players ’ strategies confidential. The provided open source library LibTMCG can be used for creating secure peer-to-peer games and furthermore for some unusual applications, e.g., secure multiparty computation or simple electronic voting schemes.
Abstract: There are many wonderful protocols in cryptography which are still waiting for their realization. Here we consider efficient solutions for secure electronic card games. Our contribution seems to be the first known practical implementation that requires no trusted third-party and simultaneously keeps the players ’ strategies confidential. The provided open source library LibTMCG can be used for creating secure peer-to-peer games and furthermore for some unusual applications, e.g., secure multiparty computation or simple electronic voting schemes.
Online gambling allows users to participate in mental games and bet over the Internet. It can open new opportunities for casinos to make more money; however, at the same time, there are a lot of security challenges. In this paper, we describe our scheme for secure online gambling and secure mental poker protocols over the Internet based on our previous researches. Our scheme provides both the fairness of online gambling processes and secure linking of the online gambling with payment. A unique link between payments and gambling outcome is provided so that the winner can be ensured to get the payment. The gambling games are generic in our fair online gambling scheme. Mental poker is one of most popular games of online gambling. In this paper, efficient and secure mental poker protocols are provided. These mental poker protocols are based on multiple encryption and decryption of individual cards. These protocols satisfy all major security requirements of a real mental poker. The card salesman has been got rid of and the minimal effect due to collusion has been guaranteed. These protocols are more efficient compared with other known protocols. The strategies of players can be kept confidential with the introduction of a dealer. These mental poker protocols are suitable for implementation in an online card game.
Abstract Card-based cryptography is a variety of secure multiparty computation (MPC). Recently, a new technique called private operations was introduced because the protocol can be implemented with fewer cards than that by using the conventional technique called the shuffle. For example, Nakai et al. showed that if the private operations are available, secure computations of AND and OR operations for two inputs can be realized simultaneously by using four cards, and the protocol is applied to a four-card majority voting protocol with three inputs. This paper shows that only three cards are sufficient to construct a majority voting protocol with three inputs. Specifically, we propose two constructions of three-input majority voting protocols. One is a protocol assuming that players can announce their output, and the other is not allowed. Compared to Nakai et al.’s protocol, the protocol with the announcement is realized without any additional private operations and communications. On the other hand, the second construction requires two more private operations and communications because it removes the assumption on the announcement from the first construction. More importantly, the idea of the second protocol can be extended to an n-input majority voting protocol with n cards, which is the main result of this paper.
Card-based cryptography, as first proposed by den Boer [den Boer, 1989], enables secure multiparty computation using only a deck of playing cards. Many protocols as of yet come with an “honest-but-curious” disclaimer. However, modern cryptography aims to provide security also in the presence of active attackers that deviate from the protocol description. In the few places where authors argue for the active security of their protocols, this is done ad-hoc and restricted to the concrete operations needed, often using additional physical tools, such as envelopes or sliding cover boxes. This paper provides the first systematic approach to active security in card-based protocols. The main technical contribution concerns shuffling operations. A shuffle randomly permutes the cards according to a well-defined distribution but hides the chosen permutation from the players. We show how the large and natural class of uniform closed shuffles, which are shuffles that select a permutation uniformly at random from a permutation group, can be implemented using only a linear number of helping cards. This ensures that any protocol in the model of Mizuki and Shizuya [Mizuki and Shizuya, 2014] can be realized in an actively secure fashion, as long as it is secure in this abstract model and restricted to uniform closed shuffles. Uniform closed shuffles are already sufficient for securely computing any circuit [Mizuki and Sone, 2009]. In the process, we develop a more concrete model for card-based cryptographic protocols with two players, which we believe to be of independent interest.
Abstract Card-based cryptography is a secure computation protocol realized by using physical cards. There are two models on card-based cryptography: public and private models. We adopt private one that allows players to handle cards privately. While much of the existing works for card-based cryptography use two-colored cards, it is also a vital task to construct an efficient protocol with playing cards. In the public model, 2n cards are necessary for any n-bit input protocol since at least two cards are required to express a Boolean value. It holds true for both two-colored and playing-card settings. On the other hand, the private model enables us to construct a protocol with fewer than 2n cards. However, all existing protocols that achieve such properties are only in the two-colored setting. This paper shows that the private model enables us to construct a protocol with fewer than 2n cards using the playing cards. We first show two-bit input protocols with fewer than four cards for logical operations, AND, OR, and XOR. Furthermore, we show a three-input majority voting protocol using only three cards, which is constructed by combining our AND and OR protocols. Notably, our proposed protocols require no randomness. All operations are deterministic and depend only on players’ private inputs.
Abstract In the history of cryptography, many cryptographic protocols have relied on random coin tosses to prove their security. Although flipping coins is indispensable in this manner, the coins themselves have never been in the spotlight. Therefore, we would like to make physical coins rise to the level of cryptography, just as a deck of physical playing cards has been used to perform a secure multi-party computation. Such a card-based protocol is known to be helpful both to perform a secure computation without any black-box computers and to understand the principles of secure protocols. In this paper, we propose a new framework of secure multi-party computation using physical coins, named a coin-based protocol. One advantage of the use of coins is that they are more ubiquitous than cards. Whereas a face-down card can conceal the information about its face side, one side of a coin reveals the information of its other side. Hence, more careful design is required for a secure coin-based protocol than for a card-based one. We formalize a computational model of the coin-based protocol and explicitly give protocols for NOT, AND, COPY, OR, and XOR computations. We also discuss the composability of the extended protocols and how to implement them in practice.