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Lecture notes in computer science

Leakage-Resilient Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Public-Key Encryption from Hash Proof System and One-Time Lossy Filter

Baodong Qin, Shengli Liu

Published Jan 1, 2013• 58 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-42045-0_20

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We present a new generic construction of a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme secure against leakage-resilient chosen-ciphertext attacks (LR-CCA), from any Hash Proof System (HPS) and any one-time lossy filter (OT-LF). Efficient constructions of HPSs and OT-LFs from the DDH and DCR assumptions suggest that our construction is a practical approach to LR-CCA security. Most of practical PKEs with LR-CCA security, like variants of Cramer-Shoup scheme, rooted from Hash Proof Systems, but with leakage rates at most 1/4 − o(1) (defined as the ratio of leakage amount to secret-key size). The instantiations of our construction from the DDH and DCR assumptions result in LR-CCA secure PKEs with leakage rate of 1/2 − o(1). On the other hand, our construction also creates a new approach for constructing IND-CCA secure (leakage-free) PKE schemes, which may be of independent interest.

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In leakage resilient cryptography, there is a seemingly inherent restraint on the ability of the adversary that it cannot get access to the leakage oracle after the challenge. Recently, a series of works made a breakthrough to consider a postchallenge leakage. They presented achievable public key encryption (PKE) schemes which are semantically secure against after-the-fact leakage in the split-state model. This model puts a more acceptable constraint on adversary’s ability that the adversary cannot query the leakage of secret states as a whole but the functions of several parts separately instead of prechallenge query only. To obtain security against chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) for PKE schemes against after-the-fact leakage attack (AFL), existing works followed the paradigm of “double encryption” which needs noninteractive zero knowledge (NIZK) proofs in the encryption algorithm. We present an alternative way to achieve AFL-CCA security via lossy trapdoor functions (LTFs) without NIZK proofs. First, we formalize the definition of LTFs secure against AFL (AFLR-LTFs) and all-but-one variants (ABO). Then, we show how to realize this primitive in the split-state model. This primitive can be used to construct AFLR-CCA secure PKE scheme in the same way as the method of “CCA from LTFs” in traditional sense.

Security and Communication Networks•Oct 31, 2019•1 citation
We present a new generic construction of a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme secure against leakage-resilient chosen-ciphertext attacks (LR-CCA), from any Hash Proof System (HPS) and any one-time lossy filter (OT-LF). Efficient constructions of HPSs and OT-LFs from the DDH and DCR assumptions suggest that our construction is a practical approach to LR-CCA security. Most of practical PKEs with LR-CCA security, like variants of Cramer-Shoup scheme, rooted from Hash Proof Systems, but with leakage rates at most 1/4 − o(1) (defined as the ratio of leakage amount to secret-key size). The instantiations of our construction from the DDH and DCR assumptions result in LR-CCA secure PKEs with leakage rate of 1/2 − o(1). On the other hand, our construction also creates a new approach for constructing IND-CCA secure (leakage-free) PKE schemes, which may be of independent interest.
The goal of this paper is to design an id-based encryption (IBE) scheme that can flexibly tolerate leakage bounds, by only increasing the size of secret key proportionally, and the security level can be achieved to be against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA). As our main technical tool for CCA security, we introduce an initiation of all-but-one lossy filter, which is a simple version of all-but-many lossy filter to the leakage resilient settings. As our main result, we use the all-but-one lossy filter to construct an IBE scheme that is secure against leakage resilient chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA), and the leakage rate is 1/2 − ο(1).
In leakage resilient cryptography, there is a seemingly inherent restraint on the ability of the adversary that it cannot get access to the leakage oracle after the challenge. Recently, a series of works made a breakthrough to consider a postchallenge leakage. They presented achievable public key encryption (PKE) schemes which are semantically secure against after-the-fact leakage in the split-state model. This model puts a more acceptable constraint on adversary’s ability that the adversary cannot query the leakage of secret states as a whole but the functions of several parts separately instead of prechallenge query only. To obtain security against chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) for PKE schemes against after-the-fact leakage attack (AFL), existing works followed the paradigm of “double encryption” which needs noninteractive zero knowledge (NIZK) proofs in the encryption algorithm. We present an alternative way to achieve AFL-CCA security via lossy trapdoor functions (LTFs) without NIZK proofs. First, we formalize the definition of LTFs secure against AFL (AFLR-LTFs) and all-but-one variants (ABO). Then, we show how to realize this primitive in the split-state model. This primitive can be used to construct AFLR-CCA secure PKE scheme in the same way as the method of “CCA from LTFs” in traditional sense.